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Howard University

**The Correlation Between The Strategic Security Environment and
Extent of Weapons Acquisition: A Theoretical Reformulation of
Competing Theories in International Security**

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of the
Graduate School of Arts and Sciences

of

Howard University

in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

By

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Washington, D.C.
May 2000

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
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
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
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
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DEDICATION

To the most special people in my life, especially Bidemi, April, Moyin, Nathaniel, Samuel, Ladi, Simi, Remi, Kehinde, Idowu, Alaba, my father, Chief Pius Ojo Apelua, and the memory of my beloved mother, Mrs Amina Olaitan Ojo.

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the fundamental causes of arms acquisition and tests the relationship between security and arms buildup. The author formulated a post-structural theoretical framework of what constitutes the strategic security environment by unifying competing concepts, in pursuit of a contemporary and broadly accepted notion of causes of insecurity. The framework was empirically applied to three specific cases: Pre- and Post apartheid South Africa and the state of Israel.

This investigation of weapons acquisition and its relationship to a particular security environment is shaped by a careful review of the theoretical literature on security, national defense and interest, and on the empirical data derived from the three cases identified above.

The study identifies six causal variables that are pertinent in explaining the relationship of a country's security environment and its pattern of weapons acquisition. They are: (1) the neorealist structural anarchy; (2) historical circumstances; (3) demographic composition; (4) geopolitics; (5) national motivations; and (6) norms and identity. The theoretical and empirical evidence utilized in this dissertation affirm two central hypotheses: (a) that an unstable or threatening environment does not enhance a state's quest for security but instead propels it toward aggressive/chronic weapons acquisition; and (b) without ameliorating or eliminating the causes of insecurity in a state's strategic security environment, the realization of regional or global arms control seems unattainable. The historical evidence also shows that neither armament, which sometimes metastasize the problem of insecurity, nor arms control has ensured sustainable security. This study, therefore, concludes that to prevent war and guarantee long-term security, the (state/non-state) causations of distrust, threat, and instability must be addressed.

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ACRONYMS

ANC	African National Congress
AIDS	Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
ARMSCOR	State Armaments Corporation
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COSATU	The Congress of South Africa Trade Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
DV	Dependent Variable
EC	European Community
ESC	External Security Climate
EWA	Extent of Weapons Acquisition
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
GNP	Gross National Product
HIV	Human Immuno-deficiency Virus
IACO	International Arms Control Objectives
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IISS	International Institute For Strategic Studies
INF	Intermediate Nuclear Forces
IR	International Relations
ISC	Internal Security Climate
ISDSC	Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
IV	Independent Variable

MIRV	Multiple Independently Re-entry Vehicles
MNCs	Multinational Corporations
MPLA	The Movement for the Total Independence of Angola
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (Weapons)
NDPP	National Defence Planning Process
NGOs	Non-governmental Organizations
NPT	Non-proliferation Treaty
OAU	Organization for African Unity
PAC	Pan-Africanist Congress
RDP	Reconstruction and Development Programme
SACU	Southern African Customs Union
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SADCC	Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF	South African Defence Force
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAP	South African Police
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SSE	Strategic Security Environment
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWAPO	South West Africa Peoples Organization
TMS	Total Mobilizable Strength
TS	Total Strength
UDF	United Democratic Force

UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNSCP	United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
USA	The United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWI	World War One
WWII	World War Two
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African's People's Union

Chapter 1

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

A systematic review of arms acquisitions by nation-states since World War II (WWII) reveals recurring patterns in the types of weapons sought as well as the purposes for which they are acquired. Thus, the United States, admittedly the most armed nation, has a different reason to engage in arms buildup than Switzerland or France. While Switzerland would arm itself to maintain its neutrality and France does so to assure strategic flexibility, the United States has an entirely different purpose: it seeks to retain unchallenged strategic superiority for the foreseeable future. Other major and minor states may have geography-related reasons to arm themselves. Though military policies vary from state to state, the empirical evidence suggests the existence of certain patterns in pursuit of armaments. Such patterns become more evident when the relationship between security and weapons is subjected to a holistic analysis that allows consideration of those factors that, collectively, constitute the security environment of a given state. The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, will be to develop an analytical model, which will incorporate pertinent variables that may explain whether a relationship exists between a state's security environment and the level of militarization or arms acquisitions. More specifically, the author will focus on the causal relationship between external and internal threats and the levels of weapons acquisitions.

However, the development of an holistic approach and the search for causal links between security and arms would require a critique of the existing theoretical models that have shaped strategic thinking since the end of the Cold War, but which have yet to jell into a coherent theory. Collectively, these models do provide solid foundations for the

development of new approaches to international security and will guide the author's efforts in a dissertation that has a more modest goal: the development of a model that explains weapons acquisitions pattern only, via those variables that link a state's security environment to its arms policies.

To fulfil this goal, two crucial steps shall be taken: first, a theoretical analysis of rationale for weapons acquisitions and link such to the strategic environment. Second, empirical analyses would be conducted to illustrate the relationship. Yet our focus is on military security, which concerns 'physical survival,' and engulfs both traditional and nontraditional security issues which when ill-managed, might lead to war fighting.¹ Although non-military security issues such as economic, political, social, and environmental elements often lead to military disputes, they do not always concern physical survival of an international actor.

At the level of abstraction, a theoretical reconstruction of what constitutes the post Cold War military aspect of security environment (i.e. the strategic security environment (SSE)), shall be carried out. As utilized in this study, the strategic security environment is defined as a combination of the internal security climate (ISC) and the external security climate (ESC) which harbor states' strategic interests relative to their physical survival, and national motivations. The author assumes that the SSE also harbors multidimensional causations of insecurity, which emanate threats that confront these interests. Given this dual nature, the strategic security environment can be stable or unstable. However, and

¹ Structural realists like Kenneth Waltz argue that while states goals might range from survival to global domination, their first concern is with maximizing security. In the state of anarchy, security is the highest end. See Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1979) p. 91; 126; Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and The Expansion of War Aims," *Security Studies*, 6.4 (Summer 1997): 8. In fact, Waltz argues that security and not power is the ultimate concern of state. See Kenneth Waltz, "The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory," in Robert Rotberg and

unlike neorealist definitions of international system, many of which are too broad to be useful, the SSE is changeable and can be modified by ameliorating or eliminating the primary causes of insecurity. Rather than adopting the neorealist international environment which looks at conflict through the window of anarchy that towers over states' behavior, the SSE is defined by six specific causal variables, namely: historical circumstances, demographic circumstances, geopolitics, national goals and ambitions, anarchy, and norms and identity. Explaining the causal character of these variables in the context of both the internal and external security climates constitutes a core objective of the theoretical reconstruction exercise undertaken here.

Though the critique of existing theoretical models constitutes a major part of this dissertation, the author believes that his arguments can best be defended by empirically tracing the patterns of weapons acquisition of two states whose historical experiences differ but would show parallel paths in weapons acquisition: Israel and South Africa (pre and post-apartheid era). Hence, an empirical analysis shall be utilized to substantiate the theoretical assertion.

These two states have been selected for the following reasons: Israel offers a good example of a state that seeks weapons to fend off **external** threats to its security, while South Africa (apartheid era) did so to counter **internal** turmoil that predicated any external insecurity. Combined, these two cases will provide hopefully an empirical basis that would make possible the evaluation of the relationship between the **uniqueness of strategic security environment** and defense policies. Moreover, post-apartheid South

Theodore Rabb, *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 15-38.

Africa also provides an opportunity to consider whether changes in its domestic security environment have altered its arms acquisition patterns.

Since the end of the Second World War, military insecurity was viewed essentially as external in origin and the core values that states sought to defend (e.g. sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence) were clearly understood. However, the perceptions and reality of security have changed dramatically as the millennium comes to a close. Now, insecurity is increasingly seen as emanating mostly from internal causes. Yet most studies on the subject remain wedded to approaches developed since the end of World War II and still reflect the conceptual problems that were inherited from the era of bi-polarity. It is generally agreed that, since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, traditional measures to enhance security seem anachronistic because they hardly accounted for threats originating from sub-state actors, i.e. cross-national terrorism, massive refugee and migration flows, ethnic insurgencies, civil war and the like.

Neither small nor big states are immune to the new threats to stability that have caught both security analysts and practitioners in limbo. Security issues, if explained in the context of the Cold War paradigm, would raise analytical concerns in the post-Cold War period for one simple reason: past assumptions of what constitutes security are limited by the time of their formulation (Cold War) and, at a minimum, require a dispassionate re-evaluation.

This dissertation attempts to address the theoretical and conceptual issues that the systemic transformation has brought about with the end of a bipolar world order. To do this, it will attempt to reformulate along causal-effect lines of the theoretical premises of

neorealism (the dominant paradigm in international relations theory) that underpin its central assumption about insecurity and its causes.

Neorealists attribute the causes of insecurity to the structure of the international environment. This study will consider whether this assumption is still useful and, if not, whether the strategic security environment of a given country is the main source of its own level of insecurity and by extension of world peace. The reasons for this undertaking will become obvious as we develop a critique of the dominant models of security. The central hypothesis in this research project is the following: the SSE, that comprises of both the strategic interests on the one hand, and internal and external threats on the other, dictates a country's level of weapons acquisition.

Purpose of Study

In their quest for security three patterns of behavior are prevalent among states. First, individual nation-states give priority to competitive arms buildup and alliance formation. This in turn militarizes inter-state political code of conduct. Aggressive states with unstable security environments tend to do this to the extreme. Second, the realization that this first behavior causes a security dilemma² leads to the adoption of arms control as a formal or tacit means of attaining security at the international level. In most respects, however, the realization of international arms control objectives has been elusive. Finally, the approach that is most important, but which is given the least attention in the efforts to guarantee security, is addressing the primary source of fear, distrust and insecurity in the state's security environment. This last pattern, which could

² For the dynamics of security dilemma, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under Security dilemma," *World Politics*, 30.2 (January 1978).

have been given the utmost priority, unfortunately, is largely overlooked and is given attention only after the first two approaches have failed. The problem, thus, is that two carts are placed before the horse. The horse being the security environment, particularly the SSE, and the carts, competitive armament acquisition and arms control regime.

Studies in the field of international security show that the probable number of war casualties caused by military weaponry (technology) both in terms of quantity and quality make the physical survival of the world citizens less assured. According to William Eckhardt of the World Watch Institute, in his study of two milleniums of war (i.e. from first to twentieth centuries), about 149 million people have died in wars since the first century. But over 100 million of these deaths occurred in the twentieth century. In fact Eckhardt shows that “war deaths jumped from 3.2 deaths per 1,000 population in the sixteenth century to 44.4 in the twentieth.”³ Out of this, World War I (1914-1918) claimed 26 million lives, and World War II (1939-1945), 53.547 million.⁴ From national perspectives, Robert C. Johansen opines, “One’s own preparation for war easily appear to have a positive utility that from a global perspective they appear to lack.”⁵ Whether weapons are acquired to defend against attack or launch aggression, their chronic acquisition may exaggerate insecurity at all levels. History shows the fallacy of this pattern.

Since 1945, humankind has devoted an unprecedented amount of productive skills

³ “Two Millenium of Wars, *Washington Post*, (Saturday March 13, 1999): A13. Also see World Watch Institute; William Eckhardt, “War-Related Deaths Since 3000 B.C.”, *Bulleting of Peace Proposals*, December 1991; Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1996.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Robert C. Johansen, “Do Preparations for War Increase or Decrease International Security?” in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Ed. *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 229.

and energies to military purposes than ever before. On the average, Johansen observes, the resources devoted to armament acquisition endeavors in the 1980s have been more than ten times larger than those from 1925 to 1938.⁶ In 1913, the world spent 0.3 to 3.5 percent of its overall output on war preparation. In the years between 1950 to 1970, it increased to 7 - 8 percent. By the 1980s, it leveled off to about 6 percent; “an amount greater than the total income of the poorest half of the world’s people.”⁷ Yet the conditions that cause violence remain untackled and neglected because the resources have been devoted to the wrong curative mechanism.

The post World War II era militarization and the resulting military competition between the two superpowers militarized the international political code of conduct, virtually in every corner of the globe, and simultaneously eroded the normative constraints on the use of force.⁸ Johansen is one of many scholars/analysts who tender plausible arguments that chronic weapons acquisition system is a contributing cause of war.⁹ Not only has it induced competition that led to security dilemmas among states and made war more likely, it also makes swift and massive destruction likely. Habitual weapons acquisition, which enhances military technological revolution, makes it difficult to defend against advanced modern technology.¹⁰ If, as Johansen argues, even modest preparations make war more likely, then why do states prepare for war continuously even during peacetime? This is a theme that will be developed in this dissertation.

⁶ Johansen 1991, p. 236.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 236 - 7.

⁸ Ibid. , p. 235.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Arms control, as a measure to assuring security, has not been successful either.¹¹

The repeated failures of states to comply with their arms control limitations might attest to the argument that chronic weapons acquisition by them is indicative of the overall inconsequential impact of arms control on global stability. Experience shows that pervasive militarization legitimizes military preparedness as a desirable norm.¹²

This study has established that arms control failure flows from the same reason why states seek security by armaments. As long as a state's SSE is unstable and insecure, that state's motivation for armament acquisition would remain strong and its adherence to international arms control objectives would be generally poor. Failure to address sources of insecurity and threats in the context of states' strategic security environment, thereby ameliorating interstate fear and distrust, would perpetuate both unrestrained weapons acquisition and the defeat of international arms control obligations and/or objectives.

Moreover, since it appears that chronic military buildups have decreased international security by legitimizing "an obsolescent, war-prone international system,"¹³ arms control objectives have also proven difficult to realize. This study, therefore, would suggest that addressing the primary causes of distrust and insecurity is the best approach to attain a viable world security or at least explain its absence. This dissertation also contends that the main source and causations of military insecurity, which gear countries towards endless weapons acquisition, is traceable to the strategic security environment. An extensive literature review suggests that by seeking security in the wrong places (i.e.

¹¹ Johansen 1991, p. 223; 233.

¹²The discussion of why arms control has not been successful shall be done in Chapter 7. See Collin S. Gray, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1992), Chapter 1.

¹³ Johansen 1991, p. 228.

chronic weapons acquisition and international arms control) without ameliorating the actual causal factors of insecurity can only escalate inter-state concerns into a malignant insecurity web.

On the other hand, by identifying the context in which the causes of insecurity reside, a link between the strategic security environment and extent of weapons acquisition becomes obvious. Marked differences do exist between states in a stable strategic security environment (e.g. post Cold War European countries, less-militarized cultures, such as Costa Rica, which has no army, etc)¹⁴ and those within unstable environment (e.g. the Middle East countries especially Israel, and apartheid South Africa, etc). In contrast to Costa Rica, for example, Israel's defence expenditures have been in the double digits from 1970 to the present, and in 1975 it climbed to 26.7 percent of its total GNP.¹⁵ Secondly, it is assumed that whenever an unstable strategic security environment of a state is transformed into a stable one, such a change has a diminishing effect on its desire to militarize. For example, in contrast to the situation under apartheid South Africa, the defence expenditure of post-apartheid South Africa fell by 53 percent in real terms since 1989 when it embarked on disarmament; and defence spending as a proportion of GNP has dropped from 4.3 percent to 2.1 percent over the same period.¹⁶

Primarily, the author assumes that the military security environment is the context which drives a state's action and behavior in international politics. Neorealist

¹⁴ Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Harper Collings College Pub., p.128.

¹⁵ See the 1970 to 1999 series of *SIPRI Yearbook Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

¹⁶ *SIPRI Yearbook* 1998, p.196; The International Institute For Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London: Oxford University Press, 1998/99), P. 237; David Silverberg, "The Morning After The Honeymoon," *Armed Forces Journals International* (January 1997): P. 50.

perspective, which offers the most relevant interpretations of interstate relations and international security, makes a similar argument. However, its conception of international environment is monolithically based on the idea of 'structure' particularly, anarchical structure. Anarchy characterizes the international arena which lacks a central authority. Also, neorealism is limited to one level of analysis, i.e., the external or systemic level. The Anglo-American dominance of the field of international relations/security leads to the neglect of internal security climates because their states have highly stabilized ISCs. Although anarchy protagonists (i.e. structural theorists including neoliberals) have no monopoly in describing and explaining the context in which international relations take place, there are other paradigms with differing explanations. However, like neorealism, none of these theoretical tools can adequately account for the causes of insecurity and security issues in the contemporary and changing world.

As such, the central purpose is to reconceptualize states security environment beyond the neorealist understanding. Based on the concept of strategic security environment, a unified theory would be built by integrating the aforementioned six analytical concepts, including neorealist anarchy, in explaining the source(s) and causes of insecurity. The effort here is not to achieve a particular mixture of these perspectives, but to arrive at a theoretical framework that can accommodate various elements of causal concepts from the mainstream and other germane perspectives in understanding crucial security issues and the causes of insecurity.

Beyond the theoretical reconstruction goal, the purposes of this study are to achieve the following objectives: (1) determine empirically, what role does a turbulent strategic

security environment play in eliciting unrestrained state behavior, especially in the habit of chronic militarization; and (2) demonstrate that as long as competitive security and mistrusts characterize the strategic security environments of states, the realization of international arms control objectives would remain difficult and elusive. Generally, therefore, the author intend to argue for the need to shift the focus from militarization and arms control to addressing the actual source and causes of insecurity.

Literature Review and Contribution to the Field

As an emerging subfield of international politics, international security literature is embedded in an ad hoc fashion in international relations literature at large. Theoretical orientation of security studies, as a distinct entity from international relations (IR) field, is at its nascent stage. Up until the present, international relations especially the neorealist perspective dictated the scope of security studies.

In the classical era, realism was the principal school of thought concerned with the causes of insecurity and war. States' struggle for power was identified as the major cause of insecurity and war. Like Thomas Hobbes, Nicollo Machiavelli and other classical realists, argue that power is crucial in human behavior.¹⁷ Hobbes contends that man has a "perpetual and restless desire for power after power that ceaseth only in death".¹⁸ To him, covenant without the sword are just words which cannot secure man. Man by nature is selfish, brutal, self-centered, ruthless, and insecure. In the *Leviathan*, he

¹⁷ Nicollo Machiavelli in Evan Luard, *Basic Texts in International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1992), pp. 130-135.

¹⁸ Thomas Hobbes (1651), *Leviathan*, Edited by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1946), p. 64; See Luard 1992, pp. 40-44.

propounds that insecurity causes man to seek self-preservation. In nature, Hobbes argues, there are three principal causes of quarrel: competition, difference and glory; all of which are relative to the quest for power. “The first, maketh men invade for gain; the second, for safety; and the third, for regulation.” He sees little chances of fundamental change in human nature and behavior, in the hostile environment he is destined to inhabit.¹⁹ Hans Morgenthau’s *Politics Among Nations* postulates that state interest are “defined in terms of power.” Interest is the essence of politics, and whatever can be utilized to control or influence others in the pursuit of national interest is power.²⁰ Generally, security issues and analysis in classical realism were state-centric, they focused on foreign policy.

Geopolitics, one aspect of causations in the external environment, is one of the most ancient and extensive traditions of realism. Students of geopolitics argue that without understanding the geopolitical setting, and the situation of state in it, it is impossible to fully understand the causes of threats to its security and hence the driving force behind its weapons acquisition behavior. Although it is largely rendered irrelevant by technology as a distinct theoretical position in international relations, most forms of geopolitics are types of realism, even before the term ‘realpolitik’ was coined in the nineteenth century.²¹ Realists often argue that the geographical location of a state conditions, if not determines their political behavior.

¹⁹ Luard 1992, pp. 40-44.

²⁰ Thomas S. Mowle, *When Do States Adopt Realist or Liberal Foreign Policies Toward Ongoing War? An Analysis Using WorldViews* (The Ohio State University, 1996), p. 22; also see Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations, 6th Ed.* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985), pp. 4-17.

Early geopolitical thinker, Thayer Mahan (1890), conceived of geopolitics to “stress the influence of geographic factors on state power and international conduct”.²² Despite their differing positions, geopolitical scholars like Sir Hatford Mckinder and Nicholas Spykman commonly contend that the struggle for better geopolitical condition is the cause of insecurity and war²³. In the contemporary world, Patrick O’Sullivan argues that geography matters in the relations among states, be they friendly or hostile. From the standpoint of man’s survival, the sphere of influence which rests on geopolitical circumstance is critical.²⁴ Therefore, states’ war preparation activities are seen as measures to protect and preserve or improve one’s geopolitical circumstance. This paradigm focuses on insecurity at the interstate level.

Similar to classical period, the Cold War paradigms pertaining to the source or causes of insecurity are confined within the dominant IR perspective. The Cold War principal school of thought, neorealism or structural realism (generally regarded as born in 1979 with Kenneth Waltz’s book), distances itself from the classical realist notion of the pursuit of power as an end in itself. However, it argues that states pursue power as a means to the ultimate goal of security, primarily, military security.²⁵ Neorealism is an environment-based theory which purports that the structure of the international system constraints states’ behavior (i.e. in their quest for military capability and behavior).

²¹ Daniel Deudney, “Geopolitics and Change” in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry Ed. *New Thinking In International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 91.

²² Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformations 6th Ed.* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 43; James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. *Contending Theories of international Relations: A Comprehensive Survey 3rd Edition* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 56; 58-64.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 58-64; 67-71.

²⁴ Patrick O’Sullivan, *Geopolitics* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), p. 1.

Whatever the state behavior that cannot be explained by the anarchical structure of the system, is trivia. In this analysis, the primary interest of a state is survival by warding off the threats that emanate from the anarchical environment. Under neorealist self-help condition, balance-of-power by the way of increased military strength or alliances, is the best way to guarantee security. Neorealism is a Third Image or systemic theory, wherein security is analyzed at the international or external level only in terms of structural constraints, unlike classical realism that focuses on domestic politics and foreign policy.

Another brand of realism, motivational realism, suggests an important causation of insecurity that should not be overlooked. Motivational realism is “best thought of as one strand of neorealism, alongside structural realism”. However, both motivational and structural realism are direct descendants of classical realism.²⁶ Motivational realism departs from structural realism in positing that structure alone does not cause insecurity and conflict. For conflict to occur, greedy states must be present; for a reason unrelated to security. A greedy or an aggressive state wants the benefits of the international system to be redistributed in its favor.²⁷

Randall Schweller, a reknown motivational realist, argues that not every state is merely interested in survival.²⁸ Some are interested in territorial aggrandizement,

²⁵Joseph Nye, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” *World politics*, XL.2 (Jan. 1988) : 241. This is a review article of Robert Keohane, Ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York; Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 378; and Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 268. Also see Steven Wayne Brinkoetter, *Ideorealism: Theory for the New World Order*, (Los Angeles; university of Southern California, 1996), p. 2.

²⁶ Andrew Kydd, “Sheep in Sheep’s Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other”, *Security Studies*, 7.1 (Autumn 1997): 115.

²⁷*Ibid.*, 116.

²⁸ Randall I. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?” *Security Studies* 5.3 (Spring 1996) : 90-121; and “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” *International Security*, 19.1 (Summer 1994) : 72-1107. Also see Kydd 1997, p. 115.

influence, power, wealth and so on. Classical realists like Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr too, argue that anarchy is not so bad in itself, without aggressive motivations typified by lust for power. As Charles Glazer points out, it is the 'greed' of states that makes anarchy dangerous, and the build up of their military forces is intended to overturn the status quo and prey on their neighbors.²⁹ Like neorealism, motivational realism is a system theory, which analyzes security at the international level but, with emphasis on motives rather than opportunities.

Although neoliberals contend that states have inclinations to cooperate especially with the aid of international institutions, they nonetheless accept some of the core neorealist assumptions, especially the claim that anarchy is the cause of international insecurity and states self-help behavior.³⁰ Beyond seeing causation at the international level (i.e. structural effect of anarchy) neorealism apportions some role to the domestic explanation as a causal variable. Michael Doyle builds upon Immanuel Kant's idea, and claims that democracies do not go to war against other democracies, while non-democratic regimes are prone to causing international instability.³¹ Despite being a formidable alternative to neorealism, neoliberalism has little impact on national security.

However, for Marxism, social causation is the root of insecurity. Marxism-Leninism views insecurity as a social phenomenon inherent in class society. Insecurity

²⁹ Charles L. Glaser, "Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," *World Politics*, 44.4 (July 1992): 497-538.

³⁰ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institution" in David A. Baldwin, Ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 85-115; Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique," in Baldwin, Ed. 1993, pp. 147-153.

³¹ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 2nd Ed (New York: Longman, 1997), p. 40; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics", *American Political Science Review*, 80 (December 1986): 1151-1169.

and war emerged simultaneously with class society and it will vanish when class society ceases to exist.³² Marxism addresses the issue of security at the societal level with an international implication for world revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie. In this context, the state itself is the enemy, and the root of class division is alienation as a result of the inequitable distribution of capital and ownership of property. Insecurity and conflict emanate from socio-economic root.

Contemporarily, critical theories in general (e.g. post-modernists, constructivism, neo-marxism, feminism, etc.) commonly argue that: (1) the basic structure of the international system is social and not exclusively material, contrary to the realist materialist tenet; and that (2) these structures influence actors' identities and interests rather than just their behavior. In their view, the social structure (e.g. norms and identity) of the international system is the cause of insecurity.³³

One post Cold War paradigm that has attempted to introduce a new approach that differs from those of the dominant paradigms in international relations is a critical theory called the constructivism. The constructivists utilize a sociological approach to analyze how social and political worlds function. Rather than being a theory, constructivism is an approach that is based on two assumptions, according to Jeffery T. Checkel. First, that agents and states' action takes place in an environment that is both social and material. Second, this setting accustoms human agents and states with their interests. However, the relationship between agents/states and the broader structural environment is mutual

³² L. Bramson and G. W. Goethals Eds. *War: Studies from Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 14 in Linder Julian, *On the Nature of War* (Farnborough, Hants: Saxon House, 1983), p. 9.

³³ Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, 20.1 (Summer 1995): 71-72.

where neither can be reduced to the other (as the neorealists tend to do).³⁴ Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein argue that while neorealists and neoliberals focus on material forces and their relative power, the constructivists contend that there is no *a priori* reason that realism will dictate social practices (e.g. culture, norms etc.). However, social practices will dictate material outcomes. In other words, the world is what we make of it and that norms have causal force in international security (or insecurity).³⁵ Norms, Checkel opines, are collective understandings, which shape an actor's behavior and define their identities and interests.³⁶ Just as there are good norms, there are bad norms (e.g. Cold World's) that cause insecurity among states. Constructivists address issues at both the systemic and domestic levels of security.

In the post Cold War period, various concepts have been utilized in an attempt to account and/or explain the contemporaneous cause(s) of insecurity and instability. Samuel Huntington, for example, elucidates that the clash between civilizations will substitute for ideological and other forms of conflict and will be determinative of world politics. "The fault lines between civilization will be the battle lines of the future."³⁷ However, the most salient forms of insecurity and conflicts have been domestic and occurring within civilizations since the end of the Cold War. As if in self-contradiction, Huntington himself concedes that conflicts could also occur within the same civilization, but he argues that such conflicts will be less intense and less likely to expand.³⁸

³⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "The Constructivist Turn In International Relations Theory," *World Politics*, 50 (Jan. 1998): 325-6.

³⁵ Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 33-75.

³⁶ Checkel 1998, pp. 327-328.

³⁷ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs*, 72.3 (Summer 1993): 22-49 in *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate* (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1996), p. 1.

³⁸ Huntington 1993, p. 15.

Apparently, he omits the fact that both WWI and WWII occurred within the same civilization and that they were both intense and expanded like wild fires.

James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul vehemently dismiss the structural realist fundamental argument and reincarnate the core and periphery paradigm. In addition to nuclear weapons, shared norms of economic liberalism and political democracy have enhanced the incentives for avoiding the role of military force in settling conflicts among the core states. Disputes between them would be settled through negotiation and compromise. On the other hand, the lack of shared norms, primarily economic interdependence, political democracy, and nuclear weapons which mitigate security dilemma among the core states, would perpetuate the linkage between wealth and instability/war at the periphery. The saliency of the incentives for territorial aggrandizement, and zero-sum contexts, which elicit beggar-thy-neighbor policies at the periphery, would be the source of insecurity.³⁹ Other scholars explain states' quest for security from different perspectives.

In refining the traditional balance-of-power theory, Stephen Walt argues that rather than states' balancing against states' power, states would form alliance to balance against (the most serious) threat in order to reduce their vulnerabilities. Walt's concept is state-centric and focuses only on states external efforts in their search for security.⁴⁰ Francis Fukuyama presents an hypothesis similar to that of Goldgeier and McFaul that the end of the Cold War is symbolic of the end of history; in which case, Western liberal democracy has triumphed over all other ideologies. That is, "the end point of mankind's

³⁹ James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post Cold War Era," *International Organization*, 46.2 (Spring 1992): 467-491.

⁴⁰ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press; 1994), pp. vi-vii; 263.

ideological evolution and the universalization of Western democracy as the final form of human government.”⁴¹ However, he argues that at the end of the twentieth century, the world is divided between a part that is in history (the periphery) and a part that has reached the end of history (core states). In this environment, utilizing military force in resolving differences has become less legitimate especially among core states. But conflicts will continue among and within states that are still in history relative to the lack of liberal democratic trend, typified by egalitarian and distributionist attributes.⁴² In essence, non-democratic regimes and principles would be the source of insecurity and instability among and between the poor Third World societies that are mired in history.

Currently, none of the mainstream or *ad hoc* concepts in the field of international politics and security can singularly and adequately account for the pertinent old, the new and changing world causations of insecurity and instability. In fact, none of the mainstream theories predicted the shift from the Cold World order, characterized by bipolarity and military rivalry, Communism versus Capitalism and alliances to the present world order that seems asymmetrically multipolar. Despite the awareness of theoretical and conceptual inadequacies at the end of the Cold War among students of security studies, and instead of integrating analytical tools towards cumulative theory building, the field remains polarized by islands of analytical claims. The existing paradigms in the field are either one-issue-focused, or when they address wide range of security issues, they fall short of arriving at any comprehensive framework that addresses security at all levels that are pertinent to the contemporary world.

⁴¹ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History,” *The National Interest*, (Summer 1989): 3-5.

⁴² Randolph J. May, “Revisiting Fukuyama: On the Struggle for Recognition, Aggression and Territorial Imperatives from the Beginning of History to the End of Time,” *World Politics*, 158.4 (Spring 1996): 193; Fukuyama 1989, p. 18.

Neorealism, the pre-eminent theory on security relies principally on a monolithic concept of structure and its anarchical structural constraint in explaining disparaging set of security issues in the contemporary world. While structural distribution of capabilities is dynamic, it is nonetheless predicated on static anarchical constraint. The only mainstream theory that seems multidimensional, neoliberalism, is not popular among scholars in tackling security issues and does not account for contemporaneous problems, either. On the other hand, the constructivist approach, which has attempted to free international security from the confines of international relations, focuses on empiricism at the expense of theory development.⁴³ None of the current analytical tools use a system analytic approach that horizontally and vertically addresses currently salient security issues.

In utilizing one of Waltz's three structural constraints as a point of departure for explaining the causal formation of the SSE framework, the author shall focus particularly on 'anarchy'. For Waltz, the three systemic attributes that generate structural constraints are (1) the ordering principle: anarchy or hierarchy; (2) the functional differentiation of its parts (which only comes into play in case of hierarchy); and (3) distribution of capabilities among the units.⁴⁴ A brief elaboration of these attributes is necessary.

First, when the subject of international relations and security is considered in neorealism, states are the primary actors. This means that the second principle, functional differentiation, which obtains only in hierarchical order drops out of the analytic picture. Although both state and non-state actors are treated as being pertinent to international

⁴³ Checkel 1998, p. 325; 338.

⁴⁴ Waltz 1979, pp. 103-104, Brinkoetter 1996, pp. 27-30.

security in this study, even then, many non-state actors fall outside the perimeter of hierarchical order of domestic politics (e.g. terrorists, dissidents etc).

Second, we are left with the question of why the third principle would not be emphasized. The origin 'of distribution of capabilities' among units lies in the ordering principle of anarchy. Without anarchy this principle does not exist. By focusing only on the anarchical structural constraint in this study, therefore, the third principle is implicit.

Out of all the three principles, anarchy is the deepest systemic attribute that generates structural constraints. It is the effect of anarchy that requires states to protect themselves through the use of material and diplomatic resources. As a causation of insecurity, anarchy is the main structural constraint that encourages military competition and thereby increases the chances of disputes and the use of force between states. Generally in this study, both structural and non-structural constraints are utilized to portray the causations of international insecurity. Anarchy is pivotal to Waltzian structural constraints.

This study makes some contributions to the field of international security, among which are the three below. First, as stated on page 2, the study seeks to build a unified and multidimensional theory that provides adequate explanation of the source(s) and causes of insecurity in today's world. In so doing the author integrates four existing concepts from various paradigms which are geopolitical condition, national motivations, anarchy and norms/identity, and two additional ones that are not commonly seen as causal in international politics and security. The two causal variables to be introduced are 'history'; and 'demographic composition'. Richard Schmitt considers history as a

process by which human beings repeatedly 'define' and 'redefine' themselves.⁴⁵ Thus, one can infer that Serbian definition or redefinition of who they are, as the rightful owner of the Kosovo Province, which they lost to the ethnic Albanians in a war 600 years ago, is causally historical, making the Kosovo conflict of 1998 partly historical. Demographic composition, a variable that is popular in the comparative politics theory of conflicts, has not been recognized as a major causal variable in international security. But in the context of post-Cold War conflicts, demographic composition has become a major causal variable that must be treated as such in security studies. Demography is utilized in the sense of population make up relative to its distribution, size, balance and sometimes the quest for identity. This variable is not only critical in understanding domestically originated security issues, especially ethnonational conflict, ethnic cleansing etc. but it is also applicable to understanding security issues at regional and even global contexts.

Second, by building a unified and multidimensional theory, this study intends to contribute to the endeavor of the development of international security as a separate field, consistent with the new problems and challenges in the Post Cold War environment. Third, both the existing and newly introduced variables are jointly utilized to combat the current conceptual and theoretical inadequacies by widening the levels of analysis vertically, and the range of causal factors and security issues horizontally. The theoretical framework for this study shall be based on the neorealist perspective as a launching pad, in conjunction with some concepts from the other aforementioned paradigms.

⁴⁵ Richard Schmitt, *Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p.25.

Theoretical Framework

Harold and Margaret Sprout postulate that international political milieu cannot be fully understood without acknowledging the whole spectrum of environmental factors, human as well as nonhuman, intangible as well as tangible.⁴⁶ No single concept or theory is capable of fully accounting for the contemporary international security environmental factors that drive states' behavior. Currently, a single level of analysis as is the case with systemic theories is insufficient for analyzing states security environments.

The central theoretical claim of this study contends that the state of the strategic security environment drives states' behavior in international politics; particularly, their weapons acquisition behavior. This hypothesis is inferred from the neorealist central assumption that it is the anarchical structure or environment that elicits states self-help behavior such as balance-of-power. The key independent variable, the security environment (i.e. SSE), and the key dependent variable, state self-help behavior (i.e. extent of weapons acquisition) in this study and in broad term, originate from the central assumption of the neorealist school. However, neorealism is a Cold War paradigm, and as such, its causal explanation is hardly adequate to fully understand the post Cold War security environment.

This study builds a post-Cold War or synonymously post-structural (or post-neorealist) unified and multidimensional framework. Before the central theoretical claim

⁴⁶ Cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr., p. 53; p. 76 n.1; Harold and Margaret Sprout, *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 27. The authors define environment as a generic concept "under which are subsumed all external forces and factors to which an organism or aggregate of organisms is actually or potentially responsive; or environment may be limited to the material and spatial aspects of the surrounding world, to the exclusion of the melee of human social relations." Sprout's definition of environment is similar to the conceptual launching pad of SSE. In the SSE, the state resembles an organism, in which case, the condition of the environment (i.e. SSE) to which the state responds, drives its international behavior.

in this study can be operationalized and tested, the concept of states' security environments, as conceived in neorealism, shall be reformulated, as the strategic security environment, in a manner that allows adequate analysis of post Cold War issues, and causes of insecurity. Neorealism sees the international environment, in the most part, from a military perspective. It does not acknowledge nor differentiate between military and non-military components of security issues. For this study, however, the security environment consists of both, although overlapping, yet they are treated as distinct for analytical purpose. The strategic or military security environment, as opposed to the non-strategic or non-military security environment, is our focus.

Neorealists analyze the international environment in which states exist narrowly through the window of anarchy, which is static. Relative to this structural immutability and its external or exogenous confinement, it is difficult for neorealism to account for change or include other pertinent variables, or consider the impact of domestic-level variables in world politics. Therefore, instead of analyzing the security environment from one window, there are other additional concepts from other paradigms that neorealist did not and could not incorporate. These will be integrated in formulating a post-structural paradigm. By taking neorealist central assumption as a point of departure, we shall account for both structural, and non-structural constraints and the causes of insecurity which drive states to behave in the way they do. Neoliberals utilize a similar approach by adopting the neorealist framework, in gross term, but apply it differently in its explanation of states behavior. Neoliberals accede to the neorealist claim that international environment is anarchical, and that anarchy dictates states' motives and

actions.⁴⁷ However, neoliberals diverge with neorealists on the nature and consequences of anarchy.⁴⁸ In a different and expanded manner, our framework shall utilize the neorealist central assumption that the environment (structural constraints) drives states self-help behavior (e.g. balance-of-power) only as the point of departure. But neorealist's Cold War notion of what constitute either the 'environment' or 'states behavior' is quite narrower and sometimes different from its connotation in this study.

Similar to neorealism but in broader terms, this study assumes that the strategic security environment drives states behavior. However, first, unlike neorealist framework, the SSE emanates both structural and non-structural constraints. Second, our concept of what constitutes states self-help behavior is broader and differs from that of neorealists. Instead of just simply balance-of-power, which is inter-state centric only, we argue that states balance their security needs and expectations, based on the assessment of the SSE, with military capability. Since states cannot balance against threats from non-state entities such as terrorists, they must be prepared to balance, in holistic fashion, against traditional and nontraditional threats with variegated and flexible military measures. Therefore, instead of one state balancing its power against another's, a state balances its perceived threat, holistically, with the appropriate military capabilities. In this respect, our framework can account for states' response to both structural and non-structural constraints from both state and non-state actors, respectively.

⁴⁷Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Studies Quarterly* 41 (1971): 7; see Axelrod and Keohane 1986.

⁴⁸David A. Baldwin, "Introduction: Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," in David A. Baldwin, *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) pp. 4-8.

Aware of the limitation and analytical inadequacies of the two mainstream paradigms, many students of international relations and security advocate the need to combine neorealism and neoliberalism.⁴⁹ Even then, there are additional variables and security issues beyond the reach of both perspectives. Neoliberals are guarded about domestic-levels variables nonetheless, neoliberalism sticks to its domestic roots by routinely combining systemic and domestic level-variables to explain international outcomes. However, to the present, despite being a formidable alternative to neorealism, neoliberalism has little impact on international security studies. Also, there are new sets of domestic level-variables such as insurgency, civil war, refugee issues, ethnic conflicts, etc. which have tremendous impact on the post Cold War security that neoliberalism does not address.

For the above reasons, this study would go beyond simply combining concepts from the neorealist and neoliberal perspectives, as advocated by some of those who support the endeavor of a unified theory within the field. To attain an effective analytical framework, this dissertation shall combine six concepts, that is, one concept each from six paradigms and sub-paradigms in explaining the causes of insecurity. Three of these causal variables are from the sub-paradigms of realism: anarchy (neorealism); goals and ambitions (motivational realism); and geopolitics (traditional realism). The fourth causal variable is demographic composition, and the fifth, history. The sixth variable is norms and identity (constructivism). In this post-structural framework, we shall view the state's strategic security environment from the prism of the above mentioned six conceptual

⁴⁹ Many scholars in international relations/security advocate for combining realism and idealism for a more adequate analytic framework. See Katzenstein 1996, pp. 523-528; for the lists of such advocates, see Brinkoetter 1996, p. 24.

windows instead of just one that is attainable from the neorealist framework. Because of the realist argument “that a single unchanging anarchic environment is a primary determinant of state interests and behavior appears to leave little causal room” for other variables, critics contend that neorealism cannot fully explain international outcomes.⁵⁰ The logic here is that neorealism cannot adequately explain international outcomes because (and therefore) its view of structural constraints are flawed.

The primary state behavior that neorealists focus on is the pursuit of balance-of-power. Rather than balance of power we shall argue that states balance their security and expectations with military capability. As such, militarization (i.e. the key dependent variable) epitomizes states’ self-help behavior in this study and contemporaneous military threats emanate from both states and non-state origins.

The neorealist paradigm has been criticized that it cannot afford to jeopardize its parsimonious attribute by integrating systemic and domestic variables. As such, its critics accuse it of retaining theoretical parsimony at the expense of explanatory power. Characteristically, neorealism is not deductively hospitable to domestic theorizing. Therefore, this study intends to reformulate the central assumption of neorealist security environment as the strategic security environment, which consists of not only the external security environment but equally the internal security environment component as well. Unlike neorealism, this post-structural framework would explain the danger posed to international security by non-state actors (e.g. terrorists, international organized criminals, ethnic and separatist movements etc) whose role have become palpable in

⁵⁰ Sterling-Folker 1997, p. 2; see also R. Rosecrance and A.A. Stein, Eds, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 5.

national and international instability. Both state and non-state actors are involved in conditioning the SSE.

The strategic security environment is the domain of states' strategic interests; particularly in the sub-contexts of internal security climate and external security climate. Strategic interests or synonymously vital interests range from the quest for physical survival (i.e. security) to the domination of others (i.e. aggression). It is the threat to the strategic interest or the absence of such, or the pursuit of such interest by the actors that condition the strategic security environment as stable or unstable.

Like neorealism, this post-neorealist framework is focused on military security. However, security conceived in military terms is inadequate in the post-Cold War context. For our purpose, the term security concerns physical safety, freedom from threats and protection from forces of change that are inimical to one's (individual or societal, regional, and extraregional) integrity and existence.⁵¹ Military security, Barry Buzan explains, involves "the two-level interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states' perception of each other's intention."⁵² Patrick Morgan contends that while everything might be relevant to security, "security is not about everything." In adhering to the classical definition of security, which narrowly focuses on military security, Morgan defines it as "the condition of being safe from outright military attack, in a system of separate, autonomous entities."⁵³ In this dissertation, military security involves a range of issues concerning strategic or vital interests that

⁵¹ Barry Buzan "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century", *International Affairs*, 69.3 (1991): 432-433.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 433.

⁵³ Patrick M. Morgan, "Safeguarding Security Studies," *Arms Control*, 13.3 (December 1992): 466; 476.

might readily warrant emergency or military actions, which when ill managed can readily lead to fighting.

Many theorists within and without the realist school have criticized neorealism for its narrow perspective and hence its inadequacy in accounting for contemporaneous security issues. However, none of these paradigms have been able to present a more efficient framework.

Similar to the neorealist perspective, the post Cold War paradigm shall utilize scientific and system analytic approaches as Waltz did in his 1979 work, *Theory of International Politics*. Like neorealism, this framework addresses the source(s) of global insecurity and instability (i.e. primarily, the SSE, and secondarily, chronic armament buildups or militarization), but in a manner that is more comprehensive and germane to the contemporary issues.

The monolithic anarchical international environment is the main cause of insecurity according to neorealists, whereas in this unified multidimensional framework, the six causal-chain elements that characterize the strategic security environment are the major causes of insecurity. The neorealist paradigm focuses on the nature of military insecurity in the post WWII context, our post Cold War framework focuses on military issues and insecurity in the post Cold War period. This framework would not be as parsimonious as neorealism however, it is not expected to pay a heavy price in terms of parsimony. In fact, its multi-level and multi-dimensional approach is expected to allow the framework more powerful explanatory capability than its predecessors, neorealism, and each of the other paradigms that shall be integrated in this cumulative theory building endeavor.

Causal-Effect Model and the Dynamics: A Systemic Analysis

Initially, modeling (as seen on page 32) is utilized to capture the main relationship between the variables in this research project. The logic of this approach is to depict parsimoniously, the framework in a portrait, by capturing the main abstract relationships between the variables. Qualitative analysis, which include abstractive and empirical analyses, is then utilized to do what modeling cannot do, establish the validity of causes and effects illustrated by the formal model, by testing the propositions of the model against evidence in various contexts. Here, the analytic rigor of a formal model is combined with the analytic richness of qualitative analysis.

Robert Jervis defines a model as "formal, often mathematical representation of variables and relationships in the phenomena that one is studying. Further, these variables and relationships are posed in sufficiently general terms so that they can be applied to a wide range of cases".⁵⁴ Models are parsimonious and omit large number of details that might be peculiar to distinct cases. The degree of rigor of the logic of propositions depicted by a model in social sciences is lesser than that in physical sciences. In our use of model, as in case studies, therefore, some conceptual ambiguities should be recognized. While the logic of a model is clear, it does not articulate the specifics of the outcome.⁵⁵ Our conceptual model is only a diagrammatic representation of how the variables relate to each other. As such, the model is neither the theory per se nor the empirical investigation to test it; it is only broadly designed to illustrate the analytic pathway of the study's conceptual and empirical investigation. It depicts the

⁵⁴ Robert Jervis, "Models And Cases In The Study of International Conflict" in Robert L. Rothstein Ed. *The Evolution of Theory In International Relations: Essays in Honor of William T.R. Fox* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1992), p. 66.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

causal dynamics of how a state behaves in terms of its weapons acquisition action relative to whether such state feel secure or insecure, in the context of its strategic security environment. The model reflects the relationship between the independent variables ($X(X_I, X_E); X_I$) and each of the dependent variables ($Y_1; Y_2$) at a glance (See Figure 1).

This causal model is similar, in broad terms only, to David Easton's systemic model, an analytic construct of a unified framework for political analysis that aimed at developing an empirically oriented general theory of politics. This similarity involves what Easton called the three characteristics that constitute the dynamics of any political system: inputs, conversion or 'black box', and outputs.⁵⁶ For Easton, inputs constitute new changes in the environment (as demands or support) which are forwarded to and processed in the decision-making center (black box), into outputs, or policies. Output is the response to anticipated demands in the form of decisions and actions. First, in this unified analytic conceptual model, strategic activities in the strategic security environment (SSE) can be equated with Easton's 'inputs'. Second, the national defense policy process (NDPP) is parallel to a vast 'conversion process'. Finally, the extent of weapons acquisition (EWA) can be interpreted as the 'output'. If an arrow were drawn from EWA or International arms control objectives (IACO) backward to SSE, it would constitute what Easton classifies as a 'feedback' mechanism, from outputs into inputs.⁵⁷ However, it is important to note that any parallel or comparison between this model and Easton's does not go beyond this point.

⁵⁶ James A. Bill and Robert L. Hardgrave, Jr. *Comparative Politics: The Quest for Theory* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America Inc., 1981), pp. 218-225.

⁵⁷ *ibid.*

Causal-Effect Systematic Model: Variables

●INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (IV):

●Key IV:

- X: Strategic Security Environment (SSE)

SSE consist of 2 contextual variables:

- XI: Internal Security Climate (ISC), and
- XE: External Security Climate (ESC).

●Intervening Variable:

- X1: National Defense Planning Process (NDPP)

●DEPENDENT VARIABLES (DV):

- Y1 : Extent of Weapons Acquisition (EWA)
- Y2 : International Arms Control Objectives (IACO)

It is important to note that this study focuses on the relationships indicated by the arrows facing the right side in Figure 1. That is to say, the variables influence each other sequentially and not simultaneously (by facing right and left).

In this model there are four variables that are involved in three types of relationships. The three relationships which are: (1) the dynamics of how the activities in the SSE (Context) are perceived via the NDPP (Process), (2) how such perception is interpreted to determine the EWA (Policy Action I), and (3) how EWA impacts on international arms control objectives (IACO i.e. Policy Action II). The variables briefly defined are:

Context:

The Strategic Security Environment or SSE (i.e. X) is a function of both the Internal Security Climate or ISC (X_I), and the External Security Climate or ESC (X_E).

Process:

The National Defense Planning Process or NDPP (i.e. X_1 or causal funnel) is a function of the SSE (X), which itself is a function of its two components.

Policy Action I:

The Extent of Weapon Acquisition or EWA is a function of the three independent variables: ISC (X_I), ESC (X_E), and the third NDPP(X_1). It acts as the human modifier on the first two contextual variables; that constitutes the SSE.

Policy Action II:

International Arms Control Objectives or IACO (i.e. Y_2) is a function of EWA (Y_1) and Z .

Where Z = an aspect of Y_2 that is not accounted for by Y_1 .

The first factor or variable is the 'context', that is, the environment within which nonthreatening or threatening activities that make a country feels secured or insecure, respectively, are taking place. As stated earlier, there are a total of six causal-chain variables by which the activities in the SSE can be read. These activities serve as the base for raw information or inputs necessary for national defense planning process. The context, that is, the Strategic Security Environment (SSE) is the key variable of the unified framework. It consists of two components, the Internal Security Climate (ISC) of a state, which reflects the level of internal or endogenous stability or instability in a

societal or domestic context; and the external security climate (ESC) which reflects the stability or instability, at the regional and/or extra-regional levels.

The second factor is the 'process' (or 'causal funnel' or 'human modifier') by which states perceive and translates the activities taking place within SSE and convert such into security oriented policy action, for example, in the form of EWA. The process entails the human or governmental apparatus which processes the inputs gathered from the SSE. Process, here, identified as the National Defense Planning, is the intervening variable in the framework, i.e., the intermediate factor between the key independent variable (SSE, as the domain of the causal-chain) and the dependent variable (EWA, as the effect). This is the causal funnel as such, because it reflects the effect of human factor on the causal character of the SSE and thereby shapes the effect, in the form of EWA.

The third factor, 'Policy Action I', is the effect or output derived from the inputs, that is, the result of strategic security environment activities which have been processed by the national defense planning body. Policy Action I is the implementation of decision made in the process of national defense planning. Policy Action I is the level of weapons acquisition toward state tendencies to match military capability with threat and/or potential threats and national motivations. The Extent of Weapons Acquisition (i.e. EWA or y_1) is the primary dependent variable, in this unified security theory.

Along with this primary dependent variable y_1 , there is a second dependent variable, y_2 , defined as Policy Action II (outcome). Policy action II helps deduce the impact of decisions that are made and implemented at national level based on ISC/ESC or SSE condition, on global arms control objectives, which are a regional and extra-regional phenomena. This second dependent variable enables this study to foresee how the

relationship between the strategic security environment and weapons acquisition dictates the level of failure or success of international arms control and/or nonproliferation regime objectives, in a state, a region or globally. The assumption is that Policy Action II, operating at the international level, is triggered by the 'effect' of extent of weapons acquisition at the national level. The dynamics here is such that the condition of the strategic security environment (context) is the 'cause' of weapons acquisition (Policy Action I), i.e. the 'effect'. And the relationship between the 'cause' and 'effect' leads to Policy Action II and International 'outcome'. In this dissertation, the theoretical utility of the model shall be exercised by testing two hypotheses.

Hypotheses

The author proposes to test two hypotheses, hoping to establish a link between the internal security climate, the external security climate and chronic weapons acquisition. These two hypotheses will be substantiated by an empirical analysis of the states of Israel and South Africa in order to provide evidence(s) that the correlation between the strategic security environment and extent of weapons acquisition is not spurious but in fact causal.

Hypothesis I: Unstable or threatening Strategic Security Environment does not enhance a state's quest for national security, but gravitates it towards aggressive/chronic weapons acquisition.

Hypothesis II: Without ameliorating or eliminating the causes of insecurity in states' strategic security environment, the realization of international arms control objectives would be difficult, if not impossible to attain.

Method of Study

Data gathering includes primary and secondary sources. Interviews of government officials at the embassies of the states of Israel and South Africa, etc., were carried out as was necessary. Content analysis of the multiples of data collected from literature reviews, interviews, etc was done. Based on these types of information sources, a comparative empirical analysis of the military security environment and extent of weapons acquisition of the two countries was conducted.

The primary unit of analysis in this research as illustrated or encapsulated by the model (Fig. 1.), is the nation-state, that is, the legal actor in the international system. However, the roles of both the state and non-state actors are acknowledged. The research design in this study acknowledges that security and insecurity are not primarily a function of particular actor, at one level, but a product of interconnectedness of different actors and different levels. Dominant analytic models in international relations oblige student of security studies, to select one level at the expense of others. In this research project, however, to focus on the international level only would exaggerate the systemic impact on the lower or subsystemic levels, thereby underestimating the effect of national and subnational factors. The reverse is also true. To focus on domestic factors underestimates those at the international level. Therefore, this research addresses security concerns at both subnational, regional and extraregional levels. In essence, the concept of security was broadened vertically, thereby ameliorating the limitation of the mainstream – systemic – theories, whose analysis is confined to the systemic level only. Any approach lesser than this in identifying the reference object of security in the contemporary world could only provide partial explanation for international outcomes.

This holistic consideration is the key guidepost upon which the direction of this work is based.

This study acknowledges that the security system of any given state is a composition of social, economic, political, and military dimensions of security and that sometimes they are closely interrelated. But the framework addresses only the military and/or potential military aspect of security. In light of this, it is important to realize that potential military threat cuts across all elements of security; at all levels even though the degree of such might vary.

The causal-effect model is utilized as the point of departure for the descriptive and analytical method that will be used throughout the study. The use of a formal model facilitates the illustration that captures the main relationships in the research. These variables and relationships are parsimoniously presented in broad terms to give the reader a road map of the course of this analytical investigation at a glance.

Generally, a qualitative approach is used in this project. However, the method will vary accordingly, depending on the area of the subject matter of the study that is being addressed. An empirical analysis is utilized to depict the relationship between the security environment and extent of weapons acquisition. Israel, apartheid and post apartheid South Africa have been selected for this purpose. To compare the weapons acquisition of the three societies, their military expenditure as the percentage of gross national product, the number of military forces and personnel, and possession of nuclear capability are compared approximately and broadly from 1955 to the present. Historical sequence is applied when necessary in the course of the qualitative analysis.

Structure of the Study

This study consists of seven chapters. As indicated above, the first Chapter provides the prospectus of the study, identifies the research problem and the nature of study, and the theoretical framework. Moreover, it provides the literature review and contribution, as well as the hypothesis to be tested. The second Chapter shall examine the leading world view, neorealism, on the subject of international security. This exercise allows insight to the limitation of the neorealist paradigm and prepares the ground for the theoretical reformulation. The neorealist standard argument shall be tendered and the argument of its critics will also to be articulated.

Chapter three focuses on the conceptualization of the strategic security environment as the source of threat causations, i.e. by the way of the six causal-chain factors. Each element shall be explained to reflect its causal attribute. The strategic security environment is explained in relation to its size, strategic interests, and threats. Chapter four will analyze the strategic security environment components: the internal and external security climates, and examines the forms of threats attainable in each context. We assume that each type of threat is caused by one or two or more of the six dominant causations within the strategic security environment. This Chapter also illustrates the role played by the intervening variable in this study, the National Defense Planning Process (NDPP). As the national defense apparatus, NDPP is utilized (as the causal funnel) to understand and interpret threat causation and threat, potential threat, or national motivation within the strategic security environment. It would then process the final 'perception' by translating them into state's security needs and expectations, in terms of military capabilities.

Chapters five and six conduct the empirical test of the theoretical model in Chapter three by examining the strategic security environments of Israel (in Chapter 5), apartheid South Africa, and post apartheid South Africa (in Chapter 6). Each of the six causal-chain elements is used in these analyses to understand if and how they play any part in conditioning these societies' SSEs. Chapter seven conducts a further empirical analysis of the SSE theory constructed in Chapters three and four to show the applicability of the framework to real cases. Here, the internal security climate and external security climate of the three societies are compared. The extent of weapons acquisition based on defense expenditure, military manpower, and nuclear weapons capability is also compared. In essence, the comparison of the three societies helps us in testing the central hypothesis: i.e. the correlation between the strategic security environment and extent of weapons acquisition. The latter section of this Chapter shall constitute the empirical result of the core hypothesis that shall be tested.

Finally, Chapter eight examines the implication of the relationship between the strategic security environment and the extent of weapons acquisition on international arms control objectives. In other words, under what condition does the strategic security environment condones the realization of the international arms control objectives and under what condition would the contrary be the case. Prior to doing this, the arguments of the optimists and the principal objectives of arms control are articulated. Also the arguments of the pessimists on arms control are equally tendered. Then, the standard arms control and the strategic security environment arguments are contrasted. Finally, the implication between the key independent variable (the strategic security environment) and key dependent variable (extent of weapons acquisition) on international arms control

objectives (the secondary dependent variable) is discussed. The last section of the study consists of the summary and conclusion.

Chapter 2

THE COLD WAR DOMINANT PARADIGM IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY: NEOREALISM STANDARD ARGUMENT AND ITS CRITIQUES

Neorealist Standard Argument

Structural realism (i.e. neorealism) distances itself from 'human nature,' a key variable that lies in the heart of classical realism. It also distances itself from the classical realist idea that sees the pursuit of power as an end itself, but it adopts the use of power as a means to attain the state's ultimate goal, security. It lays emphasis on security. States ultimately pursue security, primarily military security, and not power.¹

Power balancing is a noted feature of the modern system, as it was in the multipolar system of eighteenth century Europe. Power balancing reappeared between the superpowers during the Cold War. Therefore, it is not surprising that the structural realist theory emerged during this period beginning with Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Waltz's intention in this work was not to start a new line of theory, but to systematize realism into structural realism which its critic, Robert W. Cox, nicknamed "neorealism."²

While classical realism focuses on domestic politics and foreign policy, neorealism is an environment-based theory that purports that the structure of the international system determines state's behavior, including balance-of-power. Whatever

¹ Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics*, XL. 2 (Jan. 1988): 241. This is a review article of Robert Keohane, Ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 378; and Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 268; also see Steven Wayne Brinkoetter, *Ideorealism: Theory for the New World Order*, (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1996), p. 2.

² Brinkoetter, 1996, p. 2; Nye, 1988, p. 241.

states' behavior that cannot be explained by the structure of the system is trivial. In this analysis, states are seen as similar in all ways except their capabilities, irrespective of whether they are democratic or not. With the primary interest of states being their survival, they must fend for their essential interests or else face the risk of destruction.

Neorealism is a third image theory, wherein the systemic structure determines either conflict and/or peace. A system is a set of interacting units which attain behavioral equalities and identity over time. Structure connotes the way in which units, as components, are arranged and relate to one another relative to specification of functions and the distribution of capabilities within the system. Waltz presents a typology of structure which is either hierarchical or anarchical. The more hierarchical a system is, the greater the differentiation of functions, whereas the more anarchical a system the greater the degree of resemblance among the functions of its units. In domestic politics, the ordering principle is hierarchical, and anarchy typifies that of the international system. Structure is also defined by the distribution of capabilities (e.g. multipolarity or bipolarity). Waltz purports that states are "unitary actors, who at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, drive for universal domination." As such, in a realist world, the necessity for balance-of-power behaviorism is a fait accompli.³

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York, McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1979), pp. 93-101. See James Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, *Contemporary Theories of Interantional Relations: A comprehensive survey, Third Edition* (New york: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990), p. 120; Nye 1988, p. 241.

Anarchy for Waltz means the lack of any superordinate authority to enforce agreement; that is, the absence of a common government.⁴ Anarchy requires states to protect themselves

either through their own material or diplomatic resources in order to ensure their survival and security. In such a system, the principle of self-help is a necessity for the survival of states. Self-help is achieved by engaging in internal efforts to enhance political, military, and economic capabilities and effective strategies and/or aligning externally with other actors within the system.

The structural constraints which are characteristic of the system are explained primarily by anarchy. The effects of anarchy according to Waltz include: the promotion of recurring balance-of-power behavior; encouraging states' adoption of similar methods and technologies that enable them to compete; impeding the likelihood of cooperation and making interdependence less attractive; providing explanation for recurrence of military competition; and war. States are prone to be caught up in the complexity of these effects regardless of the differences in their internal attributes. Anarchy causes structural constraints and creates a competitive environment. The polarity of the system in terms of distribution of capabilities also causes structural constraints. In general, neorealists argue that a bipolar world order is more stable than the multipolar one, not only because in a bipolar world, interdependence is low and great powers are self-sufficient. But in a multipolar world, alliance management is a problem and the fates of numerous great powers are closely linked to their mutually grasping ambitions. Two great powers can

⁴ Waltz 1971, p.102-104. Also see Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique" in David A. Baldwin, Ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp.143-169.

deal with each other better and consequently, they can more effectively deal with the world's common problem than more powers can.⁵

Self-help typifies the behavior pattern of states in an anarchical order. Such behavior includes the pursuit of power to assure survival; readiness to resolve conflicts via the use of force; eschewing functional specialization and interdependence; and distrust towards any type of cooperative endeavor.⁶

The threatening character of the anarchical environment as elucidated by Waltz is such that: "a self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer." Accordingly, the fear of unwanted consequences provokes the logic of balance-of-power behavior among states.⁷ It is this logic of balance-of-power that compels states to be vigilant about their relative positions. To the extent that security threats are unavoidable for states in anarchy, in security, fears, and concerns about relative power are equally unavoidable. Conflict and military competition stems directly from anarchy. Anarchy encourages both military competition and war.⁸ Waltz associates the causes of war to structural variables or the alleged effect of systemic polarity. Like John J. Mearsheimer, he contends that war is more likely under multipolarity than bipolarity, and the latter is more conducive to stability and peace.⁹

⁵ Cited in Brinkoetter, pp.27-28; see Waltz 1979, pp.163-170; 192-193.

⁶ Waltz 1979, pp.104-111; Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Quarterly*, 41 (1997)p. 5.

⁷ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," In Robert O. Keohane, Ed. *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 118.

⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," In Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Robb, Ed. *The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 43-44.

⁹ Brinkoetter 1996, p.195; Waltz 1979, pp.168-171.

According to Mearsheimer, a neorealist, "realism paints a rather grim picture of world politics. The international system is portrayed as a brutal arena where states look for opportunities to take advantage of each other, and they therefore have little reason to trust each other."¹⁰ As such, genuine peace in a world where states compete for power is a rare commodity. He enunciates five assumptions of realism viz.: (1) international system is anarchical; (2) states inherently possess some offensive military capability which they can use willingly to destroy each other; (3) there is uncertainty about the intentions of other states; 4) the driving force motivating states' actions is survival; and (5) instrumentally rational, "states think strategically about how to survive in the international system."¹¹ Taken together, these five assumptions can create incentives for states to behave aggressively sometimes. Mearsheimer observes three behaviors: (1) states in the system fear each other; (2) each state aims to guarantee its own survival; and (3) each state's goal is to maximize its relative power position vis-à-vis other states.¹² While realism paints a picture of international relations as competitive, cooperation does occur. Strikingly, Waltz too contends that some cooperation (i.e. arms control) is possible.¹³ However, two factors inhibit cooperation: relative gains and concerns for cheating. Realism acknowledges that sometimes states might relate to each other via institutions, but the motive behind such is self-interest.

For realists, Mearsheimer argues, "the causes of war and peace are mainly a function of the balance-of-power, and institutions largely mirror the distribution of power

¹⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," *International Security*, 19.3 (Winter 1994): 9.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p.10.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp.9-11.

¹³ Waltz 1979, pp.115-116.

in the system.” That is, the structure of the system is indicative of whether or not there would be war or peace. Even then, institutions are reflections of how power is distributed at any point in time. In short, balance-of-power is the independent variable that explains war; institutions are merely an intervening variable. He posits that any reliance on institutional solutions in the pursuit of state interest would accrue more failures and pernicious effects. He acknowledges that ‘realism is a pessimistic theory; indeed, it treats war as inevitable and, it does not distinguish between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ states. All states seek to maximize relative power.¹⁴

Neorealists argue that a rational state focuses on the possibility of conflict and take precautionary measures. The only way war can be prevented in a neorealist world is by the pursuit of appropriate defensive preparations. Despite the worst-case focus of neorealism and the high possibility of war, Waltz believes that world politics, however, “falls short of unrelieved chaos.”¹⁵ In the end, while Waltzian neorealism (which emphasizes fear) does not view the world in Hobbesian (aggressive) terms of ‘a war of all against all, yet they both have a highly pessimistic view of the world.

Neorealists see states as the key actors in world politics that is predicated by a condition of constant anarchy. The only change that takes place results from what William C. Wohlforth describes as “the rise and decline of states’ relative power, conditioned by the nature of the overall distribution of capabilities.”¹⁶ Waltz contends that ‘international systems’ are transformed changes in the distribution of capabilities

¹⁴ Ibid., pp. 12-49.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁶ William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War,” *International Security*, 19.3; (Winter 1994/95):105.

among the units. Such changes also produce new interactive patterns and outcomes among members of the system. A key to Waltz's approach is the proposition that "only a structural transformation can alter the anarchical nature of the international system."¹⁷ Beyond this type of change, competition among states explains international phenomena.

Structural realists use three arguments to uphold their standard prediction of competition: (1) states' attempts to maximize their relative power, thereby creating a zero sum condition that makes cooperation difficult; (2) states' preoccupation with or sensitivity to relative gains remarkably impedes cooperation; and (3) states are more comfortable with competitive policies because "the possibility of cheating makes cooperation risky; institutions cannot solve the problem." Even when there are no greedy states, competition for security and war are possible since some states might enhance their security through expansion. Mistrust about the adversary's motives and calculations precipitate the tendencies for competition.¹⁸

Christopher Lane identifies two manifestations of this competitiveness viz.: 'balancing' and the 'sameness' effect. Balancing stems from states' attempt to correct a "skewed distribution of relative power in the international system."¹⁹ Sameness, as used by Waltz, is the propensity of states to imitate their rivals' successful characteristics.²⁰ Neorealism's conception of states' behavior rests on the assumption that states are conditioned by the sheer possibility of conflict within the system.²¹ Stephen Brooks also

¹⁷ Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, p.121.

¹⁸ Charles L. Glaser, "Realists As Optimists: Cooperation As Self-Help," *International Security*, 19.3 (Winter 1994/95): 53-56.

¹⁹ Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," *International Security*, 17.4 (Spring 1993): 11-12.

²⁰ Waltz 1979, p.128.

²¹ See Brooks, p. 457.

delineates three principal hypotheses that recapitulate both Waltz's and Layne's assumptions regarding states' behavior: (1) balancing behavior constantly recurs, (2) states will be constrained from engaging in cooperation, and (3) states copy the advances made by rival powers (the sameness effect)."²² Maximizing relative power, some neorealist critics argue, needs to be demonstrated as the best way to increase security.

Overall, the pervasive concern of states is national security. In this light, Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf postulate that the realist road to security is based on alliances, balance-of-power, and arms control. To attain peace, you must prepare for war (See Table 1 for the realist assumptions and policy recommendations on security). In other words, rationally speaking, the prevalent states' priority is acquiring militant capabilities.

While this table does not distinguish between classical and structural realism, however, for neorealism, states are the primary actors in international politics especially great powers. States' goal primarily is self-preservation. The prioritized instrument for achieving these goals radiates around the acquisition of military capabilities. To attain and sustain peace demand preparation for war to which armament acquisition is a critical requisite. Clearly, the neorealist approach to security and peace is based on a *realpolitik* approach, epitomized by self-help behavior.

Neorealists argue that the long peace characteristic of the Cold War was primarily rooted in the bipolar structure of the system in conjunction with the unit veto factor, i.e. nuclear weapons. Christopher Layne argues that bipolarity erased the security

²²Ibid., p. 463.

TABLE 1**The Realist Road to Security: Assumptions and Policy Recommendations**

<i>The Realist Picture of the International Environment</i>	
Primary global condition:	Anarchy
Probability of system change/reform:	Low
Prime actors:	States, and especially great powers
Principal actor goals:	Power over others, self-preservation, and physical security
Predominant pattern of actor interaction:	Competition and conflict
Pervasive concern:	National security
Prevalent state priorities:	Acquiring military capabilities
Popular state practice:	Use of armed force for coercive diplomacy
Realist Policy Prescriptions:	
Preparations for war:	“If you want peace, prepare for war.”
Perpetual vigilance:	“No state is to be trusted further than its national interest.”
Persistent involvement and intervention:	“Isolationism is not an alternative to active global involvement.”
Preparedness with arms:	“Strive to increase military capabilities, and fight rather than submit to subordination.”
Preserve the balance of power:	“Do not let any state or coalition of states become predominant.”
Prevent arms races from resulting in military inferiority with rivals:	“Negotiate agreements with competitors to maintain a favorable military balance.”

Source: Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 444.

dilemma and relative gains problem among the Western powers during this period. In other words, it was structure that affected outcomes during this era.

The current world order, characteristic of a unipolar or more precisely a benign unipolar world, could eventually lead to a multipolar world because “unipolar moments cause geopolitical backlashes that lead to multipolarity.”²³ According to Layne’s neorealist prediction, “unipolar systems contain the seeds of their own demise” because the unbalanced power of the hegemon creates a systemic environment conducive to the rise of new great powers. Also, the emergence of new power in the system erodes the existing hegemon’s relative power and eventually its predominance.²⁴

In general, structural realism is a parsimonious theory of rational behavior that establishes a baseline against which less parsimonious theories can be juxtaposed. Parsimonious in the sense that it uses few possible postulates to explain the largest possible number of things. The parsimony of structural realism can be described by the following three important characteristics: (1) it focuses on material factors independent of social or institutional context; (2) it assumes a state-centric unitary actor, thereby portraying states as the key actor in the system; and (3) it is a systemic level (III - Image) theory.²⁵ Relative to its parsimonious character, structural realism can be fixed, that is, scholars are able to relax neorealism and add plastic additions to make their own brand of structural theory, in a less parsimonious context. Ironically, these brands of structural

²³ Layne 1993, p.32.

²⁴ Ibid. , p. 7; 40.

²⁵ Stephen Brooks, “Dueling Realisms,” *International Organization* , 51.3 (Summer 1997): p. 469. Here, Brooks is depicting the parsimonious characteristics of post-classical realism which in all measures reflects those of structural realism. However, he argues that post-classical realism’s less parsimony enables it to gain more explanatory power than structural realism.

realism see Waltz's neorealism as flawed; they include but are not limited to contingent realism and ideorealism. Some critics of neorealism see its parsimonious character, its supposedly strength, as its weakness for constraining its explanatory power relative to causal narrowness, and tunnel view prescriptions for security.

Critiques and Limitations of Neorealism

Kingdom Divided: The Duel Between Jacob (Neorealism) and Esau (Post-Classical Realism)

The biblical capturing of how Jacob stole the blessings of Esau from their blinded father, Isaac, in the book of Genesis (chapter 27), epitomizes the duel between neorealism and post-classical realism. Esau was the eldest and favorite son of Isaac. Prior to Isaac's death, Jacob tricked his father so that he blessed him while thinking he was blessing Esau. In this blessing, Isaac made Jacob the ruler over all his brothers (including Esau) and servants in the land God had given to Abraham the father of Isaac. When Esau came in to be blessed, Isaac realized that he had been tricked by Jacob. However, and unfortunately, Isaac told Esau that the blessing he gave to Jacob was irrevocable. When Esau persisted that his father should give him any other blessing he might have left, Isaac told him that Jacob his junior brother would be the ruler over him and the rest of his brothers. This blessing actually sounded like a curse. Esau was angered and vowed to kill Jacob. Inferring from this biblical simile, both post-classical realism and neorealism are direct offsprings of their father, classical realism. Just as Esau was the favorite son of Isaac but lost his father's blessing to a dubious brother, post-classical realism adheres to the footsteps of classical realism, but the blessing of the realist household is

manifested in the domain of structural realism, a.k.a. neorealism. Today, neorealism, as accounted for by Waltz, is ironically the leading critic of classical realist explanations of international behavior, but it is itself “predicated on particular conceptions of human nature.”²⁶ Post-classical realist perspective rejects and launches its own attack on the tenets of neorealism as theoretically dubious and unauthentic.

Stephen Brooks’ theoretical Esau, i.e. post-classical realism, uncovers neorealism’s dubiously acquired position, that while neorealism might be rejecting classical (realist) assumptions, an apple does not fall far from the tree. That is, “the internal coherence of the neorealist framework itself depends fundamentally on the psychological assumption that actors are characteristically highly fearful.”²⁷ Indirectly, neorealist conceptions of human nature, like classical realism, emphasize weariness and anxiety. Typically, the two conceptions (Morgenthau and Waltz’s) of human nature, although Waltz might not admit it, may not be so distinct from one another. Brooks argues that:

Morgenthau’s view of human nature implies that (1) actors will seek to take advantage of weaker states whenever they have the chance, and hence (2) military preparedness is the only true assurance against being exploited. This is remarkably similar to neorealism’s view that conflict is common among states because... [of] powerful incentives for aggression. Neorealists thus emphasize a different aspect of human nature than Morgenthau, but the net result is that both view the world in very similar, highly pessimistic terms. In the end, neorealism does not move beyond the

²⁶ Ibid., p. 449. Also see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 16-41.

²⁷ Brooks 1993, p. 449.

human nature arguments of classical realism; neorealists simply swap one aspect of human nature (aggression) for another (fear).²⁸

The fundamental basis upon which neorealism distances itself from classical realism is the discounting of human nature and systematically introducing the anarchical international environment as responsible for states' competitive behavior. Brooks' criticism leaves open the question whether or not neorealism is a new line of theory or a mere extension of classical realism.

Having identified the genetic root of neorealism as originated in classical realism, post-classical realism launches its own attack on neorealism regarding why post-classical realism is the true and anointed descendant of classical realism. Brooks presents three arguments that differentiate post-classical realism from neorealism. First, he rejects the neorealist argument that states' decisions are conditioned by the possibility of conflict and argues that states make decisions based on the probability of aggression. The neorealist "possibility" of conflict is a worst case perspective. Rather than adopting the worst case reasoning, post-classical realist understands states' decision as based on assessments of "probabilities" concerning security threats.²⁹ Brooks argues that neorealist worst case/possibilistic perspective is based on a single endogenous factor that induces the likelihood of conflict, that is, balance of military capabilities. However, 'non-realist' theories, e.g. liberalism, posit that the probability of conflict depends on whether a states are or are not democratic and the presence or lack of international institutions. Brooks argues that there are other factors beside the distribution of military capabilities that affect

²⁸Ibid., pp. 449-450. See Waltz 1959, 188; and Markus Fischer, "Feudal Europe 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices," *International Organization*, 46 (1992): 427-66.

²⁹ Fischer 1992, p. 446.

the probability of conflict such as: technology (as identified by realists such as Robert Jervis, Barry Buzan, Charles Glaser and Stephen Van Evera); geography (Stephen Walt and Stephen Krasner); and international economic pressures (Robert Gilpin and William Wohlforth). Coincidentally, none of these realist material factors imply other ideas such as institutions as contended by liberals and constructivists.³⁰ The above distinction set apart the 'offensive realist' (particularly offensive neorealists) that believe in offensive military action as a mode of enhancing security, from the 'defensive realists' (i.e. above post-classical realists) who are more optimistic in the likelihood of averting war.³¹

Second, the argument flowing from the possibility/probability distinction is the neorealist argument that actors heavily discount the future, favoring short-term military preparedness over longer-term objectives when they conflict. Post-classical realism, in contrast, does not agree that states always subordinate long-term to short-term security requirements; actors often make 'intertemporal trade-offs' depending on the intensity of the security pressure. Robert Gilpin argues that actors desist from making worst-case assumptions but instead appreciate the probability of conflict. Brooks sees Gilpin's probabilistic based realist framework as more dynamic than the Waltzian neorealism, which is a static theory relative to its worst-case/possibilistic focus.³²

Finally, while all realists agree that states should give priority to military security, neorealism further contends that military preparedness should be prioritized over

³⁰ Ibid., p. 456.

³¹ Ibid., p. 457. Just as there are defensive neorealists, such as Meisheimer, and Labs, there are also structural realists that are defensive e.g. Waltz, and Glaser. See Labs, 1997, pp. 1-49.

³² Brooks 1997, p. 450; 458-9.

economic capacity when they conflict. Post-classical realism argues that “rational policymakers may trade off a degree of military preparedness if the potential net gains in economic capacity are substantial relative to the probability of security losses.”³³ Brooks agrees with Gilpin that military input is not the only component of power but also includes economic capacity. Mearsheimer focuses on the military basis of power,³⁴ states ultimately pursue security not power as Waltz similarly argued. While neorealists argue that states ultimately pursue security and not power, post-classical realists, like classical realists, posit that power, and not security, is the ultimate objective of states. It advances a more conditional view of systemic military aggression than neorealism. As such, post-classical realism sees states as pursuing, ultimately, to increase their economic capability and, consequently, their power.³⁵

The Division Between Structural Realist Sub-Schools: Contingent Realists Critique of Neorealism

Charles L. Glaser’s version of structural realism - contingent realism - paints a different picture that dramatically diverges from the neorealist (i.e. structural-realist) standard argument; especially on the issue of competition and cooperation. According to the standard structural argument, “anarchy discourages cooperation because it requires states to worry about the relative gains of cooperation and the possibility that adversaries will cheat on agreements.”³⁶ As such cooperation between adversaries while not impossible will be difficult. Contingent realism purports that instead of strong propensity

³³ Ibid., p. 447

³⁴ Ibid., p. 450; also see Fisher 1992, p. 465.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 459-463.

³⁶ See Glaser 1994/95, p. 50.

toward security competition, states choices between cooperation and competition are highly contingent without any particular preference for competition.³⁷ Setting out to eliminate the standard structuralist 'competition bias on the issue', Glaser argues that the standard argument overplayed the risk of cooperation. While self-help can be equated with competitive policies, cooperation, itself, is also a type of self-help. A country will rather engage in arms control than in a risky arms race which might jeopardize its security. Self-help per se tells us essentially nothing about whether states should prefer cooperation or competition.³⁸

The desire not to lose capability and to gain military advantages cannot only lead to competition but also to cooperation. Arms races can lead to military disadvantages. While military advantages are extremely valuable, military disadvantages can be extremely dangerous. Countries would rather cooperate than lose in an arms races. Uncertainty about an adversary's motives elicits competition, according to the standard argument, however, it might also be a powerful reason for states' cooperation.³⁹ Either competition or cooperation can be risky, thus, states usually would weigh the benefits of both, prior to making a choice.

Glaser sees the need to reformulate the standard argument on the issue of power that posits that, "states evaluate their ability to achieve security in terms of power", which Waltz defines in terms of capabilities (i.e. resources, distribution).⁴⁰ Glaser sees the

³⁷ *ibid.* , pp. 89-90.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁹ *Ibid.* Just as there are offensive neorealists, such as Mearsheimer and Labs, there are also those neorealist that are defensive including Brooks, and Glazer.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, P. 61.

necessity to shift from a structural theory argument based on power to the one based on military capability which addresses the issue of security dilemma, with respect to the offense-defense balance. Offense-defense balance indicates how much military mission capability a country can get from its power, and its ability to defend itself. It is the ratio of the cost of the offensive forces to the cost of the defensive forces. "The offense-defense balance can be defined in terms of the investment in the forces that supports offensive mission which an opponent must make to offset a defenders' investment in forces that support defensive missions." It provides information about the ratio of resources necessary to maintain military capabilities that is required for effective deterrence and defense.⁴¹

The injection of the offense-defense model into structural realist analysis, Glaser opines, enables the shift from balance-of-power to a military-capabilities theory, "specifically a theory cast in terms of countries' abilities to perform military missions." In this context, security is concerned much more with mission capabilities than it is with power. Contingent realism paints a more clear picture of security through its offense-defense model by pointing to a security-seeker, of the necessity for evaluating the international environment, prior to making policy option. As such, the issue of security stalemate or security dilemma is discerned and possibly avoided prior to making a choice between competition and cooperation.⁴²

⁴¹Ibid. ; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, 30.2 (January 1978):188.

⁴² Glaser 1994/95, p. 62.

In arguing that structural-realist standard assumptions are flawed, Glaser states that increases in relative power do not necessarily increase security as neorealists suggest; otherwise international relations will be overly competitive. The neorealist argument overlooks the dynamic of the security dilemma. Increase in relative power can equally lead to military disadvantage or less security, which gives more room to the adversary to expand. Power maximization can also increase the probability of losing an arms race. Standard maximization of power that does not recognize nor distinguish between offensive and defensive potential may not actually maximize military capabilities essential for defense and deterrence.⁴³

Glaser rejects another standard structural argument that relative gains concerns make cooperation very difficult. As a contingent realist, he argues that states will cooperate when absolute gain from cooperation increases a state's security and will refuse to cooperate when relative cooperation will result in a relative loss in military assets. Finally, contingent realism rejects the argument that "states are competitive because the possibility of cheating makes cooperation too risky; institutions cannot solve the problem."⁴⁴ Cheating, Glaser contends, is not a dominant influence. The risk of cheating and its implication for cooperation varies relative to offense-defense considerations which is missing in the standard structural realist arguments. Cooperation (e.g. arms control) like competition (e.g. arms race), is a type of self-help in IR.

Contingent structural realism is more optimistic about cooperation than is neorealism. Typified by game theory, the prospects for cooperation is contingent upon

⁴³Ibid., P. 72.

⁴⁴Glaser 1994/95, p. 72; 79.

the countries preferences and the type of game in the play. Generally speaking, the contingent structural argument is comparable to the concept of SSE in its 'contingent' approach to cooperation/security.

The stability or instability of the condition of the SSE is also contingent upon whether cooperative or competitive security is obtainable in that particular milieu, respectively. In other words, whether a particular SSE is stable or unstable depends upon the degree of cooperation/cohesion or competition obtainable in the particular environment.

Another structural realist theory called ideorealism calls the predictive capability of Waltzian neorealism dubious. The end of the Cold War, the latter asserts, is an anomaly because while the military competition between the superpowers diminished, there is no significant change in the systemic structure as neorealists predicted (although some might argue contrarily). Also, the enduring democratic peace between the democracies has yielded a peace that gives no incentives to engage in power-balancing behavior. In ideorealism, the neorealist structural constraints - power balancing, and military competition - are only present under certain situations. The goal of ideorealism, according to Steven Wayne Brinkoetter, is to "free structural theory from the confines of neorealism".⁴⁵ Structural change is rare in Waltzian neorealism. Waltz's emphasis on structural constraints without the possibility of structural change is accounted for by the 'limited availability of structural variables' in neorealist theory. The positional orientation of states limits or exclude the structural variables (e.g. technology institutions,

⁴⁵ Brinkoetter 1996, p. 4.

political process) that can account for change.⁴⁶ Ideorealism, unlike neorealism, does not see structural constraints to constitute a notable cause of war. For ideorealism security threats are avoidable. Another neorealist mistake is its overlooking of domestic influences on structural constraints which ideorealist acknowledges.⁴⁷ There are those who, however, argue that neorealism is not a theory but an approach or paradigm.⁴⁸

Constructivists Critique of Neorealism

Critical international relations theories which include post-modernists (Ashley, Walker), constructivists (Adler, Kratochwil, John Ruggie, and Peter Katzenstein), neo-Marxists (Cox, Gill), feminists (Peterson, Sylvester), etc., have their own qualm with realism, and neorealism in particular. While critical theories differ, there are two basic claims that unite them: (1) the basic structures of the international system are social and not exclusively material (contrary to the realist materialism); and (2) these structures influence "actors' identities and interests rather than just their behavior (a claim that opposes rationalism)."⁴⁹ Constructivism purports that social practices will dictate the material outcomes, and not vice versa. It is important to note that constructivists, so far, have failed to identify specifically where in the society these social practices come from.

Constructivist (structural) theorists, particularly Alexander Wendt, critique neorealism for abetting 'realpolitik' behaviors, thereby creating the same problem it seeks to respond to. Neorealism posits that state behavior is in the most part shaped by the

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 11.

⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 245-246.

⁴⁸ Ibid. p. 26.

⁴⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security*, 20.1 (Summer 1995): 71-72.

material structure of the international system. However, critical theories, particularly constructivism, focus on the social structure of the system, especially, institutionalized norms which induce states to believe in a more communitarian and peaceful ways.⁵⁰ Anarchy per se is “not a structural cause of anything,” according to Wendt; “What matters is its social structure, which varies across anarchies. An anarchy of friends differs from one of enemies, one of self-help differs from one of collective security, and these are all constituted by structures of shared knowledge.”⁵¹

The constructivists criticize the neorealist assumption that the international system virtually has no normative content. Also, for the neorealists, culture and identity are seen as derivatives of the distribution of capabilities without any independent explanatory power. Culture and identity are deployed to further self-interests.⁵² Jefferson, Wendt, and Katzenstein argue first that the security environments in which states are embedded are in important part cultural and institutional, rather than just material. As such, they influence states behavior. This is an important point that this study is embarking upon by integrating the concept of ‘norm and identity’ in the theoretical framework. Secondly, the cultural environment affects not only the variety of states behavior, but also the basic character of states, i.e. states’ identity.⁵³ Peter Katzenstein charges neorealism for its continuous neglect of domestic politics and transnational relations which are in the most

⁵⁰ John J. Mearsheimer, “A Realist Reply,” *International Security*, 20.1 (Winter 1994/95): 91.

⁵¹ Wendt 1995, p. 78.

⁵² Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” In Peter J. Katzenstein, Ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia Press, 1996), p.17; 25.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

part responsible for the unexpected end of the Cold War. For the constructivists, social practices will dictate the material outcomes, and not vice versa.⁵⁴

Neoliberals Critique of Neorealism

Liberalism is not the opposite of realism, nor vice versa. The opposite of liberalism is 'conservatism'. Nonetheless, the leading critics of neorealist theory are the neoliberals, yet "Keohane the leading neoliberal borrows as much from realism as from liberalism."⁵⁵

Robert Keohane, like John Ruggie (a constructivist), thinks that Waltzian neorealism is seriously incomplete because it ignores critical aspects of world politics such as "economic and ecological interdependence, changes in the functional capabilities of governments, variations in the availability of information, and the role of international institutions and regimes."⁵⁶ Challenging the adequacy of the neorealist international system, based on the above scholastics conundrums, Keohane argues that a good structural theory should link both domestic and international levels analyses rather than depict them as incompatible with one another.⁵⁷

Richard K. Ashley (a post-modernist) in "The Poverty of Neorealism," faults neorealism for reducing state's role to that of a unitary actor, arguing that neorealism, after all, must be statist before it is structural.⁵⁸ Keohane agrees with Ruggie's

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. XII.

⁵⁵ David A. Baldwin, "Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics," In Baldwin 1993, pp. 10-11.

⁵⁶ Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics." In Robert Keohane, Ed., 1986, p. 24.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 23-24.

⁵⁸ Richard K. Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism," In Keohane 1986, pp. 268-273.

denunciation of Waltz's 'elegant definitions of structure' as truncated and insufficiently rich, with limited variables that retard its explanatory power.⁵⁹ Keohane and Nye argue that the Waltzian notion of structure needs a serious revision and take into account the significance of "economic process and international political institutions." Likewise, Keohane criticizes Waltz's theory of balance-of-power as incompatible with the latter's assumption that the aim of states is to maximize power.⁶⁰ There are times when balance-of-power principles would prevent power maximization and vice versa.

Waltzian political structure is three-dimensional: (1) the ordering principle, i.e. anarchical or hierarchical; (2) functional differentiation of parts and (3) the relative capabilities (or power) of the units. Keohane observes that in this analysis, the dimension of differentiation actually "drops out" since states perform similar functions. Accordingly, he comments:

This characterization of the first two attributes of international systems enormously simplifies the analyst's task, since it means that structures of international systems differ only along the third dimensions, that of the distribution of power. In analyzing actual international-political structures, we therefore "abstract from every attribute of states except their capabilities." What emerges Waltz calls "a positional picture," which portrays the placement of the units - where they stand relative to one another - rather than their intrinsic qualities. The key changes that we are to work for, in international politics, are changes in the distribution of capabilities across units.⁶¹

Helen Milner also notes a contradiction between two of Waltz's three central assumptions/ordering principles. She alludes that "It is difficult to assume simultaneously

⁵⁹ Keohane. In Keohane, Ed. 1986, p. 21.

⁶⁰ Cited in Ibid., p. 18.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 14-15.

that all states are equal (the first and second principles) and also that all states are not equal as a result of the distribution of their capabilities (the third principle).” If Waltz claims that states are equal in function but not in capabilities, he would further contradict himself having already stated that ‘one’s capabilities shapes one’s functions.’ She then argues that hierarchy exists in international relations just as it does in domestic politics.⁶² As such, the classification and isolation of international relations into the realm of anarchy is unnecessary. Developing them along a continuum, she suggests, will be heuristically more fruitful. Anarchy, Milner argues, has been overemphasized and interdependence neglected.⁶³

Keohane and also Ruggie argue that by truncating his own concept of structure, Waltz’s theory finds it impossible to account for principal changes in world politics. Keohane marshaled further evidence that a sound structural theory should account for some other factors excluded from the Waltzian framework. Identifying with and extrapolating from other critics (i.e. John Ruggie, Robert Cox, and Richard Ashley) in his own critique of neorealism, Keohane says:

Shouldn’t neorealist theory take better account of institutions and the role of information? How could neorealism be reformulated to account for transformation as well as continuity? Finally, the deeper foundations of the structure can be questioned. Neorealism, in the view of its more severe critics, ignores both history and human subjectivity. It does not investigate how the order that it analyzes came about, nor does it consider the production relations on which it depends. Philosophically, according to the critics, neorealism does not rest on the solid rock of a coherent epistemology but rather is sinking into a swamp of a state-as-actor theory contradicted by its utilitarian premises.⁶⁴

⁶² Ibid. , p. 157.

⁶³ Ibid., pp. 153-162.

⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 20-21

The key point here is that neorealism is too parsimonious and does not have enough variables to explain international outcomes adequately and effectively. Based on the above neorealist theory shortcomings, Keohane charges Waltz of failing to test his own theory according to the standard he himself has set up in the chapters of his book: *Theory of International Politics*.⁶⁵

Joseph Nye not only agrees with Keohane's position, but he also observes that Waltz has turned the unit level into a 'dumping ground' for whatever he considered not structural. "It is particularly odd to see nuclear technology described as a unit characteristic that has had "system-wide" pacific effects," Nye says, the question becomes, how does Waltz determine if the long peace of the bipolar system resulted from a structural or unit level peculiarity? Neorealism, Nye suggests, has purchased parsimony at the expense of explanatory power. Parsimony is not the only measurement by which a good theory should be judged, it requires good explanatory power.⁶⁶

Waltz's theory, he contends, "is too static to explain change and it "tells us nothing about what causes stability in the current world." Waltz cannot distinguish which behavior is caused by structure from that caused by nuclear weapons. Nye, particularly, has qualms with Waltz's claim that "in all of modern history, the structure of

⁶⁵Ibid., p.18; 22. Keohane is extrapolating here from the criticism of neorealism made by Ruggie, Keohane, Cox, Ashley and himself. While they agree with the basic foundation of neorealist perspective, they criticize it for not having enough variable to explain international outcomes. That is, it does not have the standard which in theory matches the sophistication of Lakatos theorem. Science Philosopher, Imre Lakatos theorem regarding theory testing demands empirical verifiability in a strict sense; and prediction by rigorous deduction. These terms are designed to satisfy natural science requirement.

⁶⁶ Nye 1988, pp. 241-243.

international politics has changed once.”⁶⁷ For Waltz, that is, change at the structural level has occurred only once in the last three hundred years. According to Nye, this claim leaves “an awful lot of the stuff of international politics to be explained at the unit level.” Contrastly, Nye sees Gilpin’s version of realism as dynamic and “enshews a purely structural theory”. Rather, it engages in unit analysis as a dynamic context, *vis-à-vis* Waltzian static neorealism.⁶⁸

Robert Powell, another neoliberal, contrary to the neorealist claim, argues that relative gains matters little, especially when the threat of aggressive war is low.⁶⁹ Relative gain only matters when the probability for the use of force is high. Otherwise, states at times act in accordance with liberal institutionalism. This is because states focus primarily on their individual absolute gains and not the gain of other states. If this is not the case, cooperation will be rare among states. However, international cooperation is not a rare phenomenon. Keohane and Robert Axelrod similarly argue that cooperation among states is achievable under anarchy (i.e. anarchy as defined in neoliberal terms).⁷⁰ Hence, Powell says, like anarchy, the question of whether states maximize absolute gains or are concerned with relative gain is a theoretical construct because “State as a rational unitary actors does not exist.” States’ outlook towards cooperation is sensitive to the relative loss likely to be incurred by the costs of fighting.⁷¹ Powell concludes that

⁶⁷ Waltz 1979, p. 163; also Nye 1998, pp. 244-245. According to Waltz, the structure of the nation-system was multipolar until 1945 when it changed to a bipolar order. This is the only time it has changed in all of modern history.

⁶⁸ Nye 1988, p. 243.

⁶⁹ Cited in Mearsheimer 1994/95, p. 22.

⁷⁰ Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane. In Baldwin, Ed., 1993, pp. 85-115.

structural realist understanding of the relationship between anarchy, relative gains and cooperation is problematic.⁷² Powell's explanation of the issue of peace and war which is based on relative gain factor is plausible, and poses a serious problem for neorealism.

Helen Milner observes the confusion of both neorealist and neoliberal schools in portraying the notion of 'government' and 'anarchy' consistently. "They tend to use government and authority interchangeably" in their literature, she states. Neorealists depict the term 'government' to imply an entity that has a "monopoly on the legitimate use of force." For others 'government' is less associated with force than it is with the "existence of institutions and laws to maintain order."⁷³ Generally, in the IR literature the term 'government' connotes three different definitions: 'institutions,' 'control authority,' and monopoly on the 'use of force'. Milner attacks neorealists' definition of 'government' as problematic for three reasons: (1) It devalues both domestic and international politics to the use of force; (2) The definition begs the question of who determines legitimacy; and (3) How much monopoly of force must a government have to exist?⁷⁴

Other neoliberal criticisms of neorealism include the assumptions that neorealism is too pessimistic a theory of IR; it treats war as inevitable (despite contrary evidence e.g. among democracies). It does not distinguish between good or bad states; it has a schematic problem, especially on the notion of anarchy and government. The critiques

⁷¹ Robert Powell, "Absolute and Relative Gains in International Relations Theory," In Baldwin, Ed. 1993, pp. 209-233.

⁷² Ibid., p. 213.

⁷³ Helen Milner, "The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory; A Critique," in David Baldwin, Ed. *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 149-153.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 149-153.

also includes its predictive failures, particularly in accounting for the end of the Cold War, and the argument that many patterns of states behavior defy neorealists explanations and expectations (e.g. the forces behind the proliferation of European institutions, in their pursuit of mutual advantage as opposed to egotistic rational interest, in areas not limited to economics, but also political and military concerns), etc. The boldness of neorealism as a theory of IR has earned it unforgiving bombardment of criticisms, e.g. that it is a Eurocentric theory or that its scope is limited to great powers behavior. The most potent critique of all has been launched from the neoliberal corner. Neoliberalism earned a status as the alternate theory to neorealism towards the end of the Cold War as a result of the neorealist perspective's mismatch to the contemporary and changing world events.

The Limit of Neorealist Paradigm

As the dominant theory in international relations, neorealism offers the orienting framework that dictates the analytical momentum and intellectual coherence of national security studies. It also holds the prize of deductive reasoning as the ultimate prize of theorizing about national security.⁷⁵ However, neorealism "seeks to explain only the recurrence of balancing behavior of states in history", as Waltz's understanding of the subject of balance-of-power would reflect.⁷⁶ The neorealist approach to and conception of security or how it is achieved, and the causation(s) of insecurity, are only limitedly useful in the present world relative to the saliency of the changing and broad range of security issues.

⁷⁵ Katzenstein 1996, p. 26.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

Briefly stated, neorealism posits that realpolitik is indicative of the methods by which states conduct foreign policy. Structural constraints explain why states in their foreign policy behavior repeatedly utilize realpolitik methods. Balance-of-power typifies the realpolitik method of seeking security.⁷⁷ The international system is portrayed as violently brutal where states take advantage of each other, with little inclination for cooperation. Anarchy discourages cooperation as a result of individual state's quest for relative gain. And that security can only be achieved through balance-of-power.

It would be misleading to use this conception to explain the relationships between the major powers, currently (e.g. U.S.-Russia; U.S.-Japan; U.S.-Western Europe; etc). One of the reasons is that neorealism cannot distinguish between good and bad states, nor stable and unstable strategic security environment, especially at the societal and/or regional levels of security. Neorealists offer a pessimistic theory of security studies and treat insecurity, militarization, and war as inevitable. Thus the neorealist core assumption of stability that is based on self-help system, unsurprisingly, yields a dead-end solution or stalemate typified by the problem of 'security dilemma', from which neorealists cannot untangle themselves. Cooperation in today's world, and not security dilemma, increasingly typifies inter-states relationships on security matters.

Neorealist anarchical structure is static and rarely changes. Accordingly, if anarchy remains unchangeable on the one hand, and only structural transformation, which is very rare, can change the system on the other hand, cooperative security is almost impossible to come by in international relations. In this sense, neorealism might be able

⁷⁷ Keohane 1986, p. 16; also see Waltz 1979, p. 117.

to explain nation-states behavior in the Middle East, however, it cannot explain that of Western Europe. In other words, the neorealist framework is not universally applicable or generalizable. Generalization is the essence of any good theory, especially a dominant theory of any particular field of study. However, neorealist structure is so truncated that it is unable to universally account for the major changes in world politics⁷⁸ (e.g. the end of the Cold War).

In neorealism, states are the key actors with the primary goal of security and view force as the major instrument for achieving security. To manage balance-of-power effectively, one must be able to threaten the use and also use military force effectively. In this context, the surest method of achieving security is to maximize unilateral military capabilities in a competitive security context.⁷⁹ Currently however, security is often interdependent. Apart from resulting in security dilemma, competitive security is not sustainable through unilateral efforts. Therefore, neorealism can be said to be compatible with national security only, and not international security. However, in the long run, no country can increase its security while ignoring that of others.

The neorealist state-centric focus gives no room to account for new and unfamiliar set of security concerns exemplified by insecurity that emanates from non-state entities. This indicates that the present international system does not conform to the theoretical stipulations of this leading perspective. Even the principal causation of international

⁷⁸ Keohane 1986, p.17.

⁷⁹ Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas, *World Security: Challenges For A New Century 2nd Ed.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 2.

insecurity, anarchy, which excludes the domestic arena relative to its hierarchical structure, now characterizes the internal structure of some states such as Somalia, Angola, and Yugoslavia. At best, neorealism is a Cold war paradigm that works best in a two-power system, but it lacks insight to the post Cold War arrays of nontraditional security issues.

Scholars in this school have been unable to link domestic and international levels analyses and often depict them as incompatible. However, without integrating the two, the neorealist theory of international structure has limited value in the current world where domestic causations of insecurity are more destabilizing than the systemic ones.⁸⁰ In short, domestic and international levels of analyses should be integrated in any contemporary framework that purports to account for the current forms of transnational security issues and events. This dissertation intends to address this omission.

Although the assumption that it is the international environment in which states are situated that influences their behavior remains valid, however, because it is anchored on one level of analysis and a monolithic causation, it is inadequate. As such, it is important to expand both the level of analysis and causational conception of insecurity beyond neorealists' purview. It is for this reason that this study concurs only with neorealism as a point of departure for building a more adequate framework. Coincidentally, this is in line with Keohane's suggestion that "those who accept the foundations of neorealism, and the overall shape of the building, can still argue about the exact design".⁸¹ Neorealism is a truncated theory of rational behavior. It is useful in

⁸⁰ Ibid. , p.23.

⁸¹ Keohane 1986, pp. 20-21.

functioning as a baseline for theory that is less parsimonious but perhaps with more explanatory power. This study purports to make up for the unfortunate trade-off between neorealist conceptual parsimony and its theoretical explanatory power. Towards this end, the concept of strategic security environment would be introduced into the field of international politics and security in the next Chapter.

This task deserves great priority because neorealism has real flaws that other theories in the field cannot explain either. Neoliberalism is the major alternative to realism. However, the neoliberal school's effort to galvanize a comprehensive approach does not address the variegated new and unfamiliar sets of security issues that confront the current era.

Chapter 3

THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: IDENTIFYING, CLASSIFYING AND ASSESSING CONDITIONS AND FACTORS AFFECTING SECURITY

War is an idea that starts by war preparation. This is a self-evident truth that requires no periodic examination. The most honored neorealist maxim that to have peace, you must prepare for war, is becoming a crucible of self-disillusionment.¹ This study posits that to wage war, one must prepare for war and to have peace you must prepare for peace. To be preparing for war when peace is desired is as dangerous as to remain at peace when you should be going to war. Not only is such behavior counterproductive, it is paradoxically a sub-rational calculation. Such peace cannot endure but it can only be ephemeral. It is the duty of a security analyst to bring about clarity in distinguishing between “war” and “peace”, which, clearly are opposite terms, rather than confusing one for the other. Peace, the absence of war, Bernard Brodie elucidates, is better than war not only in being more agreeable but also in being very much more predictable.² On the other hand, war preparation or war, unpredictably, aims to improve hopeless conditions. The post-structural unified framework undertaken here formulates guidelines that potentially could chart a new comprehensive and meaningful

¹ Robert C. Johansen, “Building World Security: The Need for Strengthened International Institutions” in Michael T. Klare and Daniel C. Thomas Eds, *World Security: Challenges For A New Century Second Edition* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), p. 372. Johansen notes that while nations may benefit for a limited time in high levels of war preparation, however, the international society as a whole would suffer or suffers from a chronic war preparation endeavor.

² Bernard Brodie, *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton university Press, 1959), p. 408.

path towards security attainment, specifically by focusing on the source(s) and causes of insecurity.

In order to arrive at some meaningful solutions, first the problem of insecurity must be correctly diagnosed. The concept of strategic security environment (SSE), which is the focus of this Chapter, can help us in identifying and classifying factors and conditions affecting security. In formulating this unified framework, the intent goes beyond the exercise of theoretical construct alone, the essence is to arrive at a policy oriented analysis. The scope of the analytic framework envelops military security; but acknowledges, peripherally, potential military security issues (i.e. non-SSE). Our analytic scope of military security, however, subsumes the neorealist's by acknowledging the potential escalating effects of other dimensions of security beyond structural constraints in the context of their virulence/capability to abet or elicit military threats and/or conflicts. Military security, the first level of security, which is our focus, involves traditional and non-traditional issues that could readily lead to fighting, if ill-managed. The 'actors' in this post-structural framework are state and non-state actors, with the primary 'goal' of military security to be achieved in the most part by non-military 'instrument' and to a lesser part by military force in an increasingly interdependent world. We shall now explain the 'SSE' concept, the principal source of instability and insecurity.

The Principal Source of Threat in International Security: The Strategic Security Environment

The core assumption of this unified security framework focuses on the connection between the strategic security environment and national/international security and hence, the endeavor of states towards militarization.

The word “strategic” is the adjective of “strategy”. In the dictionary, strategy simply means plan, planning, game plan or master plan, etc. It also may mean scheme, design, method, program, or military tactic, etc. The term “strategic” connotes planned, i.e., devised, designed, blueprinted, tactical or cunning, i.e. crafty, artful, wily, slick, tricky, machiavellic, deceitful, stealthy, etc. The most precise meaning of the word ‘strategic’ which correlates to the usage of the term in this study is found in the Webster’s dictionary, which defines it as “of great importance within an integrated whole or to a planned effect”.

In international relations/security literature, the term ‘strategic’ has been used to mean many different things ranging from planning, to military tactics. Also, the word is the favorite of nuclear strategists in describing nuclear forces or policies, and is found in various expressions such as: ‘strategic environment’, ‘strategic policy’, ‘strategic defense’, strategic missions, ‘strategic forces’, etc.³ The use of the word in this study as: ‘strategic security environment’ encompasses the military perspective. Ordinarily in security studies literature, ‘strategic environment’ has been used to connote nuclear weapons environment or ‘security environment’. The term is used differently in this study.

³ Peter deLeon, *The Altered Strategic Environment: Toward the Year 2000* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1987), pp. 1-5.

Military or Strategic Security Environment, as opposed to the non-military security environment, is the utmost important aspect of a country's overall security environment. While security environment consists of both strategic and non-strategic security aspects, the SSE is the combination and/or the interrelation of the internal security climate (endogenous factors) and the external security climate (exogenous factors). It is the abode of a country's 'strategic' or 'vital' interests.

For our purpose, every country or region has a security environment. Contemporaneously, 'security' is a multidimensional term; which encompasses both the military and the nonmilitary or human security issues which Robert North calls the Fourth Image (in addition to Kenneth Waltz's three images).⁴ In this study, as already stated, security environment is subdivided into two parts. First, the strategic security environment which is of the greater importance within an integrated whole; and second, the non-strategic security environment which addresses secondary security issues. Within the SSE of any country resides strategic interests or issues, over which that country might readily go to war or threat to do so to protect itself, when threatened. The SSE is the nucleus or core of a country's total security environment because it bears directly upon its physical survival.

While vital interest within the SSE could readily lead to military action or war, as is the case in military security conventionally understood. Today however, the range of issues which could lead to such action have expanded beyond the scope of traditional military security that focuses on inter-state conflicts. Currently, military security issues

⁴ Robert C. North, *War, Peace, Survival: Global Politics and Conceptual Synthesis* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 183-262. . For Waltz's Three Images or levels of analysis see Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). In his 1979

encapsulate both traditional and non-traditional issues. Traditional issues are those “involving physical security (in traditional sense), territorial integrity, exercise of sovereign prerogatives and continued existence of core values”.⁵ Non-traditional issues include a set of unfamiliar issues such as terrorism, international organized crimes, ethnic or sectarian conflict, civil war, political insurgency/separatism, mass refugee flows etc.

On the other hand, within the non-SSE (i.e. peripheral) layer of a country’s overall security environment resides both traditional and non-traditional human security issues such as those of economic, environmental/societal (e.g AIDS) and political security concerns, etc.⁶ It is important to note here that while issues within the non-strategic security environment might not readily lead to war, they could precipitate conflict and war. As such, issues within the non-SSE layer could sometimes precipitate into strategic issues which then pass on into the strategic security environment level and are addressed as strategic issues. Although there is nothing new about any state’s security environment, however, there is something new about its conceptualization. Security *per se* is boundless. But based on how critical an issue is to physical survival, it could be classified as being of primary or secondary importance to security.

The causation of threats like the threats themselves reside in the SSE. Other than the idea that “anarchy” is the source of threats in international relations, the mainstream analyses remain in the most part silent in presenting a systematic analysis of what the causes of threats or the threats are in concrete terms. Anarchy *per se*, at best is contextual

book Waltz however, modified his view arguing that only the third Image or third level of analysis causally matters in accounting for international outcomes.

⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Michael N. Schmitt, USAF, “Identifying National Objectives and Developing Strategy: A Process Oriented Approach”, *Strategic Review*, XXV.1 (Winter 1997): 26.

⁶ Barry Buzan, “New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century”, *International Affairs* 69.3 (1991): 433.

and not causal. While anarchy might generate fear as neorealists contend, it does not shed any light on the ambiguity of the concept or causation of state behavior.

To fill in this analytic gap, six major causes of threats in the state strategic security environment are enumerated. Some are physical, and others are non-physical elements of the strategic security environment. While a causal element might be pinned down to one level of security, its effect might be felt at more than one. On the other hand, one causal factor e.g. demographical circumstances, can emanate from more than one level of security (e.g. internally, and regionally, simultaneously, in a cross-border manner).

Threats to security which emanate from the above causations are concretely pinned down into two types, although some variable degrees of fluidity of these threats exist between the two levels. First, the internal security climate is determined by the total sum of endogenous threats, and second the external security climate by exogenous threats. The changing cross-border effects of the threats at one level, operating at the other level, make the SSE a dynamic environment as opposed to the static anarchical environment. For example a destabilized internal security climate, as a result of one type of threat, say insurgency, might have exogenous effect, or vice versa. Conceptually, we shall now look into the causes of threat in the state's SSE.

Causations of Threat and Instability

The strategic security environment is a function of six interrelated elements, namely:

- (1) Historical Circumstances;
- (2) Demographic Composition;

- (3) Geopolitical Condition;
- (4) National Goals and Ambitions;
- (5) Anarchy; and
- (6) Norms/Identity.

A conceptual examination of each of these causations is necessary.

Historical Circumstances

In international politics and security, history is utilized in the form of a 'historical analytical approach', but history has hardly been seen as a causal factor of instability. History is the process by which human beings repeatedly 'define' and 'redefine' themselves.⁷ The attempt to adhere to or correct history and the sentiments attached to doing so invokes insecurity which sometimes precedes weapons acquisition behavior.⁸ This study assumes that unless historical investigation is utilized to uncover historical forces as causal factors, it would be impossible to fully understand why a state might feel insecure or engage in the act of unrestrained weapons acquisition. A case in point is that of Israel; without understanding the biblically grounded historical claim to the land of Palestine, one cannot fully understand the core of Arab-Israel conflict and especially the Israeli position. Ironically, Palestinians claim to the land is also supported with their own version of history. In international relations/security, history should be seen beyond a mere approach of research investigation, it should be seen as causal in driving state behavior.

⁷ Richard Schmitt, *Introduction to Marx and Engels: A Critical Reconstruction* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), p. 25.

⁸ Julian Lider, *On The Nature of War* (Farnborough, Hants: Saxton House, 1983) p. 25.

By acting as the perpetual conveyor, be it of grievances, history is causal by passing grievances from generation to generation. History as a political variable preserves and keeps alive the antique seeds of distrust, fear, prejudice, and hatred between individuals, groups, and governments - even when they are not justifiable. Positions that are based on historical claims are not easily changed. Therefore, this conveyor belt must be part of the human environment, and hence the SSE. Otherwise, for example, an incident that occurred 600 years ago in Kosovo should not have rehashed a new ethnonational violence and atrocities in 1998.

Historical factors do play major roles both in internal and external aspects of a country's SSE. Internally, for example, not only does decolonization sow the seeds of freedom, it also sometimes sows the thorny seeds of inter-ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict is rooted in the contradiction between ethnic/historical and genealogy/shared origin on the one hand, and the amalgamation of distinct and sometimes inharmonious ethnic groups in an artificial territory created by colonial architects, on the other hand. Particularly, this exemplifies the situation in Africa, as seen in Ethiopia. As Donald Horowitz opines, based on historical sentiment, national independence from the colonial power does not necessarily mean independence for the particular ethnic group among others. Thus, self-determination is incomplete until a particular group in question seizes control of the government, as in Rwanda, or achieves its own independence as done by the states in the former Yugoslavia.⁹

Regionally, historical circumstance can take the form of territorial disputes or

⁹ Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1985), p. 53; David Turton, "Mursi Political Identity and Warfare: The Survival of an Idea" in Katsuyoshi Fukui and John Markakis, Eds. *Ethnicity and Conflict in the Horn of Africa* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), p. 16.

aggrandizement. A case in point is a piece of historic territory along the Mediterranean eastern shores, between Lebanon and the Sinai peninsula, known as Palestine, which has created one of the most volatile, deep-seated and enduring problems in the post World War II international politics and security. Historical claim of the land has steadily kept alive motivational flame of the opposing entities: Palestine nationalism and Zionism,¹⁰ respectively.

Historical circumstance has played a significant role in the distrust and deep suspicion in the SSEs of the Koreas and that of Japan, as a result of the latter's history of brutal occupation (1910-1945) and colonial reputation in the former. In an attempt to ameliorate the hostility between the two states, recently, Japan acknowledged that it inflicted heavy damage in its colonial role in South Korea, and in acknowledging this historical fact, Japanese Emperor Akihito and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi, offered a deep remorse and "unambiguous apology to South Korean government and people on October 7, 1998".¹¹ History plays a critical role in rehashing latent conflicts or conflictual situations and, as such, in the condition of a country's SSE as is the case of the Kosovo crisis. History is causal by acting as the conveyor belt of past grievances which can periodically lead to volcanic eruptions of violent conflicts relative to contradictory historical claims.

¹⁰ Karen A. Feste, *Plans For Peace: Negotiation and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 1.

¹¹ World In Brief, "Japan Apologizes to Koreans for Occupation", *The Washington Post* (Thursday, October 8, 1998): A28.

Demographic Composition

There are instances around the world where the population in some countries overwhelms the available food supply (e.g. Haiti, East African countries, etc). The world population growth is (totaling 6 billion in October 1999) at an exponential rate, as seen in India, and is increasingly prone to political crisis. However, it is still regarded as a non-strategic security concern. It should remain so as long as it can be resolved domestically at the level of non-strategic security environment. But demographic composition in terms of the people that form the social order or fabric of any country, as a nation, (region or globally), has been a source of threat to international security, especially as noticeable after the end of the Cold War. Demographic composition forces, especially in the multiethnic societies, not only hinder successful nation-building, but it has also led to internal violent conflicts and wars as seen in recent years.

Multiethnicity, as seen in the former Yugoslavia, the defunct federations of the Soviet Union, Ethiopia and many African countries, impairs and impedes a cohesive political consensus. Thus, demographic forces, although having more acute and immediate impact at the domestic level than the global level, nonetheless and increasingly, have become a formidable source of threat to international stability; especially at the regional security level relative to the spill-over effect in the dynamics of kinship and ethnic conflict. While the superpowers, by chance, avoided direct confrontation and global war in the backing of opposite groups involved in ethnic conflicts in some countries during the Cold War, the possibility still remains that ethnic conflict could lead to a global war. This was the case in World War I when a Serbian student killed the Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand. Partially, disparity in the racial

composition of Germany can explain the Nazi extermination of the Jews and the cause of World War II.

Demographic forces are at play both at national, regional and global levels in the form of ethnic, racial, religious or ideological disparities, etc. Along this line of argument, Huntington argues that “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.”¹² While this might be partially true, the battle lines of the future go beyond Samuel Huntington’s lenses of vision, which focuses only on the division between cultural lines at the global level. As of today, the world continues to be fractured along tribal, ethnic, racial, religious language, ideological, and traditional lines, etc., and not just one level but at all the three levels of security identified in this study (societal, regional and extra-regional). Differences among groups, based on the above lines of divisions and not just civilizations as (e.g. slavery) Huntington postulates, have generated and would continue to generate the most prolonged and most violent conflicts in the past and future, respectively. Examples of these are the 1994 war in Rwanda and the episodes of the Serbian’s Slobodan Milosevic ethnic cleansing (1992 – 1999) in Yugoslavia.

Demographic composition and disparities, empirical evidence would reveal, have occasioned and would continue to occasion major war ‘within’ and ‘between’ the same civilization(s), and not just the latter as Huntington forecasts.¹³ Additionally, the fault lines of division would include those of political, geopolitical, and historical interests, etc.

Heterogeneity in demographic composition either in the form of religion,

¹² Samuel P. Huntington’s, “The Clash of Civilizations” in *Samuel P. Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations?: The Debate* (New York: Foreign Affairs, 1996), p. 1.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 1-25.

ethnicity or race, when marked by intolerance at any level of security, could lead to competitive security behavior in the SSE, and eventually instability. Steven David correctly observes that arms conflicts in the post Cold War era have been almost exclusively domestic. Internal wars, he says, represent 80 percent of all the wars and casualties since the end of World War II. Most internal disputes, especially since 1989, originate from ethnic and religious disparity.¹⁴ Conflicts from demographic compositional forces can take the form of revolutions, insurrections, terrorist campaigns, ethnic cleansing or genocide, and large scale violence in any other form and especially violent mechanisms in the quest for self-determination.

The most salient and violent-prone demographic factor in the last decade has been the multiethnicity which has both domestic and international ramifications. Whenever ethnically related people are divided by artificial territorial border, there is a tendency for ethnic conflict spillover on the issue relating to governance/conflict. For example, the Somali ethnic group members are found in both Ethiopia and Somalia relative to the insensitivity of colonial partitioning. Consequently, this has brought about the quest for a greater Somalia that has created a volcanic powder keg that rubbles the region from time to time. Hence, support is drawn from kinship members involved in ethnic disparities which escalates, protracts, and complicates such multiethnic conflict.¹⁵ Demographic composition, either in the form of religious, racial or ethnic heterogeneity or sometimes homogeneity (which has a tendency for hypernationalism), is a part of the SSE in which states are situated at all levels of security. It consists of both physical and nonphysical

¹⁴ Steven R. David, "Internal War: Causes and Cures," *World Politics*, 49 (July 1997): 553. According to David, the figure calculation is taken from: Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures*, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1996), 18-19.

¹⁵ Valery Tishkov, "Perspectives for Ethnic Accord," *Peace and The Sciences*, XXVIII (December 1996): 3.

elements of the environment. It poses great concerns to international security and policymakers, wherever and whenever competitive security is at play.

Geopolitics

As defined by Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, geopolitics is “a school of thought stressing the influence of geographic factors on state power and international conduct”.¹⁶ A country’s location and terrain influences its security needs and foreign policy behaviors. Natural frontiers, for countries which have them, act as natural protective shields that discourages aggression and thus reduce security threats. Without military powerful neighbors, and separated by the oceans, the United States faced no immediate security threats for the past 150 years. “Consider also mountainous Switzerland whose topography and geostrategic position have made the practice of neutrality a compelling foreign policy posture”.¹⁷ The physical separation of Great Britain, an island country, acts as a buffer which secludes it from the major powers disputes in the European continent.¹⁸ Whereas, countries that are not insular are often denied the opportunity of noninvolvement in world affairs by other states at their border. Germany’s location at the geographic center of Europe subjects its domestic political system and foreign policy preferences, historically, to be deeply affected by its geostrategic position.¹⁹ The geostrategic position of a country not only partially explains the level of the threats to which it is vulnerable, but it also dictates its choices of

¹⁶ Charles W. Kegley Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation Sixth Ed.* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 43.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

weapons. The terrain and who the enemy is, must be taken into consideration in the defense planning process. Swiss military tactics are entirely defensive and use the mountains as a means of fortification. It has a limited airspace and only needs short range missiles. Not only does Israel has a flying space problem, it needs long range or intermediate missiles to reach Iraq, Iran, etc. Also, Israel must play balance-of-power politics as well, to keep its enemies divided. In short, geography plays a vital role in international politics, the level of exposure to threats, and security policy priorities.

In the contemporary world, Patrick O'Sullivan argues, geography matters in interstate relations, be they friendly or hostile. "The strength of sympathetic and influential ties between the governments of nations is as much a matter of geographic distance as of political and cultural distance".²⁰ From the standpoint of man's survival, the sphere of influence which rests on geopolitical circumstance, plays a major role. In the quest to enhance geopolitical stance, O'Sullivan contends that "violence has been a ready resort and the preparation for war is a major feature of most civilized society."²¹ Kegley and Wittkopf remind us of the hypotheses adopted by many geopolitics theorists that topography, location, and other geopolitical factors influence states' foreign priorities; specifically that of Great Britain, Germany, China, Finland and South America States, and in fact that of the present United States.²²

Geopolitics is, after all, nothing but the situation of a nation-state in the international system. As Earl Ravenal postulates, where a nation is, by whom it is surrounded or abutted, who those surrounding states are, how powerful or even latently

²⁰ Patrick O'Sullivan, *Geopolitics* (New York: Martin's Press, 1986), p. 1.

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² Kegley et Wittkopf 1997, p. 42.

powerful, whether there are irredenta or contested areas at issue, what kinds of defensible natural obstacles exist at boundaries all matter (i.e. to the condition of that states' SSE). With what other countries in the world a state's neighbor forms an alliance, or the strategic resources that might attract the attention and interest of other states,²³ play a vital role in conditioning a state's SSE and its insecurity perception. Clearly, the regional condition in which a state is located plays a critical part in the condition of its SSE and hence its act of militarization. Without understanding the geopolitical situation and stance of a state in it, it is impossible to fully understand the causes of threats to its security and hence the driving force behind its weapons acquisition behavior.

Geopolitics, as Lider would have it, is understood as the space needed by a nation "to live prosperously and securely, as well as its boundaries and geographical location, including its relation to the crucial geographic areas of the world."²⁴ In the geopolitical approach, war is a measure to protect and preserve and/or the struggle for better geopolitical condition. Therefore, state militarization activities are seen as efforts towards such end.

National Goals and Ambitions

The goals of the state, which range from survival to global domination, play major roles in defining its SSE both in terms of size and threat perception.²⁵ States attempt to maximize security might be motivated anywhere from ensuring its own

²³ Excerpts from Professor Earl Ravena's lectures, "International Security Theory and Practice (INAF-49.6-01)", at Georgetown University, Spring 1997.

²⁴ Julian Lider, *On The Nature of War* (Fanborough, Hants, Saxon House, 1983), p. 3.

²⁵ Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," *Security Studies* 6.4 (Summer 1997):.7; John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War", *International Security* 5.1. (Summer 1990):5-56.

survival to dominating others, at either the regional or global levels. First, states would protect, defend, or advance any interest they consider crucial to their survival; in an anarchic world with an absence of central government. The environment in which such interests are located is vulnerable to being threatened by other states relative to the overlap of strategic security environments, and hence vital interests. To ensure survival, appropriate measures and policies to protect such must be pursued.²⁶ Ordinarily, individual sovereign state pursuit of its 'survival' goals, in a self-help world, would lead to the security dilemma, and thereon multiple security dilemmas. When this scenario occurs, a country's environment could become challenging and even chaotic. Hence, the Hobesian view that international arena is percolated with hostility often drives states' appetite for militarization.

Second, while the tendency to pursue state goals might be driven by the attempt to enhance security, sometimes it is driven by greed or aggression. In the world of motivational realism, it is greedy states that make the anarchic environment dangerous. Because of the existence of greedy states (e.g. Nazi Germany), security seekers have to engage in the game of power for the sake of defence. Without greedy states the "world of security seekers would be peaceful," according to Andrew Kydd.²⁷ Global domination or hegemonic attempts which typified the Cold War superpowers' rivalry, were motivated by their expansion of strategic interests and hence their pursuit of incompatible expansionist foreign policy. Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton define hegemony as "the extension by one state of preponderant influence or control over another state or region.

²⁶ Elizabeth C. Hanson, *William T.R. Fox And The Study Of World Politics* in Rothstein 1991.

²⁷ Andrew Kydd, "Sheep in Sheep's Clothing: Why Security Seekers Do Not Fight Each Other", *Security Studies*, 7.1 (autumn 1997): 115-116.

A policy of hegemony may result in client-state or satellite relationship and the creation of a sphere of influence".²⁸ The expansion of strategic interest automatically leads to the expansion of SSE, which is not limited to territorial ramification but can involve conscious bid for hegemony. The quest for expansionist strategic interest and hence expansionist foreign policy and SSE explains Napoleon's and Hitler's bid for hegemony, British and Roman hegemonic long cycle behavior for centuries.²⁹

Anarchy

Structural theories, especially neorealism, postulates generally that whatever the behavior of state that cannot be explained by the structure of the international system is trivial, and specifically that anarchy renders states insecure and leads them to maximize security. Anarchy, they say, explains the behavior of states.³⁰ According to Waltzian neorealism, although it reluctantly acknowledges the presence of other complimentary causations (e.g polarity of the system), anarchy is the principal element of the international political structure that is responsible for instability. "In anarchy, security is the highest end".³¹ Given the fact that states behave according to the dictate of a 'self-help' system. Waltz elucidates, "a self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer."³² Thus, the quest to maximize security in order

²⁸ Dr. Karl P. Magyar, Ed. *Global Security Concerns: Anticipating The Twenty-First Century* (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), p. 273.

²⁹ Labs 1997, p. 12; Kegley et Wittkopf 1997, p.69. ", *Security Studies*, 7.1 (autumn 1997): 115-116.

³⁰ Labs, 1997, pp. 1-49; quoted in Kydd 1997, p. 114.

³¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: Mcgrw-Hill Publishing Co., 1979), p. 126.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

to avert potential threats and to foster the chances of survival becomes a high imperative. Security is the only necessary and sufficient cause for armament acquisition³³ or protective alliances (e.g. balance of power).³⁴ Anarchy might be seen as the background of international politics in the absence of a central authority to mediate disputes. However, the role of anarchy as the principal causation of insecurity is over exaggerated.

Motivational realists reject the Waltizian argument that structure is the principal cause of states behavior. Kydd argues that the presence of greedy states is necessary for conflict to occur in such context. "A world of security seekers would be peaceful. Structure alone, therefore, does not cause conflict. For conflict to arise, at least one state must want to redistribute the benefits of the international system in its favor, for reasons unrelated to security".³⁵ For motivational reasons, beyond security necessity, such as regional or global hegemonism, states may also acquire military capabilities to realize their non-security aspirations.

In some regions of the world, anarchy has matured beyond what it used to be following World War I or World War II. Therefore, anarchy among friendly countries, say Western Europeans, is not the same as anarchy among enemies, as seen in the Middle East. Anarchy is only one type of contributing factors to insecurity. In this study, security threat to a state, region or the globe is not seen as a function of anarchy alone. Security concerns are also functions of demography/degree of international political

³³ Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime", *Security Studies*, 4.3 (Spring 1995): 486; also see Labs 1997, p. 4.

³⁴ Steven Wayne Brinkoetter, *Ideorealism: Theory for the New World Order*, (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1996), pp. 190; 242.

³⁵ Kydd 1997, p. 116.

consensus to which neorealist anarchy has little relevance. Clearly, neorealism, by addressing threats at the international level only, overlooks the profound role played by endogenous factors in both national, regional, or even global contexts. World War I originated from an endogenous cause. That is, the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914 at Sarajevo, in Bosnia (then part of Austrian Empire) which was perpetrated by Serbian nationalists, had its root in regional and ethnic rivalry (i.e. Serbians vs Austrians).³⁶ Also, some security analysts including Jack Snyder and Stephen Van Evera, blamed the origin of World War I on the 'cult of the offensive', by emphasizing the "domestic and the organization sources for offensive strategies."³⁷ "Cult of the Offensive" strategy demands that any conflict must be swiftly executed and short.³⁸ Stunt militarization is an undebatable requisite for such a strategy of decisive winning.

Based on what Waltz himself wrote, it is clear that hierarchy describes domestic politics and anarchy international politics:

National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation. The international realm is preeminently a political one. The national realm is variously described as being hierachic, vertical, centralized, heterogenous, directed, and contrived; the international realm, as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, homogenous, undirected, and mutually adaptive.³⁹

However, if anarchy, which characterizes the international arena, is the principal cause of conflict, why are domestic conflicts salient in the post Cold War 'internal' context, where

³⁶ Robert J. Lieber, *No Common Power: Understanding International Relations* (Glenview, IL.: Scott Foresman and Company, 1988), pp. 43-144.

³⁷ Quoted in Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn Jones, Eds. *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War: Revised Expanded Edition* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. xv.

³⁸ Lieber 1988, 145.

³⁹ Waltz 1979, p.113.

hierarchy reigns? This scenario defies the central causal argument of neorealism. If anarchy is the principal cause of international insecurity and conflicts, it does not explain the root cause of World War I (1914), Yugoslavian civil war and genocide (1989), or The Rwanda civil war and genocide (1994). The restriction of anarchy to the international realm does not explain the situation of an anarchic Somalia, a country, which has gone without a central government since 1991. Starvation, violence, destruction and chaos at the hands of fractious militias have depicted anarchy in the true sense of the word, surprisingly, within and not without a nation-state. In 1991 and 1992 alone 300,000 Somali's were killed.⁴⁰

Similarly, since Angolan independence from Portuguese colonialism in 1975, Angola has remained what Lynne Duke of *The Washington Post* called a "postponed country" at the hands of the opposing liberation armies of UNITA (the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and the ruling MPLA (The Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola). Over 20 years, more than 10 percent of Angolans have been forced out of their homes and more than 500,000 killed in this protracted war. In this "postponed country", the heavy fighting that broke out in the latter part of 1998 has added 400,000 new refugees to the million-plus of people displaced from their homes by the war.⁴¹ Systemic theory and its structural explanation cannot account for why "anarchy" is negating "hierarchy" within the nation-states. This raises a serious question of whether anarchy really has a boundary. If real anarchy is found occurring within nation-states instead of or in addition to the international system, the backbone of

⁴⁰ Karl Vick, "An Anarchic Somalia Lurches Toward Another Famine", *The Washington Post (World News)*, (Sunday, December 27, 1998): A23; A29. Col.1.

⁴¹ Lynn Duke, "Angola: A 'Postponed Country': Nation's Internal War Erupts Anew, Claiming a New Generation of Young Civilians" *The Washington Post (World News)*, (Monday, December 28, 1998.): A17.

neorealist and systemic explanations may, as it seems, has fractured. On the other hand, one can say that neorealist argument on the dynamics of anarchy remains valid in the domestic context just as it obtains in the systemic one. That is, the absence of internal hierarchy leads to instability and conflict. A realm that is anarchical, structuralists would argue, will be conflictual. Survival will be the highest priority, and security will be a scarce commodity. The case of Somalia can be said to prove this point. Anarchy, we shall assume in this study, plays a role in both domestic instability and international insecurity because its effect still impact on the security of some regions in the world, e.g. the Middle East, African etc.

Norms and Identity

Finally, this research claims that norms and identity constitute vital elements in the make up of a country's SSE. The neorealist and neoliberal theoretical debates in recent years have constituted the core of international relations, which in turn has shaped security studies.⁴² From the neorealist perspective, cultural effects such as norms and identity are largely epiphenomenal⁴³. They lack causal force. Until lately, neoliberalism and regime theory were the dominant approaches on the study of international norms.⁴⁴ From the neoliberal perspective, regimes, norms, rules and principles of conduct which are derived from states' general agreement do matter in international politics/security.⁴⁵

⁴² Ronald L. Jepperson et al, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security" in Katzenstein Ed, 1996, p. 44.

⁴³ Shah M. Tarzi, "The Role of Norms and Regimes in World Affairs: A Grotian Perspective, *International Relation Relations*, XIV.5 (December 1998): 73; Jeppersen et al 1996, p. 34.

⁴⁴ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "Norms, Institutions, and National Identity in Contemporary Europe", *International Studies Quarterly*, 43 (1999): 84.

⁴⁵ Tarzi 1998, p. 73.

“They facilitate cooperation among self-interested individuals”.⁴⁶ Even though norms are seen as constraining states behavior, they are not seen as affecting their identities and interests. Norms are dependent upon the underlying power of distribution.⁴⁷

Revitalized by the constructivist thinking, international norms have influence on states interests in a way that goes far beyond neoliberal perspectives.⁴⁸ Norms are collective understanding which shape actors’ behaviors. They constitute actors’ identities and interests. Norms are not just superstructure mounted on a material base, rather, they take part in creating and defining the base.⁴⁹

Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein define norms as “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity.” They assert that norms “either define (“constitute”) identities in the first place (generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or prescribe or proscribe (“regulate”) behaviors for already constituted identities (generating expectations about how those identities will shape behavior in various circumstances)”.⁵⁰ That is, norms establish expectations of who the actors in a particular environment would be and how such actors should behave.

Functioning as an important link between environmental structures and interests, identity is employed as “a label for the varying construction of nationhood and statehood.”⁵¹ In this case, both (a) the variation of ideologies of “collective distinctiveness

⁴⁶ Checkel 1999, p. 84.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 107.

⁴⁹ Jeffrey T. Checkel, “The Constructivist Turn In International Relations Theory”, *World Politics*, 50 (January 1998): 328.

⁵⁰ Jepperson et al 1996, p. 54.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 59.

and purpose” (i.e. nationhood or nationalism) and (b) country modal variation in state sovereignty are “enacted domestically and projected internationally” (i.e. statehood).⁵²

Although norms reinforce the pattern of states behaviors both domestically and internationally as Grotian scholars such as Tarzi argues,⁵³ constructivists argue that just as there are good norms there are bad norms as well. Consistent with this study, the constructivists invoke that social structures, particularly norms, are one type of the various causal variables in international outcomes. Just as there are ethically good norms (e.g. the imposition of stigma on the use of nuclear biological and chemical weapons), there are also ethically bad norms (e.g. those that characterized the Cold War). Ironically, technologies of mass destruction Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald argue, are socially constructed.⁵⁴ During its era, slavery was an international norm among the great powers, just as the transnational norms of racial equality or human rights are popular today. Similarly, colonization, and decolonization, the offensive military cult that some scholars blamed for WWI, and peacekeeping endeavors, are all norms.

Norms and identity are duo-causal, and they complement each other. In World War II, the quest towards attaining a purified German identity by the Nazist party created anti-semitic domestic norms and eventually the Holocaust. The issue of identity lies at the core of the ongoing Protestant and Catholic conflict in Northern Ireland, just as the violent competition taking place between the Arab world and Israel. The quest for a non-western and pro-islamic theocratic identity catapulted Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran to power in 1979 and led to the downfall of (Pro-Western) Anwat Sadat of Egypt. In these

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Tarzi 1998, p. 71

⁵⁴ Richard Price and Nina Tannenwald, “Norms and Deterrence: The Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Taboos.” In Katzenstein 1996, pp. 114-143..

regions, at their respective times, Islam was not just a set of beliefs, but a prescription for life. Thus, 'faith' as a norm, flamed Islamic revolutions in the quest for Islamic identity.

While constructivism has widened our understanding of the role played by norms, it also exhibits some weaknesses. As Jeffrey Checkel notes, first, it neglects a systematic argument on how international norms reach the domestic environment; and second it fails to account for how the same norm might have constitutive impact in one state and not in others. Thus, Checkel argues, the constructivists over-predict international normative influence and are unable to explain "cross-national variation in the constitute impact of systemic norms".⁵⁵ Nonetheless, bad norms or good ones can have domestic or systemic origin. Either way, norms, like identity, are elements of both individual and the environment at large. Sometimes, and more likely, domestic norms might exert more pressure in shaping an actor's behavior than the systemic ones, as was the case in Nazi Germany during World War II,⁵⁶ or the apartheid system of the white minority government in South Africa.

Basically, the constructivists' principal argument, which this study borrows, is that what we get in the world depends on what we do. There are both good and bad things in world politics that are socially constructed. Social constructs that are bad in the strategic security environment are causations and forms of threats to international security.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Checkel 1999, p. 85. Critics of the constructivists including Checkel, often charge that constructivism is an approach, rather than a theory because of its failure to capture and explain how the social constructivist world really works in terms of action and socialization especially at the unit level.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 108.

⁵⁷ Checkel 1998, p. 339.

Michael N. Barnett suggests that threat identification and the determination of whether and with whom to engage in alliance formation in response to that threat are propelled by identity; for example, the role of Pan-Arabism in inter-Arabs-Israeli conflicts. Non-material forces such as identity, he argues, shed an alternative approach to neorealist material forces in understanding security politics and cooperation.⁵⁸ Barnett's argument might not be applicable in all cases of conflict such as Syria's attack on Jordan in 1970 however, his argument is applicable in understanding conflicts occurring in the scenario he explains. Norms and identity play palpable role in conditioning the SSE of a country or region. Identity is not static but dynamic, a relational construct that points at who to balance against and who to ally or bandwagon with. Although sources of identity might be natural, (e.g. race, ethnic, tribal etc.) or attainable via shared values (e.g. religion, democracy etc.), but in the context of global or international politics, institutional sources of norms are less divisive, and more universalizing than these other sources. In fact, identity that is based on natural sources of limitedly shared values can exaggerate regional or interstate hostility. Generally, identity can be shaped internally or by external factors as well.

Overall, while anarchy and geopolitics as causes of insecurity might be identified to originate in the external security climate, their effects impact on states' ISC. Historical circumstance, demographic composition, goals and ambition, and norms and identity can originate in either ISC or ESC contexts. In either case, their effects are manifested at both levels. Interconnectedly, the negative effect of these causes on security can reinforce each other.

⁵⁸ Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East" in Katzenstein 1996, pp. 400-447.

Linking the Group of Six Causal Elements

In the SSE conceptual framework, we have seen that there are six causal-chain elements. Although one type of threat can be caused by one type of causal variable, (e.g. separatism) it does not mean that it also cannot also be caused by more than one causal factor (such as: a combination of historical circumstance, demographic factor, and norms/identity). In the latter scenario, none of the elements can causally play the role of nor be substituted for the others, despite their tendency to functionally overlap. No single element can totally account for a threat caused by multiple causal variables.

First, anarchy, as the lack of a central authority and a causal element, forms the background in which the other causes operate at the systemic and sometimes domestic levels of security. Many critics of neorealism argue that anarchy is more of a contextual character than a causation. It can be either, or simultaneously be both. What role anarchy plays in causing a particular threat is contingent on the threat and circumstances that are taking place.

Second, historical circumstance as a conveyor belt of the collection of past or recent memory keeps alive the origin of claims and counter-claims that might ferment and eventually erupt into a threatening situation from time to time. Therefore, threats or an aspect of a threat caused by historical circumstances, for example, cannot be accounted for by anarchy or *vice versa*, or any of the other elements.

Third, demographic composition sheds light on the type or aspect of a threat caused by social structure or constituency, which is link to, but should not be mistaken for the role of norms and identity. Fourth, norms and identity accounts for types or aspects of threat brought about by the disparity in social and collective understanding or

cultural effects. While these elements are complementary and can overlap, each can play its respective causal role independent of the other relative to the type of threat(s) in question.

Fifth, geopolitics accounts for threat or an aspect of a threat attributable to geographical factors and geostrategic situation. The location and space occupied by a state can predispose it to confront certain types of threats, which cannot be accounted for or fully accounted for by the other five elements. Finally, national motivation in the forms of goals and ambitions is causal relative not only to the incompatible motives but also aggressive motives by some state-actors.

The SSE, relative to the causal variables is therefore a six-sided phenomenon. That is, it is a six-sided analytic dice. However, this dice is not the same as the typical dice that is thrown in a game of chance. It is an analytic dice utilized in understanding the causal root(s) of threatening flash-point(s) at a given time. In other words, the dice is useful in identifying the causal factors of diverse destabilizing circumstances that can lead to conflict. Depending on the type of threat, and the context or the state being considered, the answer to the question of the causal root(s) of threats to insecurity might be found on one side or two, three, four, five or six sides of the dice. While each case of causal identification might be unique relative to its own causal pathway, nonetheless, the SSE serves as a six-sided analytic dice that can be drawn upon in analyzing menacing situations with differing causes and causal pathways. Thus, it is possible to account for the uniqueness of each state's insecurity situation, and simultaneously generalize the concept of the strategic security environment. In this sense, the SSE concept (i.e. the

conceptual six-sided analytic dice) is a multidimensional but equally a unified and systematized conceptual framework.

Size And The Strategic Security Environment

The extent of the strategic security environment of a country dictates the size of the strategic landscape defined as the 'strategic sphere of influence' to which militarization efforts must be aimed. The SSE of a hegemon in a unipolar order, for example, is large and global. As such, its militarization endeavor must be aimed at its global strategic security environment to match and succumb any threat that might evolve. Regardless of what factors shape a state's definition, a state defines the perimeters of its own SSE. For example, the United States defined its SSE in the 1920s in terms of Western Hemisphere, but in the 1950s it was defined in global terms. What explains the difference is the distribution of power, or internal politics of the US. The size of the SSE of a country predisposes the level of threat or the amount of potential threats to which that country must be militarily prepared to respond. While the size of this environment pinpoints the landscape from which threats are to be expected, threats per se shape the national strategic planning process and the extent of military capabilities to be acquired. The larger the SSE the broader the strategic interests, the wider the range of threat that must be ward off or countered, and the broader the range of goals to be pursued.

Once a state designs and defines its defense policy objectives based on its SSE and how threatening it is perceived, it must then seek out the means to achieve such objectives, regardless of whether that country is an aggressor or a security seeker. Here security needs and expectations which are germane to the size of the SSE are to be

balanced with military capability. The larger the SSE, the larger the number of vital security issues the state must worry about. Haiti, unlike the United States, does not have to worry about Iraqi aggression; neither is Uganda's strategic interest threatened by the conflict at the former Yugoslavia. Countries with imperialistic tendencies (e.g. Britain, USA, the former USSR etc.) tend to have the largest SSE relative to their tendency to expand their strategic interests. Industrialized or developed states, for example, some European countries, and Japan, would have larger SSEs followed by potential regional hegemonies such as Nigeria in West Africa, Egypt in North Africa, the Federal Republic of Congo or South Africa in Southern Africa, Brazil and Chile in South America, and Iraq, Iran, Syria and Israel in the Middle East, and so on. Countries with the smallest SSEs would include all the developing and poor ones, whose projection of power and influence are at most restricted to their regional locality.

Ironically while the size of strategic security environment determines the level of armament acquisition, the amount of acquired armaments enhances power projection and hence the widening of strategic interests and consequently the SSE. In this dynamic, the extent of weapons acquisition and strategic security environment can reinforce each other (see the arrow going backward to the left in Figure1, page 32).

The pursuit of unrestricted military capabilities to protect a gamut of strategic interests which is inherent in a widened SSE leads into steady economic over-extension. In which case, such military expenditure takes its toll on the national revenue-raising capability until the economy can no longer support the strategic security environment and the pertinent strategic interests in the form of military burden which is too top-heavy for

the weakened economic base.⁵⁹ In the history of Great Powers such as Spain, the Netherlands, France, the British Empire, the defunct Soviet Union and currently the United States, states have had to face these predicaments; that is, the dilemma of huge size SSE and the lack of the necessary economic resources to support a large-scale military establishment for a prolonged period. Such economic decline usually leads to a diminished military power in the form of shrinking SSE and strategic interests,⁶⁰ as was the case with the British empire or Soviet Union at its demise.

The size of the SSEs of some states rarely extend beyond the region in which they are located, whereas others extend over few regions or even continents. A superpower's or a hegemon's SSE is usually global. While a particular country's SSE might cut through all levels of security, i.e. societal, regional, extraregional and global, but not unlike a hole in a doughnut, it does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of restriction, that is, from the SSEs of other entities' in the system. The size of the SSE of any country is not rigid, but changes periodically relative to changes in strategic interests. Both the SSE and the strategic interest on which it is predicated are not static, but they are dynamic and changing in character.

The SSE of one state overlaps the SSE of other states in terms of proximity and strategic interests which inevitably might lead to competition that generates threatening insecurity feelings, militarization and conflicts, especially when one of the states is aggressive. This, for example, explains one of the major causes of the Gulf War. Based on historical circumstances, Kuwait used to be part of Iraq prior to it being carved out as

⁵⁹ Paul Kennedy, *The Rise And Fall of The Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. xvi-xvii.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. xvi-xxii.

a state by Britain in 1952. Both the historical circumstance and geostrategic factors, to say the least, ignited Iraqi national aspirations, when Saddam Hussein attempted to seize control of Kuwait in order to enhance Iraqi SSE and strategic interest, respectively. But because the Gulf region falls within the SSE of the United States relative to the presence of its strategic interest in the region, i.e. oil, President George Bush orchestrated what the American people described as a 'war of petroleum', camouflaged as a war for upholding democratic national independence principles against Iraq. When threat is perceived, states would go to any extreme to protect their SSEs and interests because these interests are critical and pivotal to national security. The more there is overlapping of strategic interest of states in a region without regional security arrangement, the more threatening they are to each other and need military protection to ward off such threat.

The constant struggle that emerges between states relative to the pursuit of strategic interests occurs with the expectation to enhancing it individually. Also being enhanced by increasing aggregate power to maximize security, strategic interest can in turn enhance aggregate power.⁶¹ Because of insecurity, competition, militarization and conflict are bound to happen between those who are favored by the current state in the division of world power, the *status quo* 'protagonists', and those who, on the other hand, have the short end of the rope, the '*status quo* antagonists', that want the pertinent SSEs and strategic interests revised. A state's action and behavior are driven by its strategic security environments and interests in terms of survival and/or national ambitions, irrespective of the nature of the state.

⁶¹ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 264-265. In other words, advantage gained in increased strategic interests of a state enhances aggregate power; aggregate power in turn fosters the prospect for increasing strategic interest.

The differences in how they perceive the condition of their SSEs and act is another question and a function of the type of national defense planning process (NDPP) obtainable in each state. Consequently, the forces that shape international politics emanate, to a good extent, from the overlapping SSEs of the states that constitute the system. States, to some extent, do not absolutely design their SSE, but they can only react to it and repeatedly try to modify it.⁶²

Strategic Interests and Strategic Security Environment

The SSE has a dual nature: it houses the strategic interests of states and harbors the threats that confound these interests. However, the possibility to ameliorate or eliminate these threats makes an already chaotic SSE condition changeable, unlike the static neorealist anarchic environment. Such changeability can come about via cooperative rather than competitive security.

The strategic interests of an actor in international security involve issues that may readily lead to fighting when encroached upon by another actor. While survival tops the lists of strategic interests, it is only “a precursor to understanding of states preferences rather than a satisfactory conception on its own.”⁶³ For example, although significant tension often exists between the two objectives, however, military preparedness and economic capacity are not incompatible on the issue of ‘survival’. In fact it is hard to survive without having both in a world where famine has become an effective weapon of

⁶² Karl P. Magyar, “History, Culture, and Change Foundations of Conflicts and Wars” in Dr. Karl P. Magyar, 1996, p. 24. Dr. Magyar states that the United States cannot design its conflict environment. This contention is applicable to the SSE of any country because some of the activities and condition within its SSE is beyond its own making.

⁶³ Stephen G. Brooks, “Dueling Realisms”, *International Organization*, 51.3 (Summer 1997): 450.

war, even to biblical proportions.⁶⁴ Sometimes famine is even more cost-effective as a weapon of war than military machines. Economic capacity is seen here as a requisite for military security and physical survival. This does not debase our categorization of economic security to the realm of non-strategic security environment. The categorization is based on what is immediately critical to 'physical survival', rather than what is essential for national security.

The neorealist idea that to survive, for example, a country must make a trade-off between military security and economic capacity when the two are in conflict, is not consistent with most states' behavior. To sustain a healthy national military preparedness, a healthy economic capacity is not only necessary but required. Otherwise, survival both in military or economic terms could be jeopardized as was the case of the disintegrated Soviet Empire. A weak economy, from an holistic perspective, would leave a state potentially vulnerable to military exploitation by a likely competitor, as has lately being the case between the defunct Soviet Union and the United States.⁶⁵ The pursuit of both economic capacity and military preparation are compatibly interdependent and necessary for survival in a competitive world. Otherwise Great Powers would not be falling as articulated by Kennedy, when they are faced with weak economic capacity at the middle of heavy-top military responsibilities.

Strategic interests include territorial integrity, sovereign prerogatives, societal core values, physical safety, freedom from threat, etc. Whether seen from a traditional or non-traditional perspective, strategic interest covers issues that range from survival to global domination. Depending on which international actors is in question, strategic

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 451.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 453.

interests vary accordingly. These interests are a composition of traditional and contemporarily based security prerogatives. They are dynamic and changing, just as the character of the SSE changes from time to time. How threatening the environment in which these interests are located, predicates the necessity and extent of armament acquisition necessary to protect and advance them. These interests are critical to each country's survival, sovereignty, welfare, integrity and position in the system, in both the short and long term outlook, and they are not limited to the traditional military dimension of security. Unlike non-strategic interests (areas of minimal concern), threats to strategic interests are major and are violent-prone. Threats to non-strategic interests are minor and are most likely to be resolved politically or diplomatically. They rarely breed violent encounter between actors, if at all. In the contemporary sense, threats to strategic interests directly drive the extent of weapons acquisition behavior by states; whereas dangers to non-strategic interests only have an indirect role to play in such endeavor. States defense policy mostly focus on the former since they represent threats to military security. It is for this reason that states militarize and the militarization itself also serves as deterrence against potential threats.

Threats and The Strategic Security Environment

States' conduct in international politics is shaped by the level of danger they perceive in the strategic security environment. Instead of power balancing, states rationally balance threats, real and/or perceived, with military capabilities acquisition in order to alleviate their vulnerability. States react to imbalances between exposure to harm in the context of the SSE and (inadequate) military preparedness. For every

country, there are gradations in the severity of threats based on what type of government and consequently the national defence planning apparatus that is in place. Encroachment to the SSE and hence strategic interests (or what some would call 'vital interests') is the most formidable type a state can be confronted with because it is central to its 'physical survival'.

In advancing his balance-of-threat theory, Walt articulates that threats are "a function of power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities, and perceived intentions". States he contends, forms alliances to balance against precarious circumstances.⁶⁶ (1) Power is the product of a state's total resources such as population, economic and military capability, technological process and political cohesion.⁶⁷ (2) Geographical proximity or 'proximate power' predicates that nearby states pose a much greater problem (in some cases) than those that are far away. (Walt does not indicate the contemporary effect of military technological revolution on geographic proximity).⁶⁸ (3) He defines offensive power as the ability to threaten the sovereignty or integrity of another state at an "unacceptable cost". "Aggregate power, with ease, can be converted to offensive power."⁶⁹ (4) Finally, he depicts aggressive intention to denote the degree to which another state's designs are perceived as malevolent.⁷⁰

It is clear that Walt endeavors to depart from structural balance-of-power theory,

⁶⁶ Walt 1994, p.vi; 265.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.22; 265.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 23.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 24. Walt defines offensive power as the ability to threaten the sovereignty on integrity of another state at an "acceptable" cost. I use the word unacceptable here, since a power that leads to an acceptable cost cannot be potent nor offensive because it cannot inflict lethal damage. Perhaps Walt mistakenly use the word 'acceptable' instead of 'unacceptable'. Perhaps Walt is saying that the cost is acceptable to the offensive power.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 25-26; David Priess, "Balance-of-Threat Theory and The Genesis of The Gulf Cooperation Council: An Interpretative Case Study", *Security Studies*, 5.4 (Summer 1996): 148-149.

however, his focus on the issue of threats from state-centric sense makes him fall short of articulating the issue in the manner that is germane to contemporary world security. Threats should be approached holistically, i.e., both from state and non-state actors' perspectives and covering pertinently all levels of security. Balance-of-threat theory in respect to alliance formation leaves a whole gamut of causes that pose security problems to both the state and non-states entities unaddressed. Although the subject matter Walt addresses, alliance formation, might not allow him to deal with the issue of threats in holistic terms, his work captures only partially the dynamics of states behavior in their quest for security. Today, instead of one specific canonical threat, and/or a cause of threat, the present world confronts a broad array of menacing issues, emanating from dissimilar sources.

Threat is an expression of intention to inflict injury and damage or, any entity that threatens. Threats to national or international security go beyond the traditional types that states pose to each other. To this end, Hakan Wiberg offers a contemporary characterization of the term.

Threats include already existing bad conditions: war and occupation, blackmail by military threats, deprivation of basic needs, and the absence of various individual and collective rights. They include explicit or assumed intentions of actors to create such conditions. For the concept of threat to be useful when defining 'security', it should also include scenarios that might be realized by individual actors having such intentions in the future, or, for that matter, by interaction among actors that do not know what they are doing. Since threats may thus be latent, peace, welfare and the rule of law do not automatically spell security. Security must be conceptualized as the absence of manifested threats and credible threat scenarios, not merely as the absence of manifested threats.⁷¹

This conceptualization allows room for the inclusion of non-traditional threats that arise

⁷¹ Hakan Wiberg, "(Re)Conceptualizing Security", *Arms Control*, 13.3 (December 1992): 487-488.

from non-state actors, and similarly addresses both manifested and potential threats. Whether or not interaction among actors who do not know what they are doing can elicit militarization or conflict is debatable. Mostly, states are well versed in the pursuit of their strategic interests. Although Wiberg seems to be defining the term in general as applicable to both strategic and non-strategic interests, our concerns here involve understanding threats, from state and non-state causes, in terms of their inimical effect to strategic interests.

In understanding the central role-played by threats in the dynamics of insecurity and militarization and consequently international security, six points should be noted. First, threats drive the extent of armament acquisition by states; second, threats as such, are the function of observation, analytic interpretation, empirical extrapolation and hypothetical prediction.⁷² Third, while some threats at one level of security can filter to another level or impact on more than one level they, nonetheless, can be categorized according to levels of security: (i.e. societal, regional, and extraregional but without engaging in rigid peculiarity). Fourth, measures for safeguarding security at one level, contradictorily, might have the tendency to jeopardize security at one or the other two levels. Fifth, therefore, a perfect international security requires that “the national security of all - or all major states - is safeguarded”⁷³ irrespective of whether or not this is achievable. Such approach necessitates ‘cooperative security’ (as seen in the present Europe) measures, and the jettisoning of methods of competitive security. Finally, rather than narrowly engaging in balance-of-power, states engage more broadly in balance of capability to counteract both state centric and non-state centric types of threat.

⁷² Ibid., p. 488.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 489-489.

Balance-of-Capability vs Balance-of-Power

The traditional interstate type of threat to which balance-of-power is aimed to resolve (e.g. by the way of alliance formation) is only one type of problem in the nontraditional world. There are new and changing threats and their causations that fall outside the scope of this type of self-help measure. Balance-of-power is only one type of mechanism by which states fend for their security. States from time to time assess their SSE for threats or potential dangers to (both) their security (and national ambitions). Such threats can originate from both state and non-state actors. Since states cannot balance against non-state actors, accordingly, states address such menaces by balancing their security/motivational needs and expectations with appropriate military measures.

By balancing capabilities with threats, a state is able to deal with both traditional and nontraditional problems (e.g. terrorism, civil war, etc.) in different contexts. Balance-of-power is only a microcosm of and a subset to balance-of-capability. Balance-of-capability subsumes the concept of balance-of-power because balance-of-power concept is just one method of balancing danger with therapeutic measure. Through the use of military (or nonmilitary) capabilities states are consciously and appropriately responsive to dealing with threats and the causations of threats from both state and non-state entities.

Finally, a recapitulation of the major points in this chapter would bring it into a sharper focus. In the strategic security environment framework, the actors include both state and non-state actors, while the primal state goal is ensuring physical safety. Physical safety, defined in a non-traditional sense, is more robust and concerns more issues than the traditional notion of the term. Usually, military force is the conventional

instrument of international politics/security. Today, there are wider range of transnational security issues (e.g. terrorism) that military force alone cannot sufficiently overcome. It is not possible for a state to engage in balance-of-power against terrorists. Also, relative to the apocalyptic effect of contemporary military intervention in incurring disproportionate costs with very little benefit, the use of force is not as beneficial as it used to be.

The strategic security environment, a function of a causal-chain variables consisting of six elements, is the principal source of states, fear, distrust, insecurity and instability. Militarization is the second source. The larger the size of the strategic security environment landscape, the more are the strategic interests that the state must worry about. The more the strategic interests a state has to worry about, the greater such interests and the state itself are vulnerable to feel threatened or be threatened. The level of insecurity/instability within the SSE dictates the level of weapons acquisition. Next, the concept of SSE would be articulated from both the internal and external componential perspectives, to show how interwoven are the endogenous and exogenous causal factors in influencing state behavior and international outcomes.

Chapter 4

THE CONTEXTUAL COMPONENTS OF THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY CLIMATES

In Chapter three, we focused generally on the multidimensional causes of insecurity within the strategic security environment. In this chapter, we shall examine the 'domestic' and 'external' components which constitute the SSE. That is, we shall examine the internal security climate (ISC) and the external security climate (ESC) and the types of threats obtainable in each of them. The intention is to concretize how the six causal factors interwovenly emanate into various types of threats that condition the SSE. Also, it is important to note that the causes of threat and threats that are endogenous might have exogenous impact, or vice versa. In other words, the interconnectedness or interdependency of the ISC and ESC, as components of the strategic security environment, shall be articulated. A brief examination of the intermediate level of security, regional security, shall be undertaken. It is important to do this because regional security is the linkage between the societal and extra-regional levels of security and is critical to international politics/security. It is the microcosm of international security wherein a good portion of states behavior can be studied. Also the role of the national defence planning process, the intervening variable in this causal-effect framework shall be discussed.

Threats emanate from the causal nexus within the SSE and push countries armament acquisition endeavors. Primarily, the causal roots of threat can be pinned down in the unstable internal security climate and/or a hostile external security climate which

are/is not conducive to a stable and secured strategic security environment. How do internal security climate and external security climate relate to the SSE? Another look at the model for visual inference would be helpful in answering this question further. (See Fig.1, page 32). Both ISC and ESC reinforce each other.

As in foreign policy decision making, national security decision making and implementation involve three important phases in bringing in various causal and formative elements and other independent variables. The first phase is the context which explains the source(s) and nature of real and potential threats (i.e. inputs for decision-making). The second phase involves the national defense policy 'process' which acts as the causal funnel/processor that processes the information collected from the SSE. That is, the analytic assessment of the information gathered from the context (SSE) serves as an input for decision-making (i.e. process). The third phase entails the policy action (i.e. output) that results from both the combination of context and context assessment/processing of the information gathered. The effects of insecurity on state behavior is manifested in the form of policy Action I, i.e., the extent of weapons acquisition. Here, the final decision is implemented in the form of action. In this study, the context is the SSE which serves as the source of inputs. The process is the national defense planning, which acts as David Easton's black box and involves the authoritative governmental decision-making apparatus. The policy action which serves as the output or implemented 'action' is the extent of weapons acquisition. The second output or policy action is the international arms control objectives (i.e. Policy Action II), which depicts the impact of security decisions made and implemented at the national level relative to insecurity perception and the counter-action to such action(s) to neutralize that negative effect at the

international level. Policy Action II is powered and driven by the effects of insecurity on inter-state relations. The result of the international endeavors (e.g. arms control) or the lack of such brings about international outcomes. Such outcomes can be manifested either as stability or instability.

This framework acknowledges both structural and nonstructural constraints of state behavior by linking the traditional and non-traditional endogenous causes of threat to exogenous ones. The SSE, as such, encapsulates elements of both entities and is itself a combination of these two interlocking internal and external components. That is, with all variables depending on time, the strategic security environment is a function of both the internal and external security climates. Where X measures SSE; X_I the ISC; and X_E the ESC. Also X_I and X_E are implicitly interdependent (i.e. ISC and ESC). Sometimes it is not clear where one ends or where the other begins (i.e. endogenous and exogenous contexts).

As previously ascertained, two types of threats drive states weapons acquisition desire: (1) Survival and manifested or anticipated threats to it; the emergence of which must be deterred; and (2) National goals and aspirations; threats, and potential threats inimical to them. It is important to note here that while Walt's appears to have produced the most updated study on the subject of threat, in relation to alliance formation, he fails to tell us in contemporary sense who and what the threats are.¹ In this study, we hope to fill in the gap left by this ambiguity.

¹ Walt's book is devoted to why states form alliances, primarily, to balance against threats. However, he fails to delineate what the threats and their sources are, or whether or not new types of threats have emerged since the concept of Balance-of-Power was formulated. This leaves in the dark, important facts on the concept of threats especially in terms of their sources, and nature etc, which could distinguish the use of the term, in the sense of balance-of-power from that of the balance-of-threat.

The SSE of a country epitomizes the sources of its threats and therefore its conflict environment. This unified causal-effect analysis holds that international security or insecurity and violence have both internal and international roots. The SSE is dynamic and bifurcated into two interrelated entities (i.e. ISC and ESC). The internal component of the SSE, the internal security climate, is shaped by endogenous variables. The external component is a function of exogenous threats and instability factors. Both ISC or ESC can be measured by the absence or presence of threats such as civil war, terrorism etc. The absence or presence of threats in either context serve as indicators for either a stable or unstable ISC or ESC, respectively. It is important to bear in the mind, as Martin Van Creveld argues, that most future wars would not be fought by (nor future threats posed by) traditional armies but by groups such as terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers.² Traditionally, the primary threats to security were attacks between nation-states or politically motivated insurgency.³ Today, threat issues are mostly domestic and regional in character; but with global implications.⁴

As indicated in Chapter 3, there are six causal roots of threats in the causal-effect theoretical framework: historical circumstances, demographic composition, geopolitical conditions, national goals and ambitions, anarchy, and finally norms and identity. Yet, one type of threat can be caused by more than one type of causal variable. How many causations are involved in emanating one type of threat is contingent upon the scenario at play, the actors involved and the specific context. The context might be domestic or

² Karl P. Magyar Ed. *Global Security Concerns: Anticipating the Twenty-First Century* (Maxwell Air force Base, Alabama: Air university press), 1996, p. 14.

³ Strategic Studies Institute, *World View: The 1996 Strategic Assessment From the Strategic Studies Institute* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. War College, 1996), p. 11.

⁴ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 1995, *Armaments, Disarmament and International Security* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 10.

external, or the combination of both. Terrorism, like civil war, for example, is a type of threat. Terrorism like civil war, may evolve from one causation or a combination of causations, such as historical circumstances, demographical composition, geopolitical condition, and/or norms/identity.

Each of these causations in turn (e.g. historical circumstances) can have domestic or external twists to its character. Because of this intricacy, first, it might be difficult to link one type of threat to a single cause, such as anarchy. Secondly, there cannot be a clear cut or demarcation between the causes of threat or sometimes actual threats from internal climate and external security climates. They are interconnected and interdependent. Threats (and threat causations) that shape the internal security climate, whether civil war, ethnic conflict, insurgency, etc, or those that condition the external security climate such as territorial disputes, international organized crimes, terrorism, etc., should be seen in this light as distinct and yet intricately inter-associated.

Internal Security Climate and Endogenous Threats

Internal security climate depicts the summation of domestic level variables in a causally consistent rather than ad hoc manner (as seen in the leading systemic theories), and their role in international outcomes.⁵ The traditional realist paradigm posits that threats to vital interest of states lessens security. While this is still true, the nature of such threats has changed. Similarly, neorealist security framework is state-centric. Many contemporary problems, however, are not captured in the realist framework. For our purpose, security extends above the state level as international security, and below it, as

⁵ Jennifer Sterling-Folker, "Realist Environment, Liberal Process, and Domestic-Level Variables," *International Studies Quarterly* 41, (1997): 1.

societal security. For this reason, there exists a merit to the argument that the concept of security should be broadened.⁶ Based on the realist framework, “the major focus of international relations has been on wars among states and on their efforts to prepare for, prevent, win, terminate, and recover from these struggles.”⁷ However, the idea that security is about ensuring protection against external military threats, which was achieved by maintaining certain level of armed forces, political and military alliances via blocks or coalitions, etc,⁸ has become a partial exposition of a larger portrait of what has become of international security at the end of the second millenium.

Since the thawing of the Cold War, the SSEs of states, like the international security environment, have changed. Dr. Magyar elucidates that “the patterns that formed the context for national security during that era have washed away; a new, if more ambiguous, structure is emerging in its place.”⁹ International insecurity today is rarely the product of a clearly monolithic causation; but a combination of major, and/or precipitating causes with a myriad of other underlying causes. Rather than the conventional variety of interstate problem, Inis L. Claude, Jr. correctly opines that “the main business of international relations today has to do with turbulence within states.”¹⁰ Beyond reasonable doubt, national and international security are interlocking and/or interdependent as a result of the gamut of emerging transnational security threats and issues. Domestic causations of international insecurity have become more prevalent than

⁶ Donald M. Snow, *National Security: Defense Policy in a Changed International Order* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), p.222; 21.

⁷ Inis L. Claude, Jr. “The United States and Changing Approaches to National Security and World Order”, *Naval War College Review*, XLVII.3 (Summer 1995): 46.

⁸ Alexander Yakovenko “Global and Regional Security in the 2st Century,” *International Institute for Peace, Vienna, Peace and Sciences XXVI*, (December 1995):1.

⁹ Magyar 1996, p. 14.

¹⁰ Inis L. Claude Jr. “The United States and Changing Approaches to National Security and World Order,” *Naval War College Review*, XLVII.3 (Summer 1995):48.

systemic causes, contrary to neorealist prediction. Instead of being a trivia cause, the domestic root of insecurity has become predominant in the post-Cold War era.

Five principal intra-state issues, which are not exclusive, are identified in this framework as examples of threat indicators in the ISC relative to whether the climate is stable or unstable. Although they are not exhaustive of types of endogenous threats, they are (1) civil war, (2) ethnic conflict, (3) insurgency e.g by separatist movements, (4) troubled state syndrome, and (5) conflict externalization as typified by scapegoat hypothesis. We shall briefly link how these issues, within a state, could impinge on the security of other states in international sense.

Civil War: While war has always been the center of attraction in international relations, internal war has become the most common form of arms conflict since the end of the Cold War. Steven R. David noted that: “While internal wars have made up over 80 percent of the wars and casualties since the end of World War II, this preponderance has become even more striking since the end of the Cold War.” Between 1989 and 1996, out of ninety-six armed conflicts, only five were interstate and the rest domestic.¹¹ Scholars of warfare have little choice but to focus on internal war.

Internal war can originate in the attempts of governments to eliminate insurgents or would be insurgents, or the other way around i.e., insurgents could challenge the government. The root cause of internal war cannot be easily pinned down, it could be “everything”. Nonetheless, Michael Brown identifies four broad causal factors, namely: structure (i.e demographics), political (citizens or certain minority groups), economic (i.e

¹¹ Steven R. David, “International War: Causes and Cures”, *World Politics*, 4^o (July 1997): 552-553.

health and stage of economic development), and cultural/perceptual (i.e presence of discrimination against some groups).¹²

The key issue here is that strife within a country sometimes percolate across state boundaries and poses a threat to international security and order. Such strife, as seen in the Middle East, Yugoslavia, Southern or Central Africa, becomes a cause of instability either by altering boundaries, or escalating into regional warfare which sometimes invite extra-regional intervention from sympathetic supporters. On the other hand, stable international security environment facilitates internal regimes to target threatening groups within their borders without the fear of external assistance. However, a hostile international environment precipitates internal conflict, particularly, when enemy countries back rebel groups.¹³ Inis Claude, commenting on this issue, states that “Indeed, it appears that most observers today have agreed that for the foreseeable future, the international order will be threatened less by aggression across state boundaries than strife within them.”¹⁴ The term civil war or internal war encompasses a myriad of conflict types, some of which have become notoriously recognized as very destabilizing to international security.

Insurgency: A 1986 publication of the U.S Army Intelligence Center and School defines insurgency as “a protracted politico-military activity directed toward completely

¹² Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 563.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 555.

¹⁴ Inis L. Claude, Jr. “The New International Order: Changing Concepts”, *Naval War College Review*, XLVII. No 1. Sequence 345 (Winter 1994): 11. See also Colin McInnes, “Has War a Future? (Review Article)”, *Arms Control*, 14.3 (December 1973): 457. McInnes comments on Martin Van Creveld’s hypothesis that future war will be fought increasingly within than between states, and that conflict will be of low intensity instead of high.

or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organization".¹⁵ Towards achieving their goals, insurgents undertake different actions which include guerrilla warfare, terrorism, or political mobilization to weaken governments control and legitimacy, and to increase to theirs.¹⁶ Militarily, the objective is to topple and gain control of the government. Politically, "it is a contest of political organization for loyalty and, hence, legitimacy". Insurgency entails political violence in which case each side wants to demonstrate that it can govern better than the other side. It involves battles of ideas. The antidote of insurgency is good government.

Insurgency emphasizes political elements in order to compensate for military disadvantage. Gaining the loyalty of the population is the crucial object of both insurgents and the counterinsurgents. Insurgency can be exemplified by the rejection of the government by a part of the population, which then demands changes in governmental policies, having in mind certain interests to be enhanced. Although "there is no accepted right in international law to intervene in an internal dispute whether invited by one party or not,"¹⁷ nonetheless, an intervenor's attempt to support one side often leads it to converting the war to its own affair. The countering of support by other countries of one side against the other exacerbates the internal instability into regional or international instability, as typified by the superpowers' behaviors around the world in the Cold War era.

The object of insurgency is not always limited to replacing the government,

¹⁵ Snow 1998, p. 228.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid., 231; 234.

narcoinsurgencies wage war to protect the narcotic producers and its international market, as is the case in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia. Religious fundamentalist movements, which involve religiopolitical activism, seek to destabilize secular governments and replace them with a type of governance that is in conformity with strict religious maxim, e.g in Algeria, Tajikistan.¹⁸ Other instances involve secessionist struggle aimed at altering the boundaries of one or more countries by creating a new state, which directly affects the international system.¹⁹ Religious laws are sometimes taken as a higher law than those of a country or international treaties. Religion as a political institution, in a dynamic of the “believers” vs “infidels” sentimentality, can sometimes become an international security issue.²⁰

Ethnonationalism and Ethnic Conflict: The state is the most powerful actor in world politics. Yet, nationalism and nationality are crucial cultural factors influencing political consensus. Groups within a multiethnic society sometimes pledge their primary allegiance not to the country but to their respective ethnonational group, “which shares a common civilization, language, cultural tradition, and ties of kinship.”²¹ Ethnic nationalism in world politics subdues the relevance of the unitary state and renders dubious the idea that international relations is exclusively a phenomenon between unified states.

Ethnic allegiance plays a major role in intra-national and often international conflict. Ethnic sentiments play a major role in the doctrine of national self-

¹⁸ Ibid., 236.

¹⁹ Claude 1994, p. 11.

²⁰ Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations, Second Ed.* (New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1996), pp. 204-206.

²¹ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 175.

determination. As rightly put by Horowitz, relative to this sentiment, national independence from the colonial power does not necessarily mean independence for the particular ethnic group, among others. Thus, self-determination is incomplete until the particular group in question achieves its own independence.²² Not only does decolonization sow the seed of freedom, it sows also the thorny seed of inter-ethnic conflict which unravels with the commencement of the state's independence. The reaffirmation of this thorny seed is rooted in the artificial territories created by the colonial architects, particularly in Africa, which usually encapsulates various ethnic nationals in one country. The lack of true nation-states in a region like Africa, amounts to the struggle for the control of the state or the motivation for secession, as opposed to being subordinated to the ethnic group in control of the government.

This leads to ethnic conflicts which sometimes draw in groups from neighboring states that share the same ethnic origin with the parties to the conflict in a show of ethnic allegiance and affiliation. This is the manifestation of in-group vs. outgoing dynamics that is based on peculiarly ascriptive distinctions. These distinctions creates recurrent conflict between various ethnic groups.

Although ethnic conflict has material aspects such as territorial issue or the control of government, however, the onus of the conflict stems from a dislike or hatred that members of one ethnic group feel toward another.²³ The root cause is, therefore, based on the intangible (who someone is) rather than the tangible ones (what someone does). Because it is characterized by nationalist sentiments, ethnic hostility results in

²² C.F. Bingman, *Japanese Government Leadership and Management* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989), p. 9.

²³ Goldstein 1996, p. 198.

longstanding historical conflicts. In extreme cases, it results in genocidal activities as seen in Hitler's Germany, the 1994 Hutus slaughtering of the Tutsis²⁴, or in the case of the former Yugoslavia which actually disintegrated and was followed by series of ethnic cleansing (e.g Bosnians Muslims, Albanian's in Kosovo) and military violence by the Serbs under Slobodan Milosevic. The breakdown of states, as seen in Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, often leads to regional conflict bringing about violence and war. Wherever there is transborder ethnic affinities, a considerable potential for separation and/or irredentism exists.²⁵ External assistance to or involvement with irredentism only makes ethnic disputes more complicated and protracted. Ethnicity poses remarkable challenges to political creativity both at societal, regional and extraregional levels of security. Ethnonational multiculturalism poses a potential long-term threat to the survival of state, and the success of separatist movements may lead to the balkanization of the world over.²⁶

Troubled States Scenario: Of all African states, Somalia structurally appeared immuned to multiethnic tectonics and conflicts because all Somalis belong to one ethnic group and speak the same language. However, a ruinous civil war erupted in 1992 between different clans, in which case mass starvation was effectively used as an instrument of war in addition to conventional killings. Foreign military forces intervened only to withdraw in 1995 after a humiliating failure.²⁷ This implies that group identity goes beyond ethnicity; and it is unclear why people identify most strongly with one group

²⁴ Ibid., p.200.

²⁵ Donald L. Horowitz, "Ethnic and Nationalist Conflicts", in *World Security: Trends and Challenges at Century's End* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), p. 233.

²⁶ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 179.

²⁷ Goldstein 1996, p. 203.

or another. Goldstein elucidates, “In Somalia, loyalties are to clans; in Serbia, they are to the ethnic group, in the United States and elsewhere, multiethnic states have managed to gain people’s primary loyalty”.²⁸

Failed and failing states result from domestic government’s lack of ability to maintain public order and satisfy public needs. This leads to conditions of civil unrest, famine, massive flows of migrants across international borders, and aggressive actions by neighboring states or even mass killings. Failed states, or what Inis Claude calls ‘chaotic anarchy’ (i.e. the absence of government and the dissolution of a society into the Hobbesian state of nature in the war of all against all), is a phenomenon that poses a significant problem to international security and order.²⁹ Once a troubled state fails, peace does not return easily. Instead, the country is turned into a battle ground for heavily armed factions, many of them with commercial agendas and external connections.³⁰ The cases in Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti, Angola or Bosnia typify troubled states phenomena.

Diversionsary Theory of War or Scapegoat Theory: The proposition here is that “domestic dissatisfaction within a state increases its external conflict behavior.”³¹ This contention rests on the argument that, faced with domestic political difficulties, national leaders divert public frustration and aggression towards foreigners. Vulnerability which leads to provoked and quasi external aggression is transformed through fear into hostility

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Claude 1994, p. 11.

³⁰ Institute for National Strategic Studies, *1997 Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force Structure* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), p. 238.

³¹ Birger Heldt, “The Dependent Variable of the Domestic-External Conflict Relationship: Anecdotes, Theories and Systemic Studies”, *Journal of Peace Research*, 34.1 (1997): 101.

among the citizens, even though the external states are not actually aggressive or planning an attack.³²

This theory has its root in the in-group and out-group dynamics of ethnocentrism; the belief that one's nationality is superior and special and others inferior and secondary³³ stems from the work of sociologists George Simmel (1956) and Lewis Coser (1956).³⁴ Coser applies this hypothesis to international politics saying that, groups may actually search for enemies with the deliberate intention or willing result of increasing domestic cohesion.³⁵ Show of resolve or calculated foreign policy success is aimed at increasing domestic cohesion. Internal threats, such as "civil war, public protest, economic recession, low approval ratings or elite divisions", Birger Heldt argues, may threaten the maintenance of regime leadership. It is these sort of threats, *per se*, that influence conflict behavior of states. He categorizes this behavior as "externalization".³⁶

The case of United States attack on Iraq between December 16 – 19, 1998, for example, was seen by many Americans and foreigners as President Bill Clinton's cunning attempt to divert domestic and congressional attention from the impeachment proceedings instituted against him. In this manner, he allegedly displaced domestic tension and his own frustration towards Saddam Hussein so that he could overcome the threats of impeachment and the possibility of being ousted from office.³⁷ Internal

³² Andrew Kydd, *Fear and Reassurance in International Relations* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1996), p. 27.

³³ Kegley and Wittkopf, p. 180.

³⁴ Quoted in Kevin Wang: *Domestic Politics and The Escalation of International Crises* (Florida: The Florida State University, 1995), p. 37.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Birger Heldt, "The Dependent Variable of the Domestic-External Conflict Relationship; Anecdotes, Theories and Systemic Studies," *Journal of peace Research*, 34.1 (1997): 101.

³⁷ American media particularly found this scenario interesting by severally drawing similarity between it and the movie: "Wag The Dog". Some American citizens were angry at President Clinton for his use of this tactics for his alleged personal gain.

instability or stability influences critically and contributes to conflict behavior of states and hence impacts on international outcome.

External Security Climate and Exogenous Threats

Traditional Threats to International Security: The traditional realist paradigm suggests those threats to vital interest lead to violent confrontations, which destabilizes international security.³⁸ Vital interests can take a variety of forms, e.g sovereignty, political independence, and territorial disputes. Vasquez argues that contiguity issue, i.e. disputes that involve land adjacent to states, by occupation or defending a territory rather than the struggle for power, causes interstate war.³⁹ Territoriality shapes crises and enduring rivalries.⁴⁰ Conflict of interest over issues such as “commerce navigation, protecting religious confreres, protecting ethnic confreres, defending an ally, ideological liberation, government composition, enforcing treaty terms, and balance-of-power”,⁴¹ etc., shape the international security environment.

Realism, ranging from Hobbesian to Waltzian, emphasizes the role of anarchy, that is, the absence of a centralized authority as the leading cause of interstate fear of attack and hence the preparation for war relative to states tendency to engage in self-help behaviors. Self-help behavior in turn leads to the security dilemma which spins international order out of control from time to time.

³⁸ Snow 1998, p. 222.

³⁹ John A. Vasquez, *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 124.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 130.

Hegemonic ambitions and rivalry, external military dispute, high level of regional militarization by states with closed geopolitical proximity, and protracted regional hostility have been and continue to pose threat to international instability.

Non-Traditional Threats to International Security: The post-Cold War era highlights the saliency of new threats to the international order. For example, international organized crimes, international terrorism, and massive refugee and migration flow are catching the attention of both contemporary security analysts and practitioners. Interestingly some of the threats that shape the external security climate have domestic or intra-state root. Despite their transnational character, these threats are perceived and explained primarily in the context of individual nation-states since a state *per se* is the unit of analysis of the system. The international system does not exist in abstract until the states which it consists of are considered. This explains how the linkage between endogenous (ISC) and exogenous (ESC) components of the SSE is undetachable. This linkage can also be seen in the light that threats that originate internally impact on the external security climate and conversely, threats that originate somewhere else (i.e.externally) can impact on the internal security climate of a state. Indications for measuring either the internal security climate or the external security climate have this dual characteristics.

International Organized Crimes: Post-Cold War threats, instead of disappearing, have been transformed. In traditional geopolitics, only one type of actor – states – exist. Security threats were associated with large accumulations of power, resources and territory. According to the 1995 Conference Report of European Community Studies Association, “the new geopolitics is characterized by ‘sovereign

free' networks of affiliation". The new geopolitics – geopolitics of transnational crime – poses a new threat to international security that is more diffuse, insidious, and not amenable by the resolve tactics of the Cold War period. The permissive and borderless economic interdependence which liberal students acclaim for having pacific effects on the international politics also provides a global trade market, personal mobility, and communication technology which nurture sophisticated transnational criminal organization activities globally. Like their licit counterparts, (e.g MNCs), these illicit organizations engage in strategic alliances to overcome national barriers and penetrate new markets, they have also become a global phenomenon. These alliances pose great difficulties to law enforcement agencies worldwide.⁴²

According to the 1997 *Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force Structure*, organized business lines include “extortion rackets, and trafficking in weapons, drugs, or (potentially) fissile nuclear materials” which are threat to public safety and the health of populations. Existing in various guises, organized crimes also include counterfeiting, arms smuggling, commercial activities involving illegal aliens, and human body parts, as seen in the post communist countries.⁴³ Alexander Yakovenko observes that the proliferation of drugs, drug-trafficking, narcomafia and their engagement in open fight with states governments, thereby challenging political stability, law and order, increasingly create tangible threats to security and stability in various regions of the world.⁴⁴

⁴² William Burros, “Global Security Beyond 2000: Global Population Growth, Environmental Degradation, Migration, and Transnational Organized Crime” *Conference Report*, Center for West European Studies, University of Pittsburgh, November 1995, pp. 32-35.

⁴³ 1997 Strategic Assessment 1997, p.197; 200.

⁴⁴ Yakovenko 1995, p. 2.

Criminal organizations challenge governmental authorities by evading taxes, and they threaten and corrupt public and private officials, using violence as a tool to enforce discipline, settle disputes and protect profits. They add turbulence to domestic politics, diminish the integrity of financial and commercial institutions, both at national and international sections, and circumvent the established codes of conducts and norms of restraints associated with possessions and/or the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Also, these organizations “exploit and exacerbate political instability and regional conflict.”⁴⁵ Organized crimes pose direct threat to both national and international security.⁴⁶ While no country is immune from their penetration, the *1997 Strategic Assessment* identifies eight countries that have the largest and strongest of such organizations: China, Hong Kong-Taiwan, Colombia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, and the United States.⁴⁷

Terrorism: Terrorism has always been a feature of both domestic and international politics. International terrorism grew to epidemic proportions in the 1970s and 1980s, and governments attention were caught by domestic terrorism in the mid-1990s.⁴⁸ There is no universal definition of what terrorism is relative to the dichotomy in the cliché that: “One man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” Terrorism is a mix of criminal acts with (legitimate) political purpose. The *1997 Strategic Assessment* defines it as “the use of indiscriminate violence for a political purpose by an individual group, or states, against noncombatants.”⁴⁹ Some experts agree that terrorism is “the use of threat of violence, a method of combat or strategy to achieve certain goals, that its aim

⁴⁵ Burros 1995, p. 35.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ 1997 Strategic Assessment, p. 198.

⁴⁸ Ibid., 187; Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 372.

is to induce a state of fear in the victim, that it is ruthless and does not conform to humanitarian norms, and that publicity is an essential factor in terrorist strategy.”⁵⁰ “One person’s terrorist may be another person’s liberator.”⁵¹ How one classifies a terrorist group is in the eye of the beholder. A nationalistic “freedom fighter” group would like its acts portrayed as political acts against injustice. The difference between it and a government claiming to protect freedom is a lack of territory to call country. However, the state usually label such terrorist group, “criminals”.⁵² Terrorism is both a strategy and a tactic. The clandestine and highly fragmented nature of terrorists groups makes it difficult to penetrate them.⁵³ Nonetheless terrorist groups are one kind of non-state actors in international politics and security.

Usually, terrorism is characterized either as non-state sponsored or state sponsored.⁵⁴ This classification does not bring into light clearly the fact that the state itself commits terrorist acts against his own population or others. Our taxonomy of the subject would therefore fall under three divisions: 1) State terrorism, 2) state-sponsored terrorism, and 3) non-state sponsored terrorism.

State terrorism, for example, was portrayed in the ruthless acts and the genocidal Nazi regime of Adolph Hitler in Germany in 1930s and 1940s; French counterrevolutionary measures against opposition in 1793, the violent acts of Russian Bolsheviks against opponents after 1917 as typified by the regime of Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot of (Khmer Rouge) Cambodia, Idi Amin of Uganda, or Saddam Hussein’s use of

⁴⁹ 1997 Strategic Assessment, p. 185.

⁵⁰ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 371.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 374.

⁵² Snow 1998, p.244; Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, pp. 374-375.

⁵³ Snow 1998, p. 242.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 241.

chemical weapons against the Kurds in 1989, etc. Countries do utilize military and destructive terrorist tactics against opposition groups.⁵⁵

State-sponsored organizations can be subdivided into: state-supported groups and state-directed groups. State-supported groups, while they receive assistance from governments, operate independently without receiving direct orders from them. Examples of this are the Hezbollah and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.⁵⁶ In the 1980s the United States accused the Soviet Union, Syria, Iraq, and Libya of such acts;⁵⁷ and also since 1993, Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Libya.⁵⁸ Similarly, in the 1980s, others leveled charges against the United States of sponsoring terrorism in Vietnam, Chile, El Salvador, Nicaragua, etc.⁵⁹ On the other hand, state-directed groups receive not only support but also operational direction from their sponsors. Example of this is the so-called Libyan “hit-teams” that allegedly blew up the Pan Am 103 jet over Lockerbie Scotland in 1988.⁶⁰

Finally, and most challenging of all, is the non-state supported organizations. In this type, terrorism is used as a tactic of the powerless against the powerful. This type of terrorism ranges from individually orchestrated terrorists like the unibomber or the individual from the right-wing Jewish fanatics of the Kach religious terrorist group that assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. Few individuals also conduct terrorist acts, as seen in the 1995 bombing of United States Federal Building in Oklahoma City.⁶¹

⁵⁵ 1997 Strategic Assessment, p.185; Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, pp.188-189.

⁵⁶ Snow 1998, p. 240.

⁵⁷ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 375.

⁵⁸ 1997 Strategic Assessment, p. 193.

⁵⁹ Kegley and Wittkopf, p. 375.

⁶⁰ Snow 1998, p. 242.

⁶¹ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, pp.372-373.

Terrorist groups consist of social minorities, ethnic movements, religious extremist, e.g Hamas, those seeking independence (e.g Basques in Spain), etc. The use of chemical weapons by the Aum Shirikyo in the 1995 Tokyo subway attack is symbolic of the capability and indiscriminate use of violence especially in the use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. Other examples include atrocities perpetrated by Colombia drug cartels, e.g Medellin and Cali drug cartels, the Irish Revolutionary Army in Northern Ireland, or the Middle Eastern Islamic fundamentalist group that bombed the World Trade Center in New York City in February 1993.⁶²

The easy access of terrorists to sophisticated forms of technology, e.g “advanced communications, global positioning systems, high explosives and stinger missiles”,⁶³ and the possibility of further use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) especially NBC, its actual use or the use for political blackmail, raises tremendous concern for national and international security. The indiscriminate nature of terrorism acts to provoke overreaction and gain attention means that the clandestine use of terrorism as the tactic of the weak would continue to pose tremendous threat to societal, regional and extraregional security.

Terrorist activities, according to the list compiled by James J. Gallegher, in 1992 include “bombing, arson, hijacking, ambush, kidnapping, hostage taking, assassination, raids, seizure of property, sabotage, and hoaxes (e.g fake bomb threats).” We also saw the use of chemical weapons in Japan, and most likely, the list of possibilities would continue to grow. The world recorded 665 incidents of terrorists attacks in 1987, which declined to 332 incidents in 1994, but again increased to 440 in 1995 targeting 51

⁶² 1997 Strategic Assessment, p.187; Kegley and Wittkopf, p. 373.

⁶³ 1997 Strategic Assessment, p. 186.

countries.⁶⁴ Terrorists have an uncontested position as major non-state actor in international politics and the negative impact of terrorism cannot be discounted in the calculus of international security.

Mass Refugee and Migration Flow: Mass migration, whether forced or by choice, is not new. However, what is new is the scale and speed with which it is occurring in the last few decades. The waves of refugees across international borders have reached a proportion of biblical scale in the 1990s. Refugees are people fleeing from conflict from their home country and crossing international borders.⁶⁵ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in its 1967 protocol defines a refugee as “any person who has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group and because of this fear has fled his country of origin.”⁶⁶ A 1969 widely accepted broadened definition of refugee by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) states that any individual fleeing his home country as a result of “external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality.”⁶⁷ Kegley and Wittkopf define refugees as: “individuals who – because of a well-founded fear of being persecuted on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinions – live outside the country of their origin or nationality and are unable to return to it.”⁶⁸

In a series of Post-Cold War civil conflicts, one or a combinations of these factors

⁶⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf, pp. 372-373.

⁶⁵ 1997 Strategic Assessment, pp. 209-210.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 210.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Kegley Wittkopf 1997, p. 92.

is exploited by political leaders, or groups to battle their opponents or neighbors, respectively. Civilians who are caught between the warring factions are not just seen as by-products of war, but as targets of war, despite the fact that the Geneva Convention forbids the deliberate uprooting of civilian populations.⁶⁹ Extremist politics, politically motivated bigotry, human right abuses, war and arbitrary persecution are fermented over time into a 'volatile cocktail of insecurity' which affects not only the refugee sending states and the citizens but the receiving states and their citizens as well.⁷⁰ Persecution, ethnic cleansing and armed conflict that accompanied the breakup of former Yugoslavia created 3 million victims and the challenging refugee problem in Europe. The Gulf War created 5 million refugee population, Afghanistan 6.3 million, and Rwanda over 2.0 million.⁷¹ Violence and man-made upheavals worldwide created 1.4 million refugees in 1960; 8.2 million in 1980, and swelled to 15 to 20 million in 1996. "In the 1996 global population of 5.8 billion, roughly one out of every 120 persons was displaced by war, civil strife, or persecution."⁷²

With the proliferation of xenophobia (fear of foreigners), doors to safe havens were shut against refugees seeking asylum, and some are physically attacked in some countries. The propensity of refugee flow accompanied by terrorism provokes security fears. The flow of thousands of refugee from Cuba and Haiti incited anti-immigrant sentiments in the United States in the early 1990s. Receiving states, of massive refugees, consider such as destabilizing to their internal order/security, e.g a quarter of million Rwandans infiltrated into Tanzania within 48 hours at the end of April 1994 or those 1

⁶⁹ 1997 Strategic Assessment, pp. 210-211.

⁷⁰ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 293.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 292.

⁷² 1997 Strategic Assessment, p. 210.

million that crossed into Zaire within 4 days period in mid-July 1994.⁷³ There also exists the danger of using the receiving state as locus of insurgency activities and the possibility of conflict spillover into such society.

A clear distinction exists between migrants and refugees. While a refugee flees involuntarily, a migrant relocates either in search of a better life (a pull factor) or due to deterioration of the conditions of living (a push factor) because of violence, environmental degradation or poor economic conditions. Migrants sending countries sometimes encourage their citizens to emigrate as a way of combating problems like unemployment, (e.g Cubans desire to come to the U.S.). However, this practice of hemorrhaging the best educated and most talented citizens into the receiving state causes brain drainage from the sending state.⁷⁴

A third and final category resulting from internal disorder and insecurity is the internally displaced persons (IDP). Displaced within their country, these individuals do not cross border into other countries. This may lead to instances of states collapse as seen in Somalia. Often the victims are trapped in the midst of armed conflict that is sometimes impossible to gain access to by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Especially when the government has broken down, it leaves no authoritative body to protect the citizens or for humanitarian organizations to negotiate with.⁷⁵

As a rule, how many of the six elements of the causal-chain variables are applicable to a particular state is contingent upon the uniqueness of its SSE and the types of insecurity causes obtainable within it. Consequently, while the combination of threat

⁷³ Ibid., p. 211.

⁷⁴ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 294.

⁷⁵ 1997 Strategic Assessment, pp. 211-212.

causations or threat nexus that destabilize a state's internal or external security climates might follow a general patterns, however, a detail examination would reveal a variegated causal dynamics from state to state. The assumption here is that the cause of instability originates not just from one (e.g. anarchy) but a combination of two or more causes relative to the uniqueness of the SSE in question. Although geopolitics and anarchy as causal roots of insecurity are appropriately identified with the external security climate, however, the remaining four causal variables can be found operating in either the internal or external security environment.

Wherever all the above threatened ISC or ESC indicators are high, the potential for insecurity is also high. Wherever conflict or instability exists, or the threshold for conflict or potential conflict are high, the state perception of insecurity to their national strategic interests would be high also. When they are low or in situations when states perceive threats only to non-strategic interests, the threshold for states perception of insecurity would be low. Instability/conflict, high threshold for or potential instability/conflict, relative to threats in the ESC and/or ISC, drive states toward militarization. Since the strategic interests of states are somewhat similar, particularly on the issues of physical survival or hegemonic ambitions (regional or global), these are the interests that potential aggressors are more likely to threaten. For states to deter such aggression, war preparation endeavor in terms of armaments acquisition must ensue in order to guarantee national ability for military resolve to ward off such threats.

Unfortunately, the steps or tactics that states take to ensure the protection of their survival and the pursuit of their aspirations, most often, are inimicable to the security interest of their neighbors or other states. Hegemonic ambition in a region where there is

two or more contestants can only lead to power rivalry and to arms race and military confrontation.

Regional Security

In this study we have identified three levels of security: societal, regional, and extraregional. Regional security, the link between societal and extraregional security, is very critical to both national and international security. Zeeve Maoz in his study of “regional security” in the Middle East defines regional security as:

The sum total perception of national safety (or perception of freedom of external threats) which members of a regional system feels at a given time. This perception is inversely correlated with the sum total of – individual or collective measures that states in a region employ at a given point in time to ensure their independence and deal with external and internal threats. Regional security or insecurity can thus be inferred from aggregate regional levels of conflict, military allocations, and collective institutions, or alliances.⁷⁶

Regional security in this context is seen as a perceptual variable. Perception, however, might not be correlative to the level of threats that actually exist in a region. Therefore, perceptual variable alone is not enough to measure threats. Maoz understands this problem and deals with it by measuring states level of security, an elusive term, by looking at their level of insecurity. However, whether or not this approach is any less elusive is also debatable.

Each state within ‘a geographic expanse’ views its security problems differently. The list of threats, i.e ISC or ESC threat variables or indicators, of each state differs. However, in any insecure state, these dissimilar threats are weaved together and commonly result into a tapestry of insecurity. Unlike insecure states, a secure one, Maoz

contends, does not invest heavily in national defense, it does not engage in security alliances, and does not start international conflict.⁷⁷ Regional security is understood here by measuring the inverse of regional actors' specific actions. Maoz shows in his study that the more insecure a state feels, the more likely it would engage in activities designed to combat the pertinent threats by fighting them.⁷⁸

Like the SSE framework, internal and external nexus of threats are the backbone for deciphering insecurity in Maoz's study. He measured insecurity by measuring three variables: 1) level of investment in national defense; 2) formal security alliance engagement; and 3) the severity and magnitude of a state's involvement in internal and external conflicts. However, in this study we focus only on the two out of the three variables above. That is, the level of investment in national defense or what we identified as the extent of weapons acquisition, and also the severity and magnitude of states involvement in conflicts. This study acknowledges the issue of states, involvement in internal and external conflicts not only as evidence of insecurity, but also as a driving factor behind the extent of armament acquisition. In fact, Maoz's third factor falls within the concept of the SSE in terms of the ISC and ESC. Alliance engagement is not just a way of balancing, it is also a way of arming oneself. In a sense, armament acquisition behavior of a state subsumes alliance formation in highlighting the level of insecurity. In this or Maoz's study, the approach of measuring the inverse of actions of a state's defense planning process enables the pinning down of the level of insecurity relative to the level

⁷⁶ Zeev Maoz, "Regional Security in the Middle East: Past Trends, Present Realities and Future Challenges", *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 20.1 (March 1999): 6-7.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

of threats and potential threats. Also, in either case, it is the (strategic) security environment that shapes states behavior.

National Defense Planning Process (NDPP)

Our focus so far in this chapter has been the key independent variable, the SSE, which is further bifurcated into the external and internal variables. While the SSE might drive the extent of weapons acquisition, by states, human or perceptual factor acts as the intermediary between the key independent variable, the SSE, and the dependent variable, EWA. It is here that rational actor model comes into play through the behavior of individuals making rational choices. Whatever threats exist in the environment must be given an overall assessment, interpretation and conclusion by a country's defense policy planners. The conclusive understanding of the level of threat becomes the basis for what needs to be done militarily, in terms of human/material measures to overcome such threats. In this sense, NDPP, which is the intervening variable in this study, acts as the national security lens and the modifier of the ongoing activities within the strategic security environment.

National Defense Planning Process (NDPP or x_1) is a function of $ISC(x_I)$ and $ESC(x_E)$, such that, the measure of perception by the NDPP as the governmental apparatus responsible for such processing, depends on the internal and external security climates. In other words, NDPP, as the 'causal funnel', is a function of the overall SSE. While the SSE is the target of assessment, the assessment function of NDPP itself is dependent on the condition of the SSE. Through the NDPP, decision measures for securitization are made and implemented by the governmental defense planning

apparatus. As aforementioned, this role of the NDPP is similar to that of David Easton's 'conversion' process.⁷⁹

Inherently, the SSE drives the identification of states' defense policy position relative to the threatening conditions or lack of such to both national survival and ambitions. It is important to note that it is the NDPP apparatus that distinguishes the strategic interests from non-strategic interests.

Decision-making by governmental apparatus regarding how much military preparation is required to guard against threats to strategic interest (i.e. national survival and aspirations) is based on the level of perceived vulnerability. Therefore, the decision made by the NDPP is a function of both empirical information and perceptual interpretational nexus. The processing of the data gathered from the SSE and the subsequent response to any vulnerability, if any, involve several stages.

In delineating these stages, I would apply the analytic concept of Lieutenant Colonel Sam Pope which portends that an analysis of vulnerability and the response to such involves four stages. First, the informational. Vulnerability is related to both the amount and kind of information obtainable from the SSE. The second stage is cognitive. This entails whether or not the data is accurately analyzed without unnecessary distortions. Pope warned that "Standard human processes of perception and explanation tend to inhibit accurate analysis". This must be taken into account in understanding how states understand and interpret threats into policy process that is implemented in the form of weapons buildups. It is not a perfect process, be it in a democratic or nondemocratic

⁷⁹ NDPP, like Easton's 'Conversion Process', processes gathered information (inputs) into action oriented policies (outputs).

societies. The third is organizational. Patterns of organizational behavior impacts on how threats are perceived or responded to. Whether the organization responds to a democratic or dictatorial government matters both in respect to threat assessment, interpretation, decision-making and implementation. The final stage involves the 'political' factor. The political condition of any country would affect the direction of its decision-making.⁸⁰ Perception of vulnerability to strategic interests, therefore, is directly proportional to the degree of data gathering, types of data gathered, by whom they are gathered, and how accurately such is interpreted and understood.⁸¹ Since decision-making at the NDPP involves both empirical information, perceptual and interpretational nexus, the possibility of accuracy, or misconceptions, miscommunications, misinformation, misperceptions and miscalculations can come into play.

Threat perception by defense planners is the launching pad for not only the extent of weapons acquisition but also the type of weapons to be acquired. NDPP, although a function of the SSE (ISC and ESC), is also a function of human factor in terms of informational, cognitive, organizational and the political, all combined, they contribute to the act of decision-making. Decision, that is, "a determination to act in order to narrow or close the gap between a perception of fact (what is) and a perception of value (what ought to be)"⁸² at the NDPP, by defense planners, plays a critical role in a state's quest for security and securitization. In recognizing how important the act of decision is on the subject of security, this study allows the integration of a theory of foreign policy behavior with the contending theories of international politics.

⁸⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Sam Pope, "Strategic Vulnerability", Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, *Defence Yearbook 1985*, (London: Brassey's Defence Publishers), p. 125.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 126.

⁸² North 1990, p. 36.

As already articulated earlier, the NDPP acts as a ‘modifier’ of the SSE in the relationships between the variables. Paradoxically, NDPP is itself modified by another ‘modifier’, one that can be called the “**modifier of modifier**”, that is, the “**national resources**”. That is, the former, NDPP, which modifies how the SSE is perceived, is in turn modified by the latter, national resources. In an era of finite resources, whether political (i.e. diplomatic), military or economic, resources is the *sine qua non* of any country’s endeavors in building up armament. In fact resources, the *sine qua non* of military strategy development in its entirety.⁸³ While studies have shown that states that feel insecure spend higher percentage of their resources on defense, nonetheless, resources act as a major constraint on the overall defense allocation.⁸⁴ On the other hand, economic consideration is one of the principal motives for most countries’ defense industrial base development (DIB).⁸⁵ However, this subject is not within the scope of this study.

As a rule, “the outer limits of all public expenditure are ultimately determined by the availability of resources, and security expenditure is no exception”.⁸⁶ Although the SSE might be the principal factor that made the Middle East and Northern African countries top the list of major Third World arms importers over the years, but the increase in oil prices since 1970s made such possible.⁸⁷ How much to spend on military capabilities is the most basic choice a state confronts. It ranges from Costa Rica’s zero

⁸³ Lieutenant Colonel Michael N. Schmitt, USAF, “Identifying National Objectives and Developing Strategy: A Process Oriented Approach” U.S. Strategic Institute Washington, D.C. *Strategic Review*, (Winter '97): 30.

⁸⁴ Maoz 1997, p. 6.

⁸⁵ Paige L. Buckles, *Defense Industrial Base Development: A Case Study of Israel* (Washington: The George Washington University, 1992), p. 17.

⁸⁶ Nicole Ball, “Militarized States in the Third World”, in Klare 1991, p. 203.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 204

military spending, to North Korea which spends 20 percent of all its domestic revenue on the military. Here it is important to note that despite the recent wars in neighboring Nicaragua and Panama, Costa Rica has never been attacked. On the other hand, North Korea is on the verge of bankruptcy.⁸⁸

The central theoretical advance in this chapter has been to integrate domestic and international security and insecurity perceptions as the driving motivations for weapons acquisition. The philosophical underpinning in this and the last Chapter is that weapons acquisition, provoked by the desire to reduce or eliminate vulnerability (or sometimes by the pursuit of national motivations) leads to security dilemma (and thus, a deteriorating external security environment) and perhaps war. Human beings are not as predictable as we might think. Like an organism (e.g. ameba) and its environment, any prediction of man must be grounded in the study of his environment. A country's behavior is the epiphany of its strategic security environment. Therefore, the strategic security environment, acting as human stimulus, is the key to understanding (individual) states' behavior. In the next Chapter, the SSE conceptual framework is applied to real cases for the purposes of empirical illustration.

⁸⁸Goldstein 1996, p.227.

Chapter 5

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF ISRAEL

This chapter contains the empirical analysis of the strategic security environment of the state of Israel. The analyses in this and the next chapter are intended to make it possible to operationalize the concept of strategic security environment empirically. These applications would provide the opportunity to enhance actual policy-making and policy actions by the way of empirical conceptualization. In this dynamic, abstract level of analysis can be used to interpret concrete situation, and concrete situation in turn can be utilized to corroborate abstract conceptualization, in a pendulum exercise. But it is also important to understand that theory does not attempt to describe the world, because the closer you come to reality, the less theoretical you are, and the less elegant are theories. Nonetheless, the 'form' (as conceptualized) is the mother of 'reality' (as seen).

In conducting the empirical analysis of the theoretical framework, the six causal-chain elements shall be used to analyze the SSE. This would enable us to see clearly the condition of the state's SSE regarding its stability or instability in either the internal and the external contexts. The six causal elements delineated on page 92, which interrelatedly determine the level of stability (in the SSE) on the one hand, and the extent of weapons acquisition on the other, will serve as the sequential basis for the systematic empirical analysis.

(1) Historical Circumstances

Born in a battle of bloodshed, the creation of the state of Israel literally sparked the 1948-49 Arab Israeli war. The historical record of the state of Israel for over fifty years

would show its war-ridden past and point to the fact that it is trapped in a highly unstable strategic security environment. On the very day it proclaimed its independence, specifically six hours after it did so, seven Arab states invaded its territory in an attempt to terminate its existence.¹ And since then, uneasy lies the faith of Israel's survival. Territorial issues, as surrogates of other types of conflicts, have become the barometer by which political relationships between Israel and Arab states are calculated. From its birth to this moment, Israel's existence and security, round the clock, are principally based on its military capabilities internally, and externally by securing a reliable ally or a patron for assistance.² To-date, it has been historical chains of traumatic experience that drives Israeli strategic thinking. While peace is desired, security is of utmost importance because of cultural, racial, and historical animosity in the region.

Since it was founded in 1948 after World War II, Israel has been one of the most conflict-prone states in the world. It has engaged in wars and countless skirmishes with the neighboring Arab states (exemplified by the current case of Lebanon), and even some skirmishes with non-Arab states. Prior to its existence as a country, the Jews and the land of Israel were conquered and subjected to foreign domination as far back as biblical times and before the birth of Jesus Christ. Such foreign dominations of Israelis and the land of Israel took place under the Persian and Hellenistic rulers (538-142 BCE); Hasmonean dynasty (142-63 BCE); Roman rule (63 BCE-313 CE); Byzantine rule (313-636); Arab rule (636-1099); the Crusaders rule (1099-1291); Mamluk rule (1291-1516); Ottoman

¹ David Rodman, "War Initiation: The Case of Israel," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 20.4 (December 1997): 1.

² Israel up till today has no formal treaty or defence pact with its strongest ally and patron, the United States. See Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), Chapters 2-3.

rule (1517-1917); and British rule (1918-1948).³ As a result of repeated subjugation to foreign domination and even slavery, Israelites adopted a nomadic way of life and were exiled and/or dispersed all over the magreb area of Africa and the European world.

Despite the scattered colonies of Jews outside Palestine, Zionist ideology, a modern phenomenon, brought about the quest for reunification as a people. “Zionism, the national liberation movement of the Jewish people, derives its name from the word ‘Zion’, the traditional synonym for Jerusalem and the Land of Israel.⁴ Zionism is the idea of Jewish people’s redemption in the ancestral homeland. The deep attachment to the land of Israel by Jews, although punctuated by centuries of oppression and persecution, drove their desire to revive Jewish nationality in their historical homeland, where they can feel secure, gain an identity, and be internationally recognized.⁵ Motivated by Zionist aspirations, and finally triggered by the holocaust experience, Jews in the diaspora continuously migrated back to Palestine in great numbers in the post World War II period. But the conflicting territorial demands of the Jewish and Arab communities, which has been orchestrated by the indelible polarization between Zionism and Arab nationalism, characterized the longest-running explosive situation and the most serious confrontations in the Middle East since 1940.

The conflict over who has stronger claim to the land of Palestine is central to the Middle East turmoil. Roger Fisher extrapolates from a Jewish man’s perspective by quoting Frank Gervasi, who argued that, Jewish claim to the land can be traced to the beginning of their history four thousand years ago. “... Their patriarch was Abraham,

³ Israel Information Center, *Facts About Israel*, (Jerusalem, Israel: Hamakor Press, 1998), pp. 15-24.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

⁵ *Ibid.*

forefather of the Hebrews through Isaac, his son by his wife Sarah, and the Arabs through Ishmael, his son by Hagar, Sarah's servant. The Arabs and the Jews descend from and venerate a common ancestor."⁶ In 137 A.D. the Jews dispersed but vowed to return. Palestine, formerly called Canaan, was conquered repeatedly by different external forces that left behind slaves, servants, and soldiers that shared no common ancestry. However, a handful of the Jews stayed behind over these periods. From the Jewish point of view, Israeli's claim to the land is unshakably valid.

On the other hand, Arabs' claim according to Fischer, rests on an opposing argument that:

Jews have lived in Palestine since Moses' time, but not until about 1010 B.C. did a central Jewish government exist there. About that year, David brought all the feuding Jewish tribes together in a single kingdom of Israel, which endured for seventy years until the death of Solomon. Thereafter, no Jewish government ever again controlled all of Palestine until the establishment of modern Israel in A.D. 1948. Palestine has no history as a Jewish country.⁷

Thus the formation of the state of Israel from Arabs' perspective is an act of military aggression perpetrated initially by the British soldiers on behalf of the Zionist immigrants against the people who have lived in Palestine for thirteen centuries.

Strong beliefs as to the justification for the ownership of the land persists on both sides. Rabbi Moshe Levinger, the leader of Jewish settlement in the Israel-occupied West bank, according to Fisher, declared that: "To compromise on our own home, a home that belongs not only to us but also to God, is abnormal! ... We were expelled from

⁶ Roger Fisher Et al. *Coping With International Conflict: A Systemic Approach to Influence in International Negotiation* (Upper Saddle River N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1997), pp. 27-8.

⁷ Ibid., p. 28.

this land against our will, but we always knew that it was ours.”⁸ Strikingly, Palestinians’ sentiment paralleled the above. It is therefore not surprising that the nature of the struggle over the ownership of the land is viewed as a zero-sum exercise from either side. Evidently, the intractability and intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict are rooted in historical sentiment.

The motivation of Jews to return to the ‘Holy land’ began in the nineteenth century. By 1914 the Jews made up twelve percent of the total population of Palestine. British sympathy for the Zionist cause was made known in the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917. In 1919, Palestine was awarded as a mandate to Great Britain by the League of Nations. “His majesty’s government” promised to do all within his power to see to the creation of a national home for the Jewish people, although he promised equally that such would be done in a manner not to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish inhabitants of Palestine. However, the close involvement of the British with the Jews at the time debarred the implementation of this latter promise.⁹

Initially, Palestinians welcomed the Jewish migrants and even sold them some of their lands. However, when the Palestinians realized that the Jews’ plan was to make Palestine as “Jewish as England is English”, anti-Semitism emanated from the Palestinian side. This was responsible for the Palestinian-Jewish riots of 1920-1921 and the killings that occurred along with it. The second violence occurred in 1928 and took the lives of 133 Jewish and 116 Arabs. Similarly, another fighting occurred in August 23, 1929.¹⁰

The emergence of the Holocaust led to an Emergency Zionist Conference held in

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid., p. 29.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 30-31.

New York in May 1942. In this conference, the 'Biltmore Program' which called for unhindered immigration of European Jews to Israel was established. At this time, evidence of increased Jewish militancy was present in Palestine.¹¹ On April 2, 1947, Britain referred the Palestinian question to the General Assembly of the United Nations, and between April 28 and May 15, 1947, the General Assembly established the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) with a mandate to consider appropriate solution to the question of Palestine. "On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the recommendations of the *ad hoc* committee with thirty-three votes in favor, thirteen against, and ten abstentions." In this recommendation, Palestine was divided into Jewish and Arab states.¹² Arabs rejected this arrangement.

Six hours after Israel came into existence, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon formed an alliance and invaded the new state in what the Arabs called the "Holy War."¹³ To reiterate Vasquez's hypothesis that the formation of a new states is associated with war relative to its tendency to be a cause of militarized territorial conflict is relevant at this juncture. This hypothesis provides an explanation for the occurrence of the 1947 Arab-Israeli War. "Similarly, Melvin Small and David Singer find that as the number of states goes up, so does the number of wars."¹⁴ From 1947 point on, the conflict will become intractable and intensified. Thus, the problem that started off primarily as political and ideological, once wrapped up in formalized territorial fiber, changed into military issues of tactics and strategy with economic ramifications. Since the

¹¹ Istvan S. Pogany, *A Security Council and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984), p. 19.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

¹³ Fischer, 1997, p. 31.

¹⁴ John A. Vasquez., *The War Puzzle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 143. Also see Melvin Small, and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International Civil Wars, 1816-1980* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1982) p.130; 141.

partitioning, despite efforts to find an acceptable solution, there has been a conflictual impasse characterized by regional turbulence. To put it in the words of Karen A. Feste:

Temporary settlements have been difficult and unsatisfactory for the conflicting parties. At various points, major powers in the international system, including the United Nations, have played a central role in attempting to negotiate arrangements on a number of problems. Each successive military encounter has solidified the positions held by the opposing sides in the conflict, making solutions more difficult and more complex but, nonetheless, very important to the stability of the region and also critical for the larger international system.¹⁵

Although there is some recent progress on the pursuit of the mechanism of trading land for peace, a trend of violence continues, triggered by Israeli frustration over persistent terrorism, 'Palestinian frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations, and Syria's continued "support" for anti-Israel terrorism.¹⁶ Also, indirect and covert efforts from Iran, Iraq and Libya in their opposition to the peace process, have heightened tensions and could increase confrontation in the region.

Israel has been involved in six major incidents of violent conflicts in which Israel and Arab (or Palestinian) forces faced each other. That is, the 1948-49 war of attrition, the Suez War of 1956, 1967 Six-Day war, 1969-70 War of Attrition, the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and the Lebanon War of 1982. Israel was also involved in the Jordanian Civil War of 1970, and the Intifada that began on December 9, 1987.¹⁷ From this historical narration one can easily see that historical causation contributes to the shaping of Israeli SSE and its condition.

¹⁵ Karen A. Feste, *Plans for Peace: Negotiation and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), p. 23.

¹⁶ National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies. *1997 Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force Structure* (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1997), p. 107.

(2) Demographic Composition

With a population of 5,813,000, the demographic of Israel is made up of 81 percent Jews, 15 percent Arab (about 1 million), 3 percent Christian, 2 percent Druze, and about 3,000 Circassians, according to the 1997/98 edition of *The Military Balance*. The Jewish population includes the estimated 140,000 Jewish settlers in Gaza and the West Bank, the estimated 200,000 in East Jerusalem, and 13,000 in Golan Heights.¹⁸ Although the majority of Israelis are made up of Jews, and unlike many Arab states, the possibility of a coup d'etat is remote.¹⁹ However, Israel's internal security environment is not immune from instability.

Suspicion runs deep and trust remains elusive between Israeli Jews and Israeli Arabs. The long time Israeli policy to restrict Palestinian movements and reduce terrorist threat only played into the hands of Islamic militant groups like Hamas. The growing divide between rich and poor, Palestinians being the have-nots, forced more people to depend on Hamas' social welfare provisions, which enables it to reach and build support at the grass root level.²⁰ Thus, facilitating the militant suicide bombing campaign against the Israeli Jewish community.

Internal polarization within Israel goes beyond the Jewish-Palestinian divide. Israel is a democratic country. But there is a deep division even among its Jewish community as a result of the divide between those that support trading land for peace in

¹⁷ Rodman 1998, p. 1; Vasquez 1996, p. 126.

¹⁸ *The Military Balance 1997/98*, The International Institute For Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 128.

¹⁹ Alan S. Cohen, *Israel And American National Security Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The American University, 1986), p. 45.

²⁰ Geoffrey Kemp and Jeremy Pressman, *Point of No Return: The Deadly Struggle for Middle East Peace* (Washington, D.C. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Cooperation with Brookings Institution Press, 1997), pp. 77-78.

the Labor Party and the extremist hardliners from Likud Party who oppose such a policy and have newly formed a new party, the Herut, by defecting from Likud in their quest for such opposition.²¹ Another area of polarization involves how to reconcile a fast modernizing society with traditional values. Dispute between the two sides of Judaism, ultra-orthodox religious and secular Jews have lately become a cause of alarm. The religious Jews (10% of the over 5 million population) convened rallies to protest what they expressed as the systematic persecution at the hands of the secular elites. The former want a Jewish state with a Jewish character “based on the Torah and Torah values”.²² Secular Jews, on the other hand, are protesting the rise of ultra-orthodox political power and allocation of governmental subsidies. In a counter-demonstration of February 1999 in Tel Aviv, a secular protester charged: “Basically, they don’t work and feel they should be paid because they’re praying on our behalf. This doesn’t exist in New York”.²³ This dispute has the potential of erupting into a political dynamite if the massive gulf of mutual suspicion continues. Finally, the persistent challenges from within include the assimilation of new Jewish immigrants, and the Israeli decision to build a new settlement on Arab lands especially the Arab sector of East Jerusalem.²⁴

Disparity in human demographic composition of the land of Palestine between Israelis and Palestinians started the territorial dispute that is the foundation of Arab-Israeli conflict; and it is a source of major threat to the state of Israel’s survival.

²¹ *World In Brief* “Shamir Quits Likud, Joins Begins Party” *Washington Post, (World in Brief)*, Thursday, March 25, 1999, A28; see also Israeli Hard-Liners Form New Alliance” *Washington Post, World in Brief*, Saturday, March 13, 1999, A14.

²² Lee Hockstader, “Two Sides of Judaism Stage Protests in Israel,” *Washington Post, (World News)*, Monday, February 15, 1999, A23.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Adam Daniel Rotfeld, “Introduction: Transformation of the World Security System”, *SIPRI Yearbook 1998, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*, (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 9.

Competing historical claims by the opposing demographic entities, grounded on domestic/regional demographic structure and differences, feed the conflictual stalemate and the irreconcilable security differences between the Jews and the Arabs in the Middle East. This demographic disparity compounds the instability that characterizes Israeli SSE at the regional level relative to its small size.

(3) Geopolitical Condition

The fact that suspicions run deep and trust remains elusive, in the most part in Arab-Israeli political relationships, zero-sum rather than positive-sum sentiments typifies many categories of interactions in the Middle East.²⁵ Israel's strategic position is characterized by lack of peace, encirclement by hostile Arab states and myriads of terrorist campaign by guerilla groups.

Geostrategically, the unique importance of the Middle East region within the international system is self-evident. Petroconsultants estimate that the region harbors 60 percent of the world total crude oil (in 1993) and (at the beginning of 1994) 31 percent of the world total natural gas.²⁶ Nevertheless, Naji Abi-Aad and Michel Grenon contend that, "the Middle East has been an unstable area. Its troubled history has been punctuated with crises since civilizations were born."²⁷ By its location and territorial shape, the region commands a ponderable geopolitical importance. Fringed by five seas for easy accessibility, it also provides a land that acts as a bridge between Africa and Asia, a short sea crossings between Europe and Africa; and by land, sea and air, links Europe, North

²⁵ Michael N. Barnett, "Regional Security After The Gulf War," *Political Science Quarterly*, 111.4 (1996-97): p. 111.

²⁶ Naji Abi-Aad and Michel Grenon, "Middle Eastern Geopolitics: Factors of Instability and Sources of Conflict", *Peace and The Sciences*, XXVI (June 1985): 18.

²⁷ Ibid.

America and the Far East. However, the turbulence over the last half-century marks the fragility of the stability in the region “as a complex geopolitical fault line in the earth’s crust.”²⁸

The inherent, potential and imminent factors militating conflict and instability in favor of continuous political volatility in the region are interwoven and reinforcing. They include the potentially explosive problem of internal instability facing the autocratic regimes in the region, explosive demographic problems posed by religious, ethnic minorities, flows of refugees, and labor migration. And the issue of how to reconcile modernization and traditional values is a source of leadership succession problem in the Middle East.²⁹

The rapid growth in the population rate in the face of decline in oil prices is likely to exacerbate economic, political and social challenges in the nearest future. Abi-Aad and Grenon opine: “sources of interstate conflict in the Middle East include ideological cleavages, border disputes, disparity in economic development and population growth, divergence in petroleum policy, military antagonism and race, religious rivalry and ethnic heterogeneity”.³⁰ The division between cleavages such as ‘Pan-Islamists’, ‘Pan-Arabs’, ‘conservatives’ and ‘radicals’ not only overlap but causes a charade of interstate tensions and conflicts. Divergence in petrol policy elicited major conflicts such as the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990-91 conflict over Kuwait.³¹ The rivalry between religious groups such as the Islamic Sunni and Shi’a, when combined with the struggles over sacred places or the holy places’, especially the city of Jerusalem, can generate an

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 19.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 21.

³¹ Ibid., p. 20-21.

explosive powder keg. Because the region is hyper-arid, “water is as precious as oil is plentiful.” Conflicts over sharing of major water resources aggravates the instability in the region.³²

Middle East politics is characterized by the regional ethnic map which depicts a polarized regional politics punctuated by conflicting positions on issues between the Arabs, and non-Arab states (Iran, Turkey, and Israel). Iran, although historically associated with Arabs, occupies an ambivalent position.³³ Also, foreign powers seizing the Arab-Israeli confrontation as a pretext, entangle themselves in Middle East affairs chiefly to defend their oil (strategic) interest in the context of multiple threats.³⁴

The most serious and longest running conflict prevalent in the regional geopolitics is the protracted inter-Arab-Israeli confrontation since 1948. Territorial disputes and maritime boundaries are regionally unresolved matters. Israel’s post-1967 Six Day War occupation of the (Sinai), the Golan, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, created bilateral issues for (Egypt) Jordan and Syria against Israel. There has been, however, a shift by the Arabs from demanding the dismantling of Israel to the formula of trading territory for peace. Syrian-Israeli or Jordanian-Israeli agreements could have been reached by Israel’s retreating to the pre-1967 borders; however, the irresolvable Palestinian issue made such agreement problematic. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflicts have become “Palestinianized” both from the Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli perspectives.³⁵ Meanwhile, terrorist attacks in Israel by Hamas and Hizbollah persist; and in southern Lebanese territory, Israel

³² Ibid., p. 22.

³³ Ibid..

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Yehuda Lukacs and Abdalla M. Battah, Eds. *The Arab-Israel Conflict: Two Decades of Change* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 337-338.

continues to maintain the 15-kilometer security zone since 1978 to buttress its deterrence strategy.³⁶ President Ehud Barak's Summer 1999 pledge to withdraw the Israeli army from the region is yet to be implemented, since it appears contingent upon Israel's forging peace with Syria.

Regional hegemonic rivalries between Egypt and Israel, Israel and Syria, Israel and Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Libya, Iran and Iraq, Iraq and Turkey exemplify the competitive major arms races in the region.³⁷ The strategic thinking of Israel, especially the post-1967 war in which France refused further sales of arms to it, has been mostly characterized by a self-reliance tradition of acquiring military hardwares.³⁸ Confronted with both unfavorable internal and external security climates, Middle East regimes are entrenched in a tradition of building strong armed forces to heighten their military capability.³⁹ Lacking any formal ally, diplomatically and strategically isolated, Israel is a small state faced with acute security problem since it was established. Its military superiority in the region is unquestionable and so far unsurpassed.⁴⁰ In fact Israel is assessed to have enough fissionable materials to fabricate 60-300 nuclear weapons⁴¹ and

³⁶ *The Military Balance* 1998/99, p. 115.

³⁷ Michael T. Klare, "Wars in The 1990s: Growing Firepower In The Third World," *Bulleting of The Atomic Scientists*, (May 1990):11

³⁸ Jason Sherman, "Niche Carving: Subsystem Upgrades Catapult Israeli Defense Industry To New Neights", *Armed Forces Journal International*, 134.12 (July 1997): 34; Efrain Inber, "Israel: The Emergence of New Strategic Thinking," *Jane's Defence Magazines, International Defence Review – Defense '95*, (1995): 90.

³⁹ Abi-Aad and Grenon 1985, p. 21.

⁴⁰ Inbar 1995, p.90; Donald C. Bergus, "Forty Years On Israel's Quest For Security," *Middle East Journal*, 42.2 (Spring 1988): 202.

⁴¹ Edwin S. Cochran, "Deliberate Ambiguity: An Analysis of Israel's Nuclear Strategy," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19.3 (September 1996): 321.

is considered by security practitioners and analysts as an undeclared nuclear power.⁴² This only depicts the extent that Israel would go to further its own survival in the face of a very threatening and unstable geopolitical condition.

(4) National Goals and Ambitions

Encircled by hostile Arab countries and harboring its own dream of 'Greater Israel', physical survival and security is the primary goal of Israel. Handel observes that "the basic assumption underlying Israeli politico-military doctrine is the understanding that the central aim of Arab countries is to destroy the state of Israel whenever they feel able to do so while doing everything to harass and disturb its peaceful life."⁴³ Isolated militarily, and to a limited extent, politically, while Israel greatly desires peace, security is of more importance. In its declared *casi belli*, Israel includes potential developments that are critical to its security: any threatening concentration of Arab forces in one or more of its borders; the closing of the Straits of Tiran or direct air or sea routes to Israel; any attempt to shift the balance-of-power in Israeli eastern border by an Arab state that attempts to seize control over Jordan; unbalanced arms to Arab countries *vis a vis* Israeli, etc.⁴⁴ Also, included are any act of aggression by any Arab state against Israeli territory; Israeli self-sufficiency and self-reliance in domestic production and limited importation of military weapons; the desire to avoid confrontation with any of the superpowers, but

⁴²James E. Overly, "Threats from Third World Regional Hegemons," in Dr. Karl P. Magyar, Ed. *Global Security Concerns: Anticipating The Twenty-First Century* (Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1996), p. 286.

⁴³ Michael I. Handel, "The Development of The Israeli Political-Military Doctrine," in *Comparative Defence Policy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p.284; see also Y. Harkabi, *Arab Attitudes to Israel* (Jerusalem: Israel University Press, 1971).

⁴⁴ Handel 1974, pp.284-285.

will fight back directly if threatened or attacked Israel; the pledge not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the region but keep nuclear option open; and Israel's desire to maintain its character as a Jewish nation.⁴⁵ Israeli strategic or politico-military doctrine cannot be properly understood without understanding its underlying traumatic experience. Motivated by past trauma, Israel is the most militarily powerful, and even though it has its own internal problem, it is the most politically stable state in the Middle East.⁴⁶

Israel's strategic thinking is best conceived by understanding its goals. Situated in an unstable SSE, its goal of security is based on the strategy of deterrence. In this respect, Uri Bar-Joseph categorizes Israeli deterrence into four aspects: Current deterrence – aimed at preventing the escalation of low intensity conflict with any hostile Arab state; Specific deterrence - to prevent any Arab initiation of crises that might jeopardize Israeli strategic interests; Strategic deterrence – to prevent general war; and Cumulative deterrence – aimed at persuading and convincing Arab world that rather than military solution, only political means can end the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴⁷ Israel's security posture is sometimes offensive indeed. Offensive realists like Eric Labs argue that in anarchy, the best way for states to maximize their security is by maximizing their relative power.⁴⁸ Offensive structural realism in this sense explains the behavior of Israel. This behavior becomes even more evident by Israeli occupation of Arab territories it characterizes as security buffer zones since 1967.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 285.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 284.

⁴⁷ Uri Bar-Joseph, "Variations On A Theme: The Conceptualization of Deterrence in Israeli Strategic Thinking", *Security Studies*, 7.3 (Spring 1998): 148.

⁴⁸ Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and The Expansion of War Arms", *Security Studies*, 6.4 (Summer 1997): 4-5

A second ambition noticeable from the state of Israel's behavior is its hegemonic aspirations. Not only is it the most militarily powerful country in the region, as Britain did in its golden days, Israel plays militarily balance-of-power politics in the region. Israel tries to keep the Arab world divided as possible especially Syria and Egypt, and Saudi Arabia and Iran (Persian). Israel even thwarted Iraq's ambition towards acquiring nuclear weapons by pre-emptively bombing its Osirak reactor in 1981. Defensive realism posits that states with hegemonic ambition do so to guarantee their security and not because they are greedy. Whether this explains the behavior of Israel as a way of eliminating its intrinsic and extrinsic vulnerability, or whether Israel is in pursuit of a raw hegemonic ambition remains to be seen in a further study of this subject. Especially, by studying the military rivalry between Israel and Syria, Israel and Egypt, and Israel and The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which is beyond the scope of this study.

Finally, being isolated, Israel seeks friends from throughout the world especially among developed powers as sources of heavy military equipment, economic and military aids, to secure favorable votes on the issue of Palestine in the UN and the rights of Jews to freely emigrate to their ancestral land, Israel.⁴⁹ Israel has found the unquestionable support it seeks in its relationship with the United States. From time to time the United States transfers sophisticated military equipment, technology, and training, and the provision of foreign aid which underpins Israeli survival.⁵⁰ Annual aid packages from the U.S. to Israel totaled 3 billion dollars; with military aid accounting for 1.8 billion dollars and economic aid 1.2 billion dollars.⁵¹ The goal of assuring its survival and the

⁴⁹ Trevor M. Dupuy et al. *The Almanac of World Military Power 3rd Ed.* (New York: R. R. Bowker Co 1974), p. 184.

⁵⁰ Cohen 1986, p. 1.

⁵¹ *The Military Balance 1997/98*, p. 116.

hegemonic aspirations have exacerbated Israeli threatening posture to the other states in the region. In widening its strategic interests via its own hegemonic ambitions, Israeli threat perceptions are in turn exacerbated. In countering these two types of threats, offensive behavior and deterrence strategy, military self-sufficiency predicated by heavy military weapons build-ups, characterize its national security catechism.

(5) Anarchy

The neorealist explanation of international outcomes by structure cannot be universalized in the contemporary world. Anarchy, at best, can be ascertained at regional or continental levels. The nature of anarchy is becoming as equally important as its structure. That is, anarchy between friendly states is not the same as anarchy among adversarial ones. However, the Middle East is one of the regions in the world where the neorealist standard argument holds. In this epitomized neorealist environment, competitive security is the rule of the game. The system is characterized by violence and 'self help', all conditioned by regional anarchy.

Surrounded by hostile Arab states, Israeli armament acquisition behavior stresses the central role of (Machiavellian) military power in achieving its security and national ambitions in a (Hobbesian) chaotic world. To prevent war and to guarantee peace and stability, realist balance-of-power lies at the heart of Israeli politico-military strategy. In this region of the world, to properly understand Israel's offensive military posture and extended militarization endeavors, one must understand the neorealist standard argument (see Chapter 2). The synopsis of the principal of this school (i.e. Waltz's) argument, posits that "A self-help system is one in which those who do not help themselves, or who

do so less effectively than others, will fail to prosper, will lay themselves open to dangers, will suffer”⁵². This contention explains the point of departure of Israeli’s tendency towards acquiring military capability or its strategic doctrine as a whole. The structure of the Middle Eastern region is truly characterized by neorealist anarchy, as far as Israel is concerned. The area is lacking in any reliable regional security arrangement, or neoliberal institutions as sources of interstate confidence building to guarantee Israeli security. Interstate relations are based on suspicion and distrust. As such, self-help is the only option to assure security. Thus, insecurity is balanced with military capability.

(6) Norms and Identity

Anarchy is an important indicator of the condition of the Middle East strategic security environment. But just as the neorealist material forces are important, norms and identity as non-material forces also play important explanatory role in international security. Using Michael Barnett’s article “Identity and Alliances in the Middle East,” as a launching pad for this analysis, there are three sources of identity. First, there are the natural sources which include race, ethnic or tribal. The second source is that of shared values like religion, democracy, and so on. And finally, institutional source of identity can result from the first two sources or can be an outcome of being a member of certain institutions or another. The latter two sources (shared values and institutional) are

⁵² Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1979), p. 118.

socially constructed.⁵³ Regardless of the source of identity, there are group norms that govern the behavior of its members, e.g. that civilized states do not go to war.⁵⁴

Natural source of identity create group norms that not only complicate but also serve as vulnerable sources of conflict itself. Despite the division of the Arab world by artificial boundaries into sovereign states, Pan-Arabism holds them in unification against Israel. Thus shared identity plays a key role in the dynamics of in-group Arabs versus outgroup – Zionist – phenomenon. As such, important connections exist between identity and threat identification in the region. Each side sees the other as a threat and thereby resorts to militarization to counter such. The outcome has been a regional security dilemma and intractable instability. For the Jews, as for the Arabs, common identity serves as the basis of common interests or hatred. Group norms dictated by Pan-Arabism among Arab states, and Zionism among the Jewish state of Israel, influences their external behavior both in the regional sense and beyond.

Shared values as a source of identity on religious ground plays a part in the SSE of Israel. Islamic religion plays some role in the unity of Arab against a Judaic state of Israel. For example, Islamic-fundamentalist groups like the Hizbollah (or the Party of God) in Southern Lebanon, Hamas which engages in the holy war such as suicide bombing, and their Israeli extremist counterpart, Eyal (that assassinated Yitzak Rabin), seize religious tenet for making rigid demands. Otherwise they are readily willing to thwart the peace process for anything less than absolute victory. Ironically, both extremist sides are committing crimes in the name God.

⁵³Barnett does not necessarily explain identity in this manner; however his idea modified, is utilized in this categorization.

Similarly, even though the Arab states are more important geostrategically to the U.S., the U.S. sees Israel as a preferable strategic partner relative to its democratic character and liberal values.⁵⁵ Again, identity (based on shared values) signals who to balance against and who to ally with.⁵⁶

Finally, neoliberal institutions or the social constructs of the constructivists can serve as paradigms for norms that guide states behavior emanate. The League of Arab States or the Collective Arab Security Pact of 1950 are examples of socially constructed types of identity. Some types of identity and norms serve as sources of threat and instability. The norm that dictates that the Jews be 'driven to the sea' is based on Arab identity, or on the other hand, those that forbid the creation of an independent Palestine state, or that the sure way to guarantee Israel's security is to occupy Arab neighbors' territories are mutually threatening. The militarization efforts to overcome such threats from both sides only lead to security dilemma and unrestrained weaponry buildups on all sides. Unfortunately, this has been the situation in the Middle for over fifty years, without an end in sight.

While identity can lead to security cooperation, common interest can result from security cooperation. Neither form is existing in the region, because there is no concrete regional and collective institution or pact to design and guide common security interests. Division and hostility which emanate from disparity in norms and identity orientation have contributed to the perilous and protracted character of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

⁵⁴ Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in The Middle East", in Peter J. Katzenstein, Ed. *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 400-447.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 444.

Summary: In summarizing the findings of this section, the views of how each element conditions the SSE of Israel shall be articulated; and also, how the elements relate to each other.

First, conflict over who has stronger historical claim to the land of Palestine is central to the Middle East turmoil, particularly the Arab-Israeli conflict. The repeated conquering and subjugation to foreign domination led to the Israelites adoption of nomadic lifestyle. Zionism brought about the idea of Jewish people's re-unification in their ancestral land. However, realizing this mission has both been quite painful, violent, and challenging. Thus, historical chains of traumatic experiences drive Israeli strategic thinking. The zero-sum struggle over land ownership is causally grounded on an historical causal variable that shapes Israel's SSE.

Second, demographic factor bears negative impact on Israel's national security and plays a major role in its perception of insecurity. Sharing borders with historic enemies, Israel is a small Jewish state isolated and encircled by hostile Arab states that at one point or another had united against Israel.

Disadvantage in regional structural composition put Israel in a distrustful and insecure position. And lacking any concrete ally in the region, Israel fortifies itself with formidable military capability to neutralize this demographic disadvantage which in turn exacerbates the overall regional security dilemma. Internally, some degree of polarization exists within a population that is made up of 81 percent Jews and 15 percent Arabs; which creates deep suspicion for the state, especially in regards to the issue of domestic

⁵⁶Tbid., p. 446.

terrorism. Regional demographic structure and disparity feed the conflictual stalemate and irreconcilable differences that perpetuate chronic instability in the SSE.

Third, regional hostility between Arabs and Israel, terrorism, hegemonic ambition and rivalry create a geopolitical tectonic circumstance that is not favorable to Israel's survival. The unstable regional SSE create regimes that are entrenched in the tradition of building strong armed forces which consequently heightens regional instability. Lacking any ally, and treated as a regional pariah, Israel embarks on the acquisition of military capability (including nuclear weapons) unsurpassed by any of the other states in the region. Also, by serving as the United States protégé in the region, Israel finds itself in an awkward position that requires being heavily funded by the U.S. government to guarantee its survival. This relationship with the U.S. made other states very suspicious and distrustful of Israel.

Fourth, Israeli strategic thinking is better understood from the perspective that its survival and security are at the top of its national goals. As such, it prioritizes security over peace. Israel adopts a combination of deterrence with offensive military strategy to achieve these goals. Its hegemonic ambition and rivalry with other potential regional hegemony further destabilizes its own SSE. The attempt to divide its enemies by playing balance-of-power has never been sufficient to stabilize its SSE nor assure its survival and security.

Fifth, the Middle East region is the epitome of the neorealist anarchical environment where competitive security that requires self-help behavior obtains. Distrust and insecurity shape the regional SSE in which Israel is hemmed in.

Finally, from the perspective of race, ethnicity and religion, identity plays a key role in the dynamics of Pan-Arab unity against Israel in most of the Arab-Israeli conflicts. A strong connection exists between identity and regional threat identification dynamics of the in-group Pan-Arabism versus out-group Zionism. Thus, identity causes security dilemma and intractable instability in Israel's SSE.

Equally, norms are often predicated by identity, yet they are both mutually reinforcing. Thus the incompatible norms and identity from both Arab and Israeli sides are contradictory and serve as sources of division, threats, and instability in Israel's security environment.

The six causal elements in Israel's SSE can be shown to relate to each other in several ways. For example, history accounts for the historical claim and the disparity in the Arab versus Jewish genealogy. History also reinforces the effect of demographic disparity. Whereas, it is the disparity in demographic composition that sets the stage for the in-group versus out-group, Pan-Arab versus Zionist collision, in term of their incompatible norms and identity.

The causal effects of historical circumstance, demographic disparity, and the differing if not hostile norms and identity are compounded by anarchy, and the absence of a central authority that can mediate disputes. All these four causations, in part, shape the geopolitics of the Middle East, and specifically the geopolitical condition of Israel. Since hostility, competitive security, and self-help system characterize the geopolitics of this region, many states, especially Israel, pursue national motives that put them in rivalry and a collision course with one another.

Each causal variable has its own unique causal attribute and role to play in explaining the condition of Israel's SSE. It is the combination of the six causal variables and their differing attributes that explain the overall condition of Israel's SSE. We shall now utilize these same variables to analyze apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa's SSE in Chapter 6.

Chapter 6

EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT OF APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA SOCIETIES

(1) Historical Circumstances

Apartheid Society: Located at the Southern end of the Eurasian – African landmass, Southern Africa was an isolated region prior to the technological advances of the past few centuries.¹ Because pre-colonial inhabitants of this region were not literate, archaeological reconstruction and account of the preliterate history is only partial. Prior to the beginning of the Christian era, African communities had lived in Southern Africa by hunting, fishing, collecting edible plants and fruits for thousands of years. These inhabitants were the ancestors of the Khoisan peoples of modern times, the white man derogatorily referred to as Bushmen (hunter-gatherers) and Hottentots (pastoralists). The mixed farmers, who are also pastoralists, were nicknamed Kaffirs. In ethnic terms, they are called (1) ‘San’, (2) ‘Khoikhoi’, and (3) the ‘Bantu’ speaking mixed farmers as Africans.² They remained isolated from the wider world until the end of the fifteenth century.³

Southern Africa is blessed with a great natural deposit of mineral resources, e.g. gold, copper diamonds, platinum, chrome, and uranium. These deposits were mined to a depth of several feet by preindustrial farming people, but modern industrial technology would later abet the full exploitation of the region’s vast quantities of natural wealth.⁴

¹ Leonard Thompson, *A History of South Africa, Revised Edition* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 3.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Eventually, this blessing would become a menacing curse both for the region and its African inhabitants, and a cause of struggle between them as the oppressed, and their oppressors, the white invaders.

European involvement in South Africa was initiated by Pope Alexander when he divided the world's unknown lands between Portugal and Spain. South Africa then became Portugal's domain. The first Portuguese expedition was headed by Bartholomeu Dias in 1487. However, corruption, mismanagement and manpower shortage prevented Portugal's monopolization. The seed of racial segregation was marked between 1652-1799,⁵ when the Khoisan people were conquered and slaves were imported into South Africa from Indonesia, India, Ceylon, Madagascar (Malagasy), and Mozambique.⁶ This practice was formulated by the Netherlands' East India Company, which was later extended to the policy of apartheid. All began in the Cape colony in 1652, and could be traced back specifically to Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the white government of Natal. Initially, the Dutch people came to trade with the Hottentots (natives). Permanent settlement of employees turned the whites into competitors against Africans for possession of the land and for the raising and marketing of livestock. From this company policy, the Europeans rapidly invaded the land, maltreated the inhabitants, the Khois, who were turned from trade partners gradually into servants.⁷

In a bitter battle between the colonial powers, Britain took the Cape colony from the Dutch in 1795. The Dutch regained control in 1803. However, Britain reconquered the Cape colony in 1806; conquered and annexed more territory, e.g. Natal in 1843, and

⁵ D. Brown, *Against the World: Attitudes of White South Africa* (Garden City, NY: Double Day, 1968), p. 45-65.

⁶ Thompson 1995, p. xv.

⁷ De Blij & Hamm, *African South* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962); pp. 251-252.

Lesotho (“Basutoland”) in 1868.⁸ In the 1948 general election, Afrikaner National Party won the general election and began to apply its apartheid policy. Hendrick Frensch Verwoerd who served as the Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958-66, as a part of the British Empire, was the architect of apartheid. It was during his administration that South Africa became a republic and left the British Commonwealth in 1961.⁹

The term apartheid was initially used by the National Party to fulfill Afrikaner ethnic goals as well as white racial segregation. However, ‘apartheid’ soon “developed from a political slogan into a drastic, systematic program of social engineering.”¹⁰

Four core ideas lay at the heart of National Party’s apartheid system. First, the idea that South Africa consists of four desparage “racial groups: 1) White, 2) Colored, 3) Indian, and 4) African. Each has its own distinct culture. Second, the “civilized” race – Whites – was entitled to absolute monopoly of state power. Third, Whites interests took preference over that of Blacks. The state is not obliged to make provision of facilities for inferior races. Finally, “the White racial group formed a single nation, with Afrikaans – and English-speaking components, while Africans belonged to several (eventually ten) distinct nations or potential nations – a formula that made the White nation the largest in the country.”¹¹

Aside from these principles, other elements that fill the gulf between apartheid as theory (separate freedoms) and its practice (discrimination and inequality) include the brutality of pass laws, forced removals, house arrests, and detention or imprisonment

⁸ Thompson 1995, p. xvi-xvii.

⁹ Ibid., p. xviii.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 188-189.

¹¹ Ibid., pp. 190.

without trial.¹² Under the apartheid system, for example, mixed marriages or sexual relations were prohibited (The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) and the Immorality Act (1950); and Africans were de-enfranchised politically.¹³ Remarkably, it was during the period when apartheid was taking root in South Africa that political power was moving in the opposite direction in the rest of Africa, the decolonization era.¹⁴ Historically, because of its inhumane, brutal and repressive nature, apartheid was openly challenged and openly defended by bloodshed. It was not just a way of life, it became a way of death.

In addition to repressive laws and unchecked executive power, a huge security establishment that included South African Defence Force (SADF), the South African Police (SAP), the armaments industry and a diverge of intelligence, civil defence and support agencies were orchestrated to protect white rule against challenge from Africans. The apartheid South Africa regime relied heavily on coercive means and violence to maintain its hold on power.

In the early 1960s, many of the leaders of African National Congress (ANC)(e.g. Nelson Mandela in 1964) and Pan African Congress (PAC) were sentenced to life in prison.¹⁵ The apartheid South African government security perceptions from the late 1970s were based on Peter W. Botha's apocalyptic vision of a South Africa besieged by the military establishments and assaults from the forces of anti-apartheid entities, especially the Communist Soviet Union and Cuba and revolutionary black nationalism. "Total onslaught," inspired by these entities especially Moscow, by implications,

¹² Ibid., p. 204.

¹³ Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 213.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. xviii.

demanded government's "total strategy" in response. The state was to use all the resources at its disposal to repel the onslaught.¹⁶ According to the doctrine of total onslaught and total strategy, the rubric was subjected to a very broad interpretation in which case, almost all aspects of modern government in South Africa could be construed to have security implications.¹⁷

Various neighboring states were categorized as posing latent conventional threats to South Africa and at the same time abetting anti-apartheid forces by granting training bases for national liberation movements.¹⁸ Apartheid South Africa forces conducted intimidatory raids against "guerrilla bases" in these states, e.g. between 1981-88, it invaded Angola, Lesotho, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia.¹⁹ Raids were also conducted to foil "guerrilla operations inside "independent" homelands. Thousands of anti-apartheid demonstrators were killed in South Africa (e.g. in Sharpeville, 1960, and in Soweto 1976-1977). Thus anti-apartheid forces were seen as emanating from internal, regional and extraregional fronts.

ARMSCOR (State Armaments Corporation) had a reputation of engagement in notorious schemes to obtain military materials and technology from abroad, while it developed indigenous equipment and perfected technical know-how. "These included the development and production from 1974 of at least six nuclear weapons later destroyed by autumn 1991 under the direction of the then South African President de

¹⁶ Dr. Louis du Plessis, "A Perspective on Perspectives: The Expanding Focus of South African Thinking on Security," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, 17.12 (November 1995): 35; Robert I. Rotberg Et al, *South Africa and Its Neighbors: Regional Security and Self-Interest* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1985), p. 20.

¹⁷ Rotberg 1985, p. 20.

¹⁸ Plessis 1995, pp. 35-36.

¹⁹ Ibid; Thompson 1995, p. xviii.

Klerk.”²⁰ The mandatory arms embargo imposed on the country by the UN Security Council in 1977 only accelerated up the apartheid process of self-sufficiency in its defence needs.²¹ Also, significant cooperation existed between South Africa and Israel defence industries both in conventional weapons such as Israel Lavi jet project and South Africa Chectan jet upgrade, and also in nuclear matters.²²

In the first half of the 1980s, a protracted and widespread resistance mounted in black South African townships occasioned violent clashes with the government forces. In the most part, the government used violence to suppress revolts. In addition to militarization and the use of force, apartheid tactics included destabilizing its neighboring states by supporting insurgent or rebel forces against their governments. Also, the government “ethnicized” the conflicts that resulted from antiapartheid struggles thereby causing division within the South African black community. This was typified by the 1986-95 violent clashes between Zulu supporters of Inkatha and the ANC in Kwazulu at Witwatersrand.²³

Post Apartheid Society: The later part of the 1980s and the beginning of 1990s ushered in an era of political change in which the failure of communism (e.g. in Angola) and the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union dwindled the doctrine of total onslaught and total strategy. On the other hand, black nationalism and black people’s struggle for self-determination increasingly signaled intra-societal division, inability to

²⁰ Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?” *International Security*, 21.3 (Winter 1996/97): 60; 69; Edward Flint, “The South African Defence Industry”. In F.H. Toase and E.J. Yorke, Eds. *The New South Africa: Prospects For Domestic and International Security* (Houndmills, Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1998), p. 172; also see B. Rabent, “South Africa’s Defused Nuclear Weapons – Trend Reversal in the Third World?” *Aussenpolitik*, 46.1 (1995), p. 71.

²¹ Toase et Yorke 1998, p. 172; See C. D’Assy, “South Africa Retreats into its Laager,” *Armada International*, 11.6 (1987): 54.

²² Toase et York 1998, p. 172.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 24; Thompson 1995, p. xix.

government and the inevitable abolition of apartheid. Internally riddled with revolts and uprisings, and internationally isolated as a pariah state, coupled with international economic and weapon embargoes, the existing white minority regime started to rethink the previously held apartheid system.²⁴ The realization of the evil of apartheid, but particularly the reality of its inevitable demise, led to the release of Nelson Mandela (February 1990) and all political prisoners in 1990 by President De Klerk, who succeeded Botha in 1989.

Following the release of Mandela, there occasioned a gradual shift from confrontation to mediation, which eventually resulted in the April 27-30, 1994 first non-racial general election that ended the apartheid system in South Africa. Nelson Mandela (ANC candidate) won the Presidential election and was inaugurated as the President of the country on May 10, 1994.²⁵

The state's security establishment which had been purely under the authority of the apartheid military came under the authority of the civilian government. Post-apartheid South Africa had not only restructured the SADF by integrating the militaries of the opposition and of the former homeland forces of the apartheid era, it destroyed its nuclear arsenal in March 1991 and became a party to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1993.²⁶ Now that the international prodigal son has come home to the community of nations, post-apartheid South African population is dealing with the reality of systematic reform. According to the *South African White Paper on Defence* 1996, perceptions of insecurity have shifted from the threat of communism and black

²⁴ Plessis 1995, pp. 25-6; 37.

²⁵ Keith Somerville, "The Long Walk to a New South Africa," *The World Today*, 51.3 (March 1995): 60.

²⁶ David Silverberg, "The Morning After The Honeymoon: South Africa Defense Adjusts To Its New Realities", *Armed Forces Journal (International)*, 134.6 (January 1997): 48; Dr. Denis Venter, "Regional

nationalism, or from predominantly military concern, to include other areas such as political, economic, social and environmental issues.²⁷ In post-apartheid South Africa, regional defence cooperation, confidence building, and common doctrines have replaced the total onslaught and total strategy doctrines of the apartheid era.

The history of South Africans, as the right and true inhabitants of the land, prior to the arrival of the “white invaders,” the establishment of apartheid regime, and the historical determination to reverse the segregated and oppressive system, created a deep crevice internally that acted as a source of threat to national security. This internal division which is grounded on historical backdrop, became internationalized and led to the international isolation of South Africa and its overwhelming external military threats. The internal and external threats disappeared at the demise of both the Cold War and apartheid. Thus, the marked differences in the SSEs of apartheid South Africa and post-apartheid South Africa.

(2) Demographic Composition

Apartheid Society: The total population of South Africa according to 1997/98 *The Military Balance* is 44,411,000.²⁸ The country’s inhabitants are racially classified into four categories: African, Colored, Indian, and White. According to Leonard Thompson, official statistics estimate of the proportion (in millions) and percentage of racial shares

Security in Sub-Saharan Africa”, Lecture to the Joint Staff Course (JSC 37/97) South African Defence College, Pretoria, 5 March 1997, p. 11; Sagan 1996/97, pp. 60; 69-70.

²⁷ *White Paper on Defence* 1996, as approved by Parliament on 14 May 1996, p. 3.

²⁸ *The Military Balance 1997/98*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (London: Oxford University Press); p. 258.

of the population for 1980, 1993 and 2010 are listed in Table 2 below.²⁹ While the white population is diminishing, the African population continues to increase as the majority.

Table 2
Population of South Africa, in Millions, 1980-2010

	1980	1993	2010
	N (%)	N (%)	N (%)
African ¹	20.8 (72)	30.7 (76)	53.4 (83)
Coloured	2.6 (9)	3.4 (8)	4.3 (7)
Indian	0.8 (3)	1.0 (3)	1.2 (1)
White ²	4.5 (16)	5.2 (13)	5.5 (9)
Total	28.7	40.3	64.4

1 Including Homelands

2 Of whom 60% are Africaners

'N' indicates number in million (s)

Source: Official statistics gathered by Leonard Thompson, 1995.

Based on racial disparity, interalia, the apartheid state was extravagant by creating three parliamentary chambers', fourteen departments of education, health and welfare; "One for each "race" at the national level, one for each province, and one for each

²⁹ Thompson 1995, p. 278. While the white population is haemorrhaging the black African population is simultaneously increasing as the majority. The gradual erosion of white, hold on disproportionate economic power, an advantage derived from decades of privilege, and the reconstruction process have deepen white's fears and threatened their future as the minority. They see better prospects overseas. England, Canada, the United States, and particularly Australia have become popular destinations. According to *Washington Post*, there are currently estimated 6 million whites among 35 million blacks in post-apartheid South Africa. See Jon Jeter, "Whites, Fears Deepen In New South Africa: Changes Prompt Many to Go Overseas," *Washington Post*, Saturday, July 10, 1999, A2; A16, Col. I.

nonindependent Homeland.”³⁰ Similarly, the apartheid state’s large military and military establishments were extravagantly based on racial/ethnic segregation.³¹

The principal infrastructure of apartheid was demographics, in which case the white man was superior and black inferior. Thus, Prime Minister Verwoed (1956-1966) bluntly described the role of African workers in South Africa as “the service of the white people”.³² The apartheid system exploited the inherent crevices of demographics to perpetuate separate and plural development, a policy of segregation, political and economic discrimination against non-European groups within the country.³³ Legal force was given to apartheid on park benches, in railway waiting rooms, in concert halls and even for swimmers in the sea. Africans’ movement was restricted under apartheid law and they were excluded from established universities and prevented from attending white churches. Demographic stratification became a tool of colonization, oppression and suppression. Apartheid institutions (e.g. the land was categorized as white area in the urban places, and homeland for the blacks) were created in this heterogeneous society to enable the white community to dominate all other races in politics and government and enjoy a privilege position that they did not deserve. Fully aware of this, the whites spent their time and the national resources trying to justify why they were doing so.³⁴ Accordingly, the source of threat to the internal security climate more often was the same very government under whose sovereignty the citizens lived through oppressive policies,

³⁰ Thompson 1995, p. 242.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Philip Mason, *An Essay on Racial Tension*, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972).

³³ Stephen Biko, *I Write What I Like* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979) pp. 15-60.

³⁴ Richard Hull, *Civilization in Turmoil* (New York: New York University Press, 1981), p. 14.

and “its incapacity to sustain a good life for all”, relative to the inequitable distribution of national resources within the republic.³⁵

On the one hand, demographic was used as the medium for sowing the seed of apartheid; on the other hand the resultant system of segregation itself became the formidable source of national vulnerability and internal strife. Internationally, this system of government became the cause of South Africa’s isolation and ostracism. The 1974 version of *The Almanac of World Military Power* states that “The threat to white political hegemony posed by the 14 million blacks, repressed under apartheid and increasingly agitated by the foreign-based liberation movements, is the gravest and most immediate strategic problem for South Africa.”³⁶ The maintenance of an oppressive system that emerged out of the weakness of demographic heterogeneity demanded and was accorded with the act of militarization.

In addition to the racial foundation and the racial dynamics of the turbulent system of apartheid, the government ethnicized the political conflict and politicized ethnicity in its efforts to overcome anti-apartheid oppositional forces. This is best typified by the violent conflict that ravaged the province of Kwazulu-Natal, a complex conflict which was not based on party and tribal rivalries but also on personal ambition and the “political opportunism” of Chief Gatsha Magusuthu Buthelezi.³⁷ A grievous blow was dealt to the anti-apartheid cause and the entire black unity when Buthelezi, the leader of Inkatha, broke off ties with the ANC. From the early 1980s onwards, a gap between the two organizations widened and was characterized by violence. This gap was

³⁵ Venter 1997, p. 1.

³⁶ Retired Colonel Trevor M. Dupuy et al, U.S. Army, *The Almanac of World Military Power 3rd Ed.*, (New York: R.R. Bowker Co., 1974), p. 256.

³⁷ Toase and Yorke 1998, p. 117.

exploited by the apartheid regime. The use of violence especially found a seat in Inkatha's political posturing.³⁸ On the one hand, Chief Buthelezi seized the opportunity presented by the apartheid regime to organize a radical anti-apartheid black nationalism, but on the other, he was determined to establish a distinct Zulu ethnic identity within the apartheid state. In this context he played the dual role of both a collaborator with the apartheid government and a disruptor of a common anti-apartheid front by black Africans. Buthelezi militarized and radicalized Inkatha between 1979-92, during which he relaunched it as 'Inkatha freedom party' (IFP; in 1990).³⁹

There was a protracted conflict within the Zulu population, that is, between the supporters of ANC and that of Inkatha. At Witwaterstrand township, conflict was mostly between Zulu migrant workers and the settled populations, mostly of Xhosa or Sotho origin.⁴⁰ Fighting among blacks in 1990 was mainly ethnic. With a heavily Xhosa leadership, ANC combated the Zulu-dominated Inkatha. The South Africa Institute of Race Relations recorded the number of political death in 1991 to be 2,672; 3,347 in 1992; and 3,706 in 1993.⁴¹ Conflicts inside South Africa could be categorized into three types: white on black, black-on-black, and black on white.⁴² Therefore, demographical composition of South Africa in the apartheid era was a major cause of threat to national security. It also served as the main recipe for the national goal of the minority white government. That is, to maintain a monopoly of power.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 119-121.

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 120-123.

⁴⁰ Thompson 1995, p. 246.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Willie Breytenbach, "Conflict in Southern Africa: Whither Collective Security?" *Africa Insight*, 24.1 (1994): 26-37.

Post Apartheid Society: The repeal of apartheid laws started in the late 1980s as secret negotiation between ANC and apartheid government was under way. In 1986, the pass laws were repealed. Between 1990-91, the 1913 and 1936 Land Act, Group Areas Act, Population Registration Act, and Separate Amenities Act were repealed, while political organizations were unbanned.⁴³ The move to a non-racial system of government and non-racial human resources procurement implies equal treatment for all South Africa citizens. The abolition of all types of racial and the process of internal reform in progress in the post apartheid society had an immediate positive impact on perceptions of security.⁴⁴ The security establishments, previously dominated by white, are being modified in order for them to be “consistent with democratic principles by reflecting the multiethnic nature of South African Society.”⁴⁵ For example, in 1994 the old SADF was reformed to effect a change from the imbalance of the past to achieving “representatives in all ranks which broadly reflects the demographic composition of the country”⁴⁶ At which point, the militaries of the opposition and former homelands, seven in all, were integrated within South African military services into one single South African National Defense Force.⁴⁷ While there is a continuing violence in KwaZulu-Natal province, and economic imbalance, demographic integration of this heterogeneous society is underway as a source of strength rather than being a source of division and insecurity. It should be noted that the general demographic trend reflects a further power shift towards Africans, being the majority of South African population, which coincides

⁴³ Thompson, p. xix; 244.

⁴⁴ Plessis 1995, pp. 31; 27-28.

⁴⁵ William Gutteridge, “South Africa’s Future Defence and Security: Identifying the national Interest”, Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, (April 1997): p.18.

⁴⁶ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 80.

⁴⁷ Silverberg 1997, p. 52.

with its principle of democratic majority.

(3) Geopolitical Condition

Apartheid Society: Located “at the junction of two oceans” South Africa was an extremely important bridgehead of world imperialism. Unfortunately, the great strategic value of this country, whose minerals the western powers were dependent upon, would eventually be dealt a great blow.⁴⁸ According to the 1979 United States Bureau of Mines, South Africa produces 60 percent of world’s annual gold supply. It produces significant quantities of essential minerals for the industrialized world, especially western industry and defence establishment. These include 47 percent of the world’s platinum, 33 percent of the world’s chromium, 21 percent of the world’s manganese, and 42 percent of the world’s vanadium. South Africa remains a major producer of world gem diamonds and produces large quantities of asbestos, coal, copper, iron, nickel, phosphates, silver, uranium, and zinc.⁴⁹ It was the discovery of these minerals that precipitated the white invasion of the country. It was the greed for minerals that triggered the white euphoric attitude of the possession and obsession to seize control of this black nation. Like a contagious disease, these strategic minerals also lured the western world to support indirectly South African Apartheid government, because their interest was mostly focused on the economic gains from their own investments. Hence, the apartheid regime gained some silent support in the perpetration and prolongation of the apartheid scheme

⁴⁸ Rotberg et al 1985, p. 30.

⁴⁹ Thompson 1995, p. 217.

and all the channels of dehumanization to edge black people out of the nation's wealth. South Africa accounts for 41 percent of sub-Saharan Africa's gross national product.⁵⁰

During the apartheid era, the strategic geography of Southern Africa was predicated by first, the Cold War, especially Cold-War related conflicts in Mozambique and Angola, and second, the problem of apartheid. The first was seen as a threat emanating from "international communists" led by the Soviet Union; and the second from "black nationalists". The former causation was external and the latter internal.⁵¹ The Soviet had strong ties with the ANC and SWAPO of Namibia, which are liberation movements with insurgent forces in their countries. Similarly, the Soviet backed the ruling Mozambique FRELIMO (Mozambique Liberation Front) and the Cubans supported the ruling MPLA in Angola.⁵² The United States and South Africa supported the opposition forces in those countries. The 'Soviet global strategy of world domination' and communism was perceived as a major threat which was intended to overthrow South African government in the midst of international isolation.⁵³ The presence of Soviet, Cuban and East Bloc surrogate forces, especially in Angola, the sophisticated Soviet weaponry build up in the region in the 1970s and 1980s, accompanied by an influx of East bloc military advisers and thousands of Cuban forces acting as proxies to Moscow, were considered to pose a major direct threat to South Africa.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ Venter 1997, p. 20.

⁵¹ Earl H. Tilford Jr. Ed. *World View: The 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA:US Army War College, 1997), pp. 55-56.

⁵² Rotberg et al 1985, pp. 59-60.

⁵³ Plessis 1995, pp. 24 – 25.

⁵⁴ Dr. Simon J. Baynham, "Regional Security in The Third World with Specific Reference to Southern Africa," *Strategic Review For Southern Africa*, xvi.1 (March 1994): 86.

The neighboring states which granted organizations training bases or transit facilities were perceived by the apartheid government to pose indirect threats to South Africa. The Republic's attempts to come to terms with its neighbors by constructing security network (e.g. the 1984 Nkomati Accord with Mozambique) yielded only limited result and failed to eliminate the impact of the ANC as a guerrilla movement.⁵⁵

In response to its threatened external security climate, apartheid South Africa adopted an offensive and aggressive military strategy, - 'total strategy' - to deal with the 'total onslaught' spearheaded by Moscow. South Africa used security forces for counter-insurgency operations against armed guerrillas, sponsored and supported counter-revolutionary anti-Communist forces, and conducted violent military campaigns in cross border operations to attack Soviet backed forces and the stronghold of ANC in exile in the neighboring states.⁵⁶ It adopted and utilized destabilizing tactics of its neighbors. However, this aggression and destabilization facilitated unity among these states and created a sense of mutual defence against one common enemy.⁵⁷

In adopting a deterrence strategy, President F.W. de Klerk explained in the Parliament in March 1993 that South Africa had owned "six atomic weapons" as a result of the "Soviet expansionist threat to Southern Africa"; "the buildup of Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary, as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on

⁵⁵ William Gutteridge, "South Africa: Threats to Security", *Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Defence Yearbook 1986*, London: Brassey's Defence Publishers, p. 260.

⁵⁶ Plessis 1995, p. 26.

⁵⁷ Van Zyl 1997a, p. 11.

outside assistance should it be attacked.”⁵⁸ Recognizing its status as a pariah state during the apartheid era, South Africa was militarily armed to its teeth.

Internally, “black nationalist” organizations, especially the ANC, were perceived as trying to overthrow the then existing white minority regime. The perception of internal threat increased as black political resistance escalated. Consequently, the nature and scope of the internal role of the military was expanded. The former SADF, in conjunction with SAP, was strengthened and deployed repeatedly to rebuff the perceived threat from antiapartheid forces both within the state and from neighboring territories. A combination of both conventional forces and tactics were evoked.⁵⁹ The quest for security became an obsession for the apartheid regime. According to Dr. Louis du Plessis,

The concept of “militarisation” was frequently used to characterize the Government’s security policy, as well as certain categories of the security management system, the political culture, economy, and communication services. The term was applied in a variety of cases from “militarisation of white schooling”, to “church resistance to militarisation”.⁶⁰

The key concept, by which the problematic nature of the Republic’s security was explained especially in the 1980s, was “Conflict”. The internal security climate prior to 1990 was perceived to constitute and characterized by a “revolutionary onslaught.”⁶¹

The apartheid government responded to the internal unstable climate by mounting sabotages against guerilla operations inside the republic, sometimes inside the “independent” homelands, and in cross border operations to territories suspected of harboring guerillas bases.⁶² Also, antiapartheid rally demonstrators were openly

⁵⁸ Sagan 1996/97, p. 60.

⁵⁹ Plessis 1995, p. 25.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 26.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 26-27.

⁶² Gutteridge 1986, p. 265.

massacred by SAP forces as seen in Sharperville in 1960 and in Soweto in 1976-1977. As mentioned earlier, conflict inside South Africa were of three patterns: The black on black type in which case the government succeeded in 'ethnicizing' the conflict by creating division between the ANC and Inkatha (e.g. at Natal under the leadership of Chief Buthelezi); the black on white pattern; and the white on black type.⁶³

Post Apartheid Society: As long as the bipolar international order persisted, the two opposing superpower blocs confronted each other in the Third World, especially in South Africa. However, in the late 1980s, superpower military rivalry gave way to diplomatic cooperation as the world witnessed the collapse of communism. This paved the way for new changes in the geopolitics of South Africa. Namibia (i.e. South West Africa until 1978) gained independence from South Africa in March 1990.⁶⁴ South African and Cuban troops withdrew from Angola. Similarly, realizing the inevitability of the demise of apartheid, President de Klerk made a policy statement in Washington in 1990 renouncing the "legal heritage of apartheid" and expressed his determination to abolish all forms of racial or other types of discriminations. Thus, the 1991-1993 negotiation between the apartheid government and ANC led to the general election of 1994. The concepts of a 'political transition', 'constitutional developments' and 'negotiations' replaced the studies of 'conflict' in the writings of South African security analysts. The internal security climate was pictured in the form of 'peaceful transition' in place of 'revolutionary struggle'⁶⁵

The geopolitics of post-apartheid South Africa is shaped by the end of the Cold

⁶³ Breytenback 1994, pp. 30-33.

⁶⁴ Berynham 1994, pp. 86-87.

⁶⁵ Plessis 1995, pp. 27-28.

War, the ending of the apartheid system, and the establishment of democracy. As a result of these new developments in its SSE, the country is no longer isolated internationally nor does it face any immediate internal or external military threat or aggression. "It has been welcomed into many international organizations, most importantly the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)".⁶⁶ With a radical reduction in the external security threat, South Africa became the first country in the history of the world to voluntarily destroy its own nuclear weapons arsenal, and has since joined the NPT regime.⁶⁷

Another remarkable strategic development since 1994 is the new leadership status of the South Africa in Southern Africa; a region that was "previously an arena of intense conflict." Its relations with its neighboring states have been transformed from suspicion and hostility to friendship and cooperation.⁶⁸ Similarly, South Africa no longer pose a military threat to its neighbors.

The country's current security doctrine makes an obvious departure from an offensive strategy based on total onslaught to a defensive approach based on collective security and preference to the use of diplomatic means as opposed to military means to resolve conflict.⁶⁹ The new political activities of South Africa in the Southern Africa region entail 'confidence-building', 'security-building measures' and regional stability and security. It joined the SADC in 1994, which had since conducted a test of a regional

⁶⁶ *White Paper 1996*, pp. 7-12.

⁶⁷ Sagan 1996/97, p. 60; see F.W. de Villiers Et al, "Why South Africa Gave Up The Bomb," *Foreign Affairs*, (November/December 1993): 98. South Africa in 1991 became the world first instance of nuclear rollback, in which case, it voluntarily and unilaterally gave up its nuclear weapons and programme.

⁶⁸ *White Paper 1996*, p. 13.

⁶⁹ Plessis 1995, p. 40.

military operation by a combined task force of the member states of these regional organization.⁷⁰

Today, in post-apartheid South Africa, the predominant geopolitical concern is no more military threat. Security as a concept and an issue has been broadened to include political, economic, social and environmental matters. According to the 1996 *White Paper on Defence*, “The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) stands at the pinnacle of national policy and, consequently, defence policy.”⁷¹ As such, while SANDF is still an important security body, but of last resort, it is no longer a dominant security institution as seen in the apartheid era.⁷² Although the prospects of regional peace and stability are now greater than in the past, future regional political equation would most certainly be influenced by South Africa’s ‘giantism’. In which case, the asymmetrical coexistence between a hegemon with good intentions, on the one hand, and weak states in Southern Africa, on the other, might prove very challenging.⁷³

(4) National Goals and Ambitions

Apartheid Society: The principal goal of the apartheid South Africa regime was to maintain Afrikanerdom by perpetuating the social system of apartheid. Ambitious to do this, it was necessary to maintain the monopolistic and hegemonic character of apartheid internally and to strengthen South African’s hegemonic position regionally. Thus, any entity or action that might act as impediments to achieving the above goals were considered as threats to the supposedly national interest which must be countered

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ *White Paper 1996*, p. 1.

⁷² Ibid., p. 3.

⁷³ du Plessis 1994, p. 58.

accordingly. The concept of “Total Onslaught” epitomized sources and types of such threats. This code name was used by President Botha to describe “the Soviet war-mongers, antiapartheid activists, and anyone else willing to support the African National Congress or other guerrilla movements in antagonizing South Africa.”⁷⁴ The onslaught was not just militaristic, it was seen as political, diplomatic, cultural, religious, social and psychological warfare.⁷⁵ Only a ‘Total Strategy’, it was conceived, could repulse the danger of total onslaught and UN mandatory arms embargo. Consequently, almost all the modern aspects of the apartheid government could be construed to have had security implications.⁷⁶

Hence, the apartheid government was determined to build a formidable security apparatus to deter potential aggressors, dissidents or internal resistance. Deterring and destabilizing the frontline Southern African states, strengthening their control of Namibia, and presenting the then ostracized South Africa as an attractive ally to the Western hemisphere were part of the national objectives as well as tactics used in the pursuit of the government’s pro-apartheid aspirations.⁷⁷ The move towards greater self-sufficiency in armament build-ups was practically pursued and accomplished in dealing with arms embargoes passed in 1963 by the UN Security Council.⁷⁸ Such move include “the development and production from 1974 of at least six nuclear weapon;” and significant cooperation with Israel in both conventional weapons and nuclear affairs.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ Rotberg Et al 1985, p. 17.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 20.

⁷⁷ Toase and York 1998, p. 170.

⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 171.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 172; also see Scott D. Sagan, “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons: Three Models in Search of a Bomb”, *International Security*, 21.3 (Winter 1996/97): 60, 69-70; Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation And The Utility of The Nuclear Proliferation Regime,” *Security Studies*, 4.3 (Spring 1995): 494-495.

Edward Flint cautions that “Indeed, whilst one may question South Africa’s claim that it was virtually self-sufficient for all its defence needs during the days of apartheid, it cannot be denied that South Africa’s defence industry was one that produced certain items that remained of significant commercial interest to Western defence firms”.⁸⁰ This, he says, became increasingly apparent after the demise of apartheid.⁸¹ Implicitly, western assistance in the building up of apartheid military machines could not equally be ruled out, it was covert.

In achieving its defence objectives, South Africa’s security concerns overshadowed any inclination for a therapeutic foreign policy. South Africa pursued a high-risk foreign policy that destabilized the SSE of the Southern African region by posing itself not only as a dominating hegemon, but also as a military threat to the other states. As such, the region was heavily militarized relative to the threatening SSE in which there was mutual perception of threat from one side by the other. Hence, the security dilemma that characterized the region in the apartheid era and the unstoppable endeavor to attain security by expanded militarization. The ability to project a resolute and superior military presence, carry out preemptive attacks, use surrogate forces (e.g. UNITA; Zimbabwe African’s People’s Union (ZAPU)), and its possession of nuclear weapons were seen as essential to accomplishing the objectives of apartheid and in preserving white political dominion.

Post Apartheid Society: The key national goals and ambitions of a post apartheid South Africa contrast those of the apartheid era. Nonetheless, it remains one nation that is yet not indivisible. The goal of national security is no longer predominantly military,

⁸⁰ Toase and Yorke 1998, p. 172; also see P. Johnson and D. Martin Eds. *South Africa's Arms Merchant* (London: Brassey's 1989), pp. 255-260.

instead, it is sought primarily to meet political, economic, social, environmental, cultural rights and the needs of South African people through efforts that also promote and maintain regional security.⁸² The post-apartheid approach to security does not warrant an expanded role for the armed forces. “Total Strategy” and aggressive defence policy have been replaced by “defence in a democracy”, in which case, SANDF orientation and posture is primarily defensive.⁸³ Presently, despite South African’s giantism, which might counter its good intentions in the future, regional integration and cooperation influenced by collective security are the dominant foci in the external dimension of its current security objectives. Envisaging to play the role of a regional peacekeeper since its transition to democracy in 1994, the country has carefully desisted from projecting an image of a regional superpower.⁸⁴

In the quest for peace and prosperity, post-apartheid South Africa realizes that nuclear weapons is not only superfluous but actually counterproductive to its political, economic and military objectives; hence, it dismantled its nuclear arsenal in 1991.⁸⁵ According to the *1996 White paper*, “South Africa is committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament.”⁸⁶ Towards these goals, the country denuclearized and joined the NPT and cooperated fully with the IAEA comprehensive safeguards on its nuclear facilities and activities.⁸⁷ In its aspiration to be fully accepted and assimilated

⁸¹ Toase and Yorke 1998, p. 172.

⁸² Earl Tilford Jr., *World View: 1997 Strategic Assessment from the Strategic Studies Institute* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1997), p. 56; see *White Paper on Defence 1998*, p. 4.

⁸³ *White Paper on Defence 1998*, pp. 3 - 4.

⁸⁴ Colonel Pieter J. Van Zyl, “South Africa and Peace Operations in the Southern African Region,” A paper submitted to the National Defence University, Washington, D.C. as an academic requirement for the Master of Science degree in National Resource Strategy, November 1997, p. 1; 5.

⁸⁵ See Sagan 1996/97, pp. 60; 69-70; Thayer 1995, pp. 494-495; Toase and Yorke 1998, pp. 171.

⁸⁶ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 4.

⁸⁷ de Villiers Et al 1993, p. 109.

into the community of nations, in its *White Paper*, the post-apartheid regime clearly states among other measures that it “shall adhere to international law on armed conflict and to all international treaties to which it is a party”.⁸⁸ There is a shift in current thinking towards political rather than military intervention, to conflict management and resolution.⁸⁹

Today, the primary goals and ambitions of South Africa is to develop a non-racial, non-sexist and non-discriminatory internal culture predicated by the national constitution,⁹⁰ and to overcome the prospects of ethnic violence especially in the Kwazulu-Natal region. Overcoming the plethora causes of insecurity that are plaguing the nation is also critical. Such threats and sources of threats include organized crime and illegal drugs trafficking, border disputes, drought, mass migrations, housing and water scarcity, diseases (e.g. HIV), and uneven democratic processes.⁹¹ Overcoming poverty by improving the quality of life of its citizens and revitalizing the economy that was intensely crippled by protracted international sanctions are high up in the national agenda.⁹² One of the most daunting challenges of post-apartheid South Africa is balancing the above domestic priorities and regional ones. Nonetheless, the risk posed by the current national goals and ambitions of South Africa is nowhere near the threats posed by those of the apartheid era to its own security and that of others.

⁸⁸ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 4.

⁸⁹ Venter 1997, p. 33.

⁹⁰ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 4.

⁹¹ Hussein Solomon and Jakkie Cilliers, “Southern African and the Quest for Collective Security,” *Security Dialogue*, 28.2 (1997): 191; Tilford 1997, p.56; Colonel Pieter J. Van Zyl, “The Multi-dimensional Challenges of Collective Security in the Southern African Region, With Specific Reference to the Potential for Economic, Political and Military Co-operation,”: A Research paper submitted to the South African Defence College as an academic requirement for the Joint Staff Course, May 1997, p. 6.

⁹² Van Zyl 1997b, p. 6.

(5) Anarchy

Apartheid Society: Physical violence was perceived as real and tangible danger from and to the oppressive white government. For the regime, threats emanated from blacks, international communists, anti-apartheid sympathizers, revolutionary movements (e.g. to Namibia) and the frontier neighboring states of Southern African. In response, apartheid South Africa engaged in 'total strategy' to counter this 'total onslaught'. Militarization was characteristic of the government's strategy, being isolated as a pariah globally, and internally threatened by instability relative to its intra-societal division and the 'ungovernability' of its own citizens.⁹³ The apartheid regime experienced the type of fear that was characteristic of states in an anarchical environment. The fear of *totale aanslag* (a Soviet invasion of South Africa), the deployment of Cuban forces in Angola, and Warsaw Pact forces in Mozambique led to the adoption of offensive strategy which included nuclear testing in the mid-1970s and the eventual acquisitions of six nuclear warheads.⁹⁴

South African efforts to dominate the region as a hegemon only destabilized it further. The southern Africa region during the apartheid era was characterized by destabilisation, civil wars, and inter-state conflicts.⁹⁵ Cross-border tensions and hostilities and the fear of South Africa's aggression prompted the militarization by the frontline states who were the major external antagonists of the apartheid system. As far as the security of the republic was concerned, the region was in a state of anarchy. It was isolated and surrounded by hostile neighbors. Its security was based on a self-help

⁹³ Plessis 1995, p. 26.

⁹⁴ Thayer 1995, p. 495.

⁹⁵ Antou de Plessis, "The Security Dimension of the Foreign Policies of Southern Africa States: Overview, Prospects and Constraints," *Strategic Review for Southern Africa*, *xvi.1* (March 1994): 57.

approach. From 1981 until the end of the apartheid era, for example, South African Defence Force conducted cross-border military operations against guerrilla bases and intimidatory raids against neighboring states suspected of harboring antiapartheid revolutionary forces (e.g. in Lesotho and Mozambique, despite the Nkomati peace accord signed with the latter).⁹⁶

Apartheid South African aggression and destabilization, the counter-aggression activities by its neighbors, revolutionary forces and Warsaw Pact forces, all completed a full vicious circle of threat and counter-threat in this anarchic region during the apartheid era.

Post Apartheid Society: The end of the Cold War, the departure of Warsaw Pact forces from the region, the independence of Namibia that followed, and the dismantlement of apartheid paved the way for the normalization of regional and foreign relations and encouraged the renewal of commitment to regional cooperation. South Africa was welcomed into the Southern African Development Community (SADC formerly SADCC) in 1994 and several member states in the region pursued the path of demilitarization.⁹⁷ The type of anarchy obtainable in the region now is the attenuated type seen among friendly states. As a result, post-apartheid South Africa unprecedentedly gave up its nuclear weapons and program and committed itself to collective regional concerns and responsibilities. Except in Angola, military expenditure in real terms or as a share of GNP is declining among the SADC members in the post apartheid era. As rightly stated by Dr. Simon Baynham, “The end of the Cold War has ushered in an era in

⁹⁶ Gutteridge 1996, p. 265.

⁹⁷ Solomon and Cilliers 1997, p. 199; SIPRI 1998, p. 199; SIPRI 1998, p. 196.

which superpower military conflict in Southern Africa has been replaced by international (i.e. regional) efforts to seek peace through cooperative diplomatic action,⁹⁸ as opposed to the anarchy and security dilemma that was salient in the region during the period of apartheid.

Today, previous state-centric preoccupation in military, economic, political, social and environmental dimensions of security has been replaced with more inclusive and holistic perspectives in all areas of security and developments that formerly posed challenges to the regional society. For example, in January of 1996, SADC established the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), an organ for Politics, Defense and Security to “safeguard the region against instability and to promote political cooperation and common political values and institutions.” One main objective of ISDSC is to further stability.⁹⁹ There appears to be a regional consensus on military security, such consensus is a prerequisite for regional security in all its dimensions.

In a symbolic and realistic gesture that the prodigal state has come home, post-apartheid South Africa joined the three principal institutions dominating regional affairs, that is, the OAU, the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the SADC. Commonly, they influence regional inter-state relations and promote regional peace and prosperity.¹⁰⁰ Based on the above premises, one can argue that Southern African region is in a state of transition to interdependency and collective security which could provide further security policy guidelines for the states in the region. However, considering that regional security would be influenced by the asymmetrical coexistence of a hegemon and

⁹⁸ Baynham 1994, p. 84.

⁹⁹ Jackie Cilliers and Mark Malan, “Old Habits Die Hard: Can SADC Counter Military Intervention in Southern Africa? *Indicator SA*, 13.3 (Winter 1996): p. 19.

¹⁰⁰ Vanzyl 1997a, p. 14.

weak states, South Africa's giantism may run counter to its good intention for the region.¹⁰¹ Nonetheless, the current strategic security of post-apartheid South Africa and that of its neighbors is dramatically in contrast to the anarchical regional order that prevailed the Cold War and apartheid period.

(6) Norms and Identity

Apartheid Society: Apartheid South Africa also validates the constructivist argument that bad norms, which are sources of threat, could be socially constructed. Apartheid institutions were constructed by the minority white government (consisting of Dutch and French settlers) to rehash and normalize the delusion of whites supremacy and the illusion of blacks inferiority salient in the days of slavery and colonialism. Apartheid (norms), which were based on racial discrimination and ethnic violence, became causes of threat not only to the government that created it and South Africa at large, but it was a major source of threat to the regional security of Southern Africa. The apartheid government was not representative but was at war with its own people and similarly its neighboring states in the region.¹⁰²

The internal security climate of apartheid South Africa was ridden with violent conflicts and political clashes, as seen in the activities of the ANC struggle against the apartheid regimes and the violent counterinsurgent measures by the government. Violent disasters ranges from that of the aforementioned 1960 Sharpeville massacre, the Soweto riots of 1976 and the state of emergency of the 1980. Stephen Mufson observes that "though violence came from many quarters, the common danger was that it would

¹⁰¹ du Plessis 1995, p. 58; 78.

¹⁰² *White Paper on Defence* 1996, p.1.

establish, or already reflected, a 'Culture of violence' in which killing was the norm and force rather than democratic debate had become the way to resolve difference."¹⁰³ During the apartheid era, the leading cause of premature death in the townships was the government's security forces. For example, between January to August 1990, 197 people were killed and 2,490 were injured by apartheid soldiers and police forces. From late 1987 to September 1990, ethnic fighting between Chief Buthelezi's Inkatha and ANC followers, the UDF (United Democratic Front) and COSATU, (The Congress of South Africa Trade Union) caused 4,000 casualties and over 12,000 displaced people in fighting that erupted in Natha-Kwazulu region.¹⁰⁴

Apartheid had a domestic origin which contrasted with the systemic norms of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Destabilizing the neighboring countries was also a norm of apartheid in the quest to maintain white hegemonic position both in domestic and regional terms. Foreign relations were grounded on adversarial modes of conduct as opposed to bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Apartheid South Africa had support especially from the western world in addition to Israel. However, in the large part, it suffered sanctions, embargoes, and ostracization from the international community relative to the contradictions and clashes between its apartheid norms at the domestic level and systemic level norms at large.

Identity was classified by racial and ethnic disparities and the apartheid guidelines which in turn inflamed the violence culture that characterized the apartheid era. There were two sets of actors: those who were pro-apartheid and those who were anti-apartheid. To the apartheid protagonists, black nationalism and communism posed alarming threats,

¹⁰³ Steven Mufon, "South Africa 1990," *Foreign Affairs*, 70.1 (1991): 132..

¹⁰⁴Ibid., pp.131-132.

and in response military intervention and solution occupied the thinking of the apartheid regimes and thus the need to militarize.

Norms constitute actor's identities and interests. The norms of apartheid dictated the identity, interests, and the behavior of the white minority government on the one hand. On the other hand, the rejection of the apartheid culture and the quest for democratic non-racial and nondiscriminatory norms by blacks in response to the oppressive system created a bipolar disorder in the areas of domestic norms and identity. The incompatibility of these oppositional *status quo* and 'revisionary' norms and identity set off the dynamic of the circle of violence that typified the hallmark of apartheid South Africa.

Post-apartheid Society: Norms in this era are dictated by transformation efforts to democracy, democratic civil-military relations, disarmament/demilitarization, regional cooperation and stability, and reintegration into global political and economic systems. The end of apartheid and the establishment of democracy have occasioned dramatic changes on the positive side of both the internal and external components of the country's SSE. Venter states: "current thinking is shifting towards political rather than military intervention, to conflict prevention (through diplomacy) rather than conflict management or conflict resolution."¹⁰⁵ This thinking is apparent both in the current conduct of the country's internal and external policies.

Domestically, there is reorientation of what constitutes security and threats to security. Non-military dimension has gained prominence over the military aspect of security, and security is now viewed in a holistic manner.¹⁰⁶ Fundamental transformation

¹⁰⁵Venter 1997, p. 33.

¹⁰⁶ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 2.

to non-racial, non-sexist, non-discriminatory institutional culture as required by the constitution is underway.¹⁰⁷ Addressing the root causes of personal insecurity and social instability have become a domestic moral obligation and strategic imperatives.¹⁰⁸ Rebuilding economic relations, political structures and domestic culture that are compatible with systemic norms are reflected in the key government policy documents such as the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the Employment and Redistribution Strategy.¹⁰⁹

Regionally, military doctrine has shifted from 'Offensive Defence' to cooperative and confidence-building posture. Regional relations with neighboring states "have changed from suspicion and animosity to friendship and cooperation."¹¹⁰ South Africa has adopted joint problem-solving techniques, confidence and security-building measures, negotiating security agreements and treaties, and peaceful resolution of inter-state conflict mechanism at regional level.¹¹¹ The country is now committed to the international goals of arms control and disarmament and the objective of a practical nuclear weapons free zone agreement in Southern Africa. Regional tension has subsided and South Africa has been welcome as an ally in the region, where common security norms are becoming universal.¹¹² Regional security is one of the issues on top of the agenda in post-apartheid South Africa.

At the global level, the country is no longer isolated, instead, it has been welcome by international organizations, especially, the UN, OAU, and the SADC (the Southern

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁰⁹ Cited in *South African Defence Review 1998*, p. 49.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.; *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 13.

¹¹¹ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 14.

¹¹² du Plessis 1995, p. 38.

African Development Community). Today, South Africa is adhering towards 'greater interdependence, regionalism and internationalism'.¹¹³ The domestic norms and national aspirations in effect are in general compatible with those of the regional and international arenas. Domestic identity, while it might have racial and ethnic composition, is not based on segregation/discriminatory but democratic principles. As Mandela himself wrote, "South Africa's future foreign relations will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core concern of international relations, and we are ready to play a role in fostering peace and prosperity in the world we share with the community of nations."¹¹⁴ This powerful invocation is symbolic of South Africa's readiness to adhere to the principles of international cooperation and therapeutic universal norms.

Summary: Apartheid South Africa: Like Israel, South Africa was conquered and subjected to foreign domination prior to the establishment of the apartheid system which would eventually give the white minority absolute monopoly of state power. Knowing fully well that historically the whites were invaders and African were the true inhabitants, the latter openly challenged and the former openly defended by violence and bloodshed the discrimination, racial inequality and oppression against blacks. These struggle and counter struggle led to a chronic destabilization and insecurity in the apartheid South Africa strategic security environment. The history of who legitimately owns or rules the land played a causal role in the instability of the security environment. Second, in building and maintaining the apartheid system and institutions, the inherent

¹¹³ *White Paper on Defence 1996*, p. 12.

¹¹⁴ Nelson Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, 72.5 (November/December, 1993): 97.

divisive weakness of social heterogeneity or demographic disparity (i.e. in terms of racial, ethnic, etc) were exploited by the regime. Demographic disparity served as the medium and mode of channeling discrimination, oppression and the inhumane treatment of blacks that chronically destabilized the SSE. Third, blessed with great natural deposit of mineral wealth, this geopolitical blessing would turn out to be a curse and a cause of the oppression of the 'original inhabitants' at the hand of the 'invaders'. The strategic minerals led to series of wars between the western colonial powers in their struggle to usurp the wealth; similarly, it led to the conniving schemes of exploiting and edging out black people of their nation's wealth.

The struggle between the superpowers during the Cold War relative to the geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the republic also destabilized the SSE. Equally, hostile frontline states were destabilized by the apartheid regime to maintain its regional and domestic hegemonic position. These struggles and counter-struggles contributed to the instability of apartheid South Africa's security environment. Thus, threats were perceived at the magnitude of a 'total onslaught', and they were matched militarily and aggressively with 'total response' by the regime.

Fourth, the principal goal was to maintain Africanerdom through the perpetuation of the socially engineered apartheid system to foster the exploitation of the national wealth and in catering for the needs of the white minority. In the same vein, maintaining a Southern African hegemonic position was crucial to the national ambition. These goals were met with internal and external resistance from anti-apartheid forces. Psychologically and politically under siege internally, and ostracized externally, self-sufficiency in

armament buildups became a paramount goal that was necessary to implement the 'total response' military doctrine.

Fifth, in the apartheid era, destabilization, distrust, intra-state and inter-state conflicts, and civil wars characterized the republic's SSE. South Africa's relationships with its neighbors were marked by hostility. As far as the security environment and security of the republic was concerned, the region was unequivocally in a state of true anarchy. Competitive security, self-help, rivalry, and security dilemma were pervasive in inter-state relationships in this part of the world. Therefore, anarchy as a causal variable contributed to the insecurity of apartheid South Africa.

Finally, as a bad norm anchored on a segregated, discriminatory and suppressive social identity, the apartheid system conditioned South Africa's SSE. In addition to the internal effects of apartheid, externally, the regime destabilized its neighboring states relative to the incompatibility of the apartheid norms. The violence and counter-violence that resulted played a critical role in the condition of the state's environment.

Post-apartheid South Africa: The SSE of post-apartheid South Africa dramatically contrasts with that of the apartheid South Africa. The end of the Cold war and the demise of the apartheid system brought about the beginning of domestic political cohesion, social integration, regional peace-building and interstate cooperation.

First, the abolition of apartheid and the installation of democratic system, coupled with the disappearance of the Cold war threats, brought about the beginning of a new chapter in South Africa's history that contrasts that of the past half century. Second, the repeal of apartheid institutions and laws moved the country to a state of demographic re-association and re-integration. Non-discriminatory style of government and its

institutions has become the 'tie and glue' that is used in binding this heterogeneous society into a unified and collective whole.

Third, the end of the apartheid era and the demise of the Cold War led to the disappearance of the threats associated with them in the geopolitical context. Regional hostility has been replaced with regional confidence-building and cooperative security. The salient geopolitical concerns are no more military threats. Security as a concept now addresses political, economic, social, and environmental issues. Thus the SSE is stabilizing, and insecurity, real or perceived, has been mitigated. Fourth, besides seeking non-traditional security such as collective economic, environmental, and social security, South Africa is embarking on regional military security. The democratic regime aspires to adhere to international law on matters related to armed conflict and arms control, treaties, especially to its NPT obligations. These goals and measures have been conducive to stabilizing the new security environment.

Fifth, the end of the Cold War and the dismantling of the apartheid system paved the way for regional cooperation and security. Regional anarchy has become more matured unlike that of the apartheid era that was accompanied with hostility. The republic has joined various regional, continental and other international organizations and is no more isolated as a pariah. And finally, the end of the apartheid era has ushered in the process and institutions aimed at establishing democratic norms and non-discriminatory and collective identity. Internal re-orientation towards unity and cohesion is being orchestrated through non-racial, non-sexist institutions. Externally, apartheid South Africa is undergoing political acculturation and re-integration into the commonwealth of regional and global societies. Meanwhile, the republic's military culture has shifted from

offensive-defensive to collective approach to security challenges, friendly and cooperative posture. Clearly, the causations that were actively erupting threats during the apartheid era are now dormant, thus the current stability in its security environment.

How do the elements relate to each other? The instability of apartheid South Africa's SSE originated from its geopolitical position relative to its geostrategic endowment and natural resources. Demographic disparity and social heterogeneity served as the fertile medium into which the apartheid scheme was planted and grown. That is, the differences in color were utilized as the ingredient of identity in creating an oppressive norm –apartheid – used by the few against the many. With history on the side of Africans, they were motivated to fight against what they perceived as the evil system.

This resistance brought about the apartheid regime's own national motivation to sustain its hegemonic position, domestically and regionally, at all cost. These causal elements at work, the inter-state system operating in the region, was not only anarchical but was also hostile. However, this situation has been improving since the end of the apartheid era.

Chapter 7

THE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE EXTENT OF WEAPONS ACQUISITION: AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF ISRAEL, APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA, AND POST APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA SOCIETIES

This Chapter compares the strategic security environments of Israel, apartheid South Africa, and post apartheid South Africa. The comparison of the SSEs is done specifically by considering the societies' internal and external security climates. Second, the concept of 'weapons acquisition' and how it bears on the search for security is briefly examined. Third, a comparison shall be made of the three societies weapons acquisition behavior relative to their SSEs. Finally, based on the outcome of the third part, it shall be established whether or not a correlation exists between the strategic security environment and the extent of weapons acquisition of each society, This will be done for the purpose of verifying the first hypothesis.

I. Comparison of the Strategic Security Environments

By utilizing pertinent elements of the six variables that constitute the causal-chain in the SSE as listed above, the internal and external security climates of the three societies will be compared.

(A) Internal Security Climates (ISCs)

Four out of the total six causal variables were applicable to understanding the ISC of the three societies selected for the empirical analyses i.e. historical circumstances, demographic condition, national motivations, and norms and identity. The internal security climates of both Israel and apartheid South Africa were conditioned by history in

their different ways. Fifteen percent of Israel's population is made up of Palestinians;¹ although they are minority, they pose tremendous threat to national security from the Israel's perspective. Israeli Palestinians are seen as assets to the "terrorist groups", especially Hamas which conducts terrorist activities within Israel. The strong belief as to the justified owner of the land, and the conflicting territorial demands between pro-Zionist and pro-Arab nationalist communities, can be traced back to four thousand years ago in Palestine, then known as the Land of Canaan. This historical backdrop sustains both the indelible polarization and conflict between the two communities.

Similarly, the apartheid system was internally destabilized mainly because it apportioned absolute monopoly of state power to the minority whites in South Africa. Historically, however, blacks identified with and owned the land prior to the arrival of white (i.e. French and Dutch) settlers. While whites consider themselves Africans, blacks consider them as oppressive invaders that have denied them their rights of self-determination, and hence, must be combated by all means to regain their rights. Although the internal chaos and instability are short of civil war, the insurgency and guerrilla activities by ANC to remake history, on the one hand, and the counter-guerrilla measures by the regime to foil such turbulence, on the other hand, threatened and destabilized national security. What one side sees as justice based on historical account, the other side sees as injustice that must be reversed both in Israel and apartheid South Africa. In both instances, the dynamics of insecurity that led to militarization and the consequential violent episodes that follow, take history as the point of departure. By contrast, the dissolution of the policy of apartheid, which created the unstable internal

¹ Lee Hockstader, "Israelis Quarrel Over Arab Legislator," *The Washington Post*, Friday July 16, 1999, A15.

security climate, brings to an end the conflict between the two parties in apartheid South Africa. In both Israel and apartheid South Africa, history is used as a point of reference for embarking on conflictual objectives by the parties involved.

Internal demographic composition contributes to the instability in the internal security climates of both countries. Suspicion and distrust run deep between Israeli Jews and Arabs. The long time restriction on Palestinians movements is similar to apartheid pass laws imposed on blacks. The restrictions on Palestinians, however, only plays into the hands of the militant group, Hamas, in their provisions of social services to the poor Palestinians populations *vis a vis* the Jewish government restrictive activities that further keeps the division and conflict between the two groups alive.

As seen in Israel, demography played an important role in the apartheid system, which was based on segregation between Whites, Indians, Coloreds, and Blacks. National and natural demographic crevices, which served as the basis of discrimination, earmarked the natural battle line in both countries. Racial sentiment between Jews and Arabs, for example, manifests itself via territorial conflicts and all the forms of violence that accompany it. In South Africa, both racial and ethnic violent confrontations destabilized the ISC during the apartheid era. This in turn incited hostility from the frontline states in the region against the apartheid regime. Despite the stabilizing character of post-apartheid South Africa, disparity in demographic composition, even among blacks, remains the most likely source of threat to national security. Presently, the negative demographical effect on ISC has diminished in post apartheid South Africa, whereas it is still alive and a source of concern to Israel's national security. Further, the regional implications of the demographic effect among Arab neighbors continue to be

detrimental to its SSE. In post-apartheid South Africa, the organizational structure of the government has changed and is largely based on democratic principles; thus the contrasts in its present internal security climate compared to that of Israel and apartheid South Africa.

South Africa's goal internally was to maintain Afrikanerdom by perpetuating the social system of apartheid. Any type of impediment to this goal was perceived as a threat, which must be countered by the security forces. Paradoxically, the citizens perceived their own government as a threat to their welfare, while the government perceived the radical elements or leaders among its black citizens as threats to the republic's ISC. This vicious circle was internally destabilizing. Similarly, in Israel, the goal and ambitions are mainly to ensure security, especially by thwarting and combating 'terrorist' activities. Post-apartheid South Africa is currently committed to the goals of non-discriminatory democratic reforms, combating social and economic problems, and the issue of organized crime. Primary national aspirations center on military security concerns in Israel and apartheid South Africa. In post apartheid South Africa, national goals concentrate on addressing non-military security issues.

Pan-Arabism holds that Palestinians identify the Israeli government (e.g. territorial occupation) as a threat to their sovereignty. For Israeli Arabs, hostility against Israeli Jews and government is the norm. For the Jews, maintaining the Jewish identity is imperative to the ambition of Zionism. Any threat to this goal is seen as threatening to the Jewish State and the essence of Zionism. The struggle that flows from the differing norms and identity predicated the in-group and out-group dynamics that solidifies the Jewish-Palestinians confrontation into a protracted and irresolvable conflict.

In apartheid South Africa, identity was mapped along ethnic and racial segregation lines. Apartheid norms protected the interests of the white minority at the expense of those of the black majority. It was a norm that was based on discrimination in all spheres of life. In both societies, violence as opposed to democratic debate is the medium to resolve differences; as characterized, for example, by the ANC and apartheid regimes; Inkatha and ANC; or Palestinians and Israeli relationships. The internal security climates of both societies are characterized by violent instabilities perpetuated by the sense of incompatible norms and identity.

Again, based on non-discriminatory and democratic principles, the internal norms and identity in post-apartheid South Africa have so far not been conflict-prone but, instead, conducive to the spirit of national unity and stable internal security climate. Unlike the apartheid era, the norms at the domestic level are now not contradictory to the regional or even the universally accepted norms concerning human rights.

It is important to note that singularly, each of the four applicable causal-chain elements to the two states' internal security climate (i.e. historical circumstances, demographic composition, national goals and ambition, and norms and identity) might sound simple and not enough to threaten security. However, one causal element might have effect on more than one level of security or even at all the three levels of it and thereby pose significant threats to security. Dominant causal-chain elements at the internal security climate are interconnected to those that are notably precarious at the external security climate. In either case, one causal-chain element, or even more so a combination of such elements, might pose more significant threats to security than can be conceptually demonstrated. Let us examine the three societies external security climate

in relation to the threats induced by pertinent SSE causal-chain elements at both regional and extra-regional security levels.

(B) External Security Climate (ESCs)

In this section, all the six causal elements shall be utilized in the empirical analyses. Six hours after its birth, seven Arab states invaded Israel. For Arabs in the region, history attests to the fact that the land of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians. The Palestinian historical claim to the land is in direct contradiction to the Israeli's. The disagreement over the ownership of the land makes territorial issues the major regional flashpoint and the root of episodic volcanic eruptions that destabilizes the regional strategic security environment. The clashes of territorial historical claims are the original seed which metamorphosize into regional insecurity. Regional historical contention has become the cause of unforgettable polarization and the zero-sum violent rivalry between Zionism and Pan-Arabism.

Similarly but more subtly, the threatening external security climate of apartheid South Africa has historical twist. The general historical claims by African states that Africa is for Africans, and that the white man is a foreigner on the continent, solidified the anti-apartheid efforts of African states against the apartheid regime. Hostility in the external security climate of apartheid South Africa was mostly inflamed by the frontline states within Southern Africa. The intensity of African states' opposition to the apartheid system was powered by historical and racial atrocities perpetrated by white civilization against Africa and Africans. Such atrocities include slavery, colonization, negative propaganda, and material exploitation.

Also, it was while the rest of Africa was achieving the previously far-fetched goal of self-determination and independence that apartheid was taking its root and South African blacks were moving in the opposite direction. The white minority rule rehashed the past racist brutality on the continent against its original inhabitants in the form of the system of apartheid. Africans' determination to put an end to the inhumane oppression originated the anti-apartheid struggle that externally isolated the apartheid regime as pariah in regional and global contexts. The end of the apartheid system of government ended apartheid atrocities, reversed the external hostility and stabilized the post-apartheid external climate.

The spillover effect of disparaging demographic composition destabilizes both Israel's and apartheid South Africa's external climates. Arab ethnic or racial identification with Israeli Palestinians and Africans racial identification with black South Africans solidified the external opposition of the immediate neighbors against each state, respectively. With each country caught in the fabric of ethnic or racial web, as the minority in the regional context, militarization measures were adopted to overcome such demographic disadvantages at the regional level by both governments. This in-group and out-group dynamics on racial ground play a causal role in the threatening condition of apartheid South Africa's external security climate. Similarly, in racial and religious form, the in-group and out-group phenomenon contributes to the hostile external environment of Israel, regionally. In either case, harboring or sponsoring guerillas against the government of either country was based on racial or religious identity, as applicable.

Egalitarian democratic principles are neutralizing the effect of the disparity in demographic composition and the sympathetic role of the external kinship in a post-apartheid South Africa security environment. Whereas demographic crevices continue to play major role in the position of states in the Middle East on Arab-Israeli conflict, and hence, the conditioning of Israel's external climate.

Geopolitically, Israel is a very small country in the Middle East. At its narrowest margin, it is 11 miles wide. Also, Israel has a terrible and severe problem with regional enemies. Among which are Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, which are bigger countries. They all manufacture and export arms because they have internal arms regimes. Israel must deal with Syria, which has about 4.5 thousand tanks. To its North, Israel has Lebanon to worry about. Regional terrorism is a major threat in the ESC. Defensive industry and weapons development based on the terrain and who the enemy is (e.g. distance factor), take a central position in Israeli national defence planning process in dealing with its active and terminal threats. In addition to producing weapons, (e.g. aircraft, short, medium and long-range missiles, and nuclear warheads) Israel has to play balance-of-power to keep its enemy divided; especially Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Hence, regionally, it has a fluid but unsteady relationships with the other states. Preemption of "terrorists activities", e.g. the 1981 bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear plant, to name one, are manifestations of how Israel perceives its ESC as percolated by active and terminal threats. Also, Israel's hegemonic ambition sets it up for head-on collisions with other regional rivals.

Like Israel, apartheid South Africa was isolated, surrounded by enemies, and faced an international arms embargo. It created a defense industry establishment during

the apartheid era to combat the rest of Africa. Israel and South Africa cooperated in weapons development since both were pariah states. Both pursued the goal of self-sufficiency to overcome arms embargo. The strategy of deterrence was also common to both states. Obsessed with the threat of communism and anti-apartheid forces, i.e. the so-called 'total strategy', offensive militarization doctrine and military activities were undertaken to overcome 'total onslaught.'

Already a hegemon based on its position and the possession of wealth of natural resources, and unlike Israel, apartheid South Africa did not have to play balance-of-power politics. Instead, it destabilized the frontline states which formed solidarity against it. By adopting these tactics, it kept these states busy and distracted them from knocking on its door. The external security climates of both Israel and apartheid South Africa are perceived by them, respectively, as threatening insecurity envelopes that required nuclear weapons to create and safeguard a secured outlet.

With the disappearance of both Cold War and the apartheid system, South Africa was welcomed to the regional organizations especially the SADC and its defense forum ISDSC (i.e. the "NATO" of Southern Africa). Post apartheid South Africa force structure is designed to directly match both the national and regional security imperatives, as generally described in both government 1996 *White Paper on Defence*, and 1998 *Defence Review*. In fostering the new post-apartheid regional cooperation that is now emerging, South Africa seriously considers the security of its neighbors in making its foreign and defense policies.

Although there are new geopolitical concerns that are germane to national security in post apartheid South Africa, they are not as critical and threatening to it like

those of the apartheid era. The challenges include international organized crimes and Russian/Eastern Europe syndicates, illegal smuggling of immigrants and properties across borders, drug trafficking, hijacking and so on. Relatively, the ESC is stable and because of this and other reasons, questions arise regarding the need for large armaments in the absence of or with declining military threats.

Regionally, two types of goal drive Israeli behavior, i.e. the goal of physical survival and hence national security, and secondly, its own hegemonic aspirations. These two goals together dictate Israel's adoption of its offensive military strategy. In similar vein, the goals of maintaining the survival of the apartheid system domestically and simultaneously sustaining the apartheid regime's hegemony regionally, motivated South African adoption of offensive military posture, preemptive military tactics, and deterrence strategy. Israeli and apartheid South Africa military strategies and tactics are very similar. Regional political codes of inter-state conduct in both cases and to a good extent are based on military maneuver as opposed to diplomatic measures. Also, both states suffered international arms embargo at one time or the other. The goal of self-sufficiency in armament research and development, production and stockpiling were imperatives common to both societies. These behavior which themselves were measures to offset a threatening external security climate contributed to the protracted instability in their respective external climates. Post-apartheid South Africa's goals are mainly to accomplish democratic reform, and fulfilling the political, economic, social and environmental needs of its society. Overcoming non-traditional types of threats to national security, engagement in constructive regional security arrangement and

collective security at regional level characterize the stability that is emerging in today's South Africa's external climate which markedly contrasts that of the apartheid years.

Hobesian or Waltzian anarchical international environment holds in the Southern Africa region during apartheid era, and similarly, in the Middle East since the creation of the state of Israel. Hostile and unpredictable regional environment in both instances demanded self-help behavior. To guarantee survival and security, acquiring sufficient military capability is necessary and critical. However, the realist school would not say how much power is enough to guarantee survival and security. Therefore, the open-endedness of acquisition of military capability based on self-help system, and without any limit, can easily slip states into misguided weapons acquisition endeavors as the cases of Israel and apartheid South Africa would suggest. Both of them possess nuclear weapons, and also engage in offensive military doctrines which could be destabilizing to regional security.

By contrast, the end of the Cold War and the demise of apartheid erased and altered the hostility obtainable in the Southern African region. These have brought about the opportunity for interstate communication and amicable relationship in the region. The friendly atmosphere in turn serves as a medium for neoliberal institutional arrangement (e.g. SADC, etc.), which has remarkably mitigated the effect of anarchy and promoted cooperation.

One can genuinely introduce the constructivist argument that we are in a world wherein anarchy must be qualified because it lacks universal applicability. Anarchy among friendly states, the constructivists argue, is different from anarchy among hostile ones. Therefore, anarchy between hostile Middle East neighboring states differs from

anarchy that is obtainable between the states of the Southern African region (i.e. the 14 member states of SADC) in the post apartheid and post Cold War context.

The shared identity of being Arabs and the norms of Pan-Arabism shape the perception of the Arab world in identifying a common threat, that is, the Jewish state of Israel. On the other hand, the Zionist prerogatives demand that Israel perceive Arabs states as threats or potential threats to its own national security. Thus, Israel consciously or unconsciously takes the issues of norms and identity into its process of threat identification, the type and extent of measures necessary to ward off such threat. Interstate relations and regional norms in the Middle East are based on deep suspicion, rivalry, distrust, and tendency for violence.

Domestically, oppressive apartheid norms against blacks emanated from apartheid institutions that were socially constructed. These apartheid norms ran into direct violent head-on collision with anti-apartheid oppositional forces both within and without apartheid South Africa. Also, the Cold War rivalry and norms, particularly the communist ones, were perceived as threatening to the apartheid regime. In fact as previously stated, the fear of the possibility of *totale aanslag*, by the Communist World, drove apartheid South Africa to develop nuclear weapons. The contradiction between apartheid and international universal norms led to the isolation of the regime as a pariah within international community. On the one hand, South Africa created socially apartheid norms that became the source of threat to its own survival. On the other hand, the Cold War norms from the Communist World posed a second set of threats that apartheid South Africa perceived as threatening to its external security climate.

The disappearance of both the Cold War and apartheid norms and the establishment of a democratic regime grounded on egalitarian criteria, as opposed to divisive identity, nullified the negative roles formerly played by apartheid norms and identity that conditioned the ESC of apartheid South Africa. Today, in addition to joining regional and international institutions, South Africa has committed itself to adopting universal human right norms, arms control and non-proliferation regimes, and disarmament objectives. Conversely, Israel continues to be defiant towards adopting any international norms including those of universal human right that do not align with its security or Zionist objectives and interests.

The above comparison has demonstrated that while the root of a particular causal element might originate in one level of security, the chances of its overlapping or spill-over effect to the other levels of security cannot be ruled out. The impact of any threat causal factor is fluid and has no boundary that is based on conceptually typologized levels of security as mistakenly construed by systemic theories. The cases of Israel and South Africa clearly reflect this fact. In Israel, the effect of demographic or territorial issues are not limited to internal security climate, they are equally if not more telling on the external climate as well. Though internally originated, the apartheid system or say its demographic backdrop, for example, contributed tremendously to the hostility that characterized apartheid South Africa external climate.

The comparison has shown that the SSEs of both Israel and apartheid South Africa are insecure, unstable and threatening to their national security. Paradoxically, in both cases, the external climates became increasingly more threatening relative to the extra-effort made to exercise control internally. However, it is the threat from within that

feeds those from without in the dynamics of which there exist a mutual reinforcement of the ISC and ESC destabilizing conditions.

The SSE of post-apartheid South Africa is stable and stabilizing. There has occasioned some observable inertia in the dynamics of threatening reinforcement of both its ISC and ESC. This has been brought about by the demise of the Cold War from without and apartheid from within.

Now that we have established that the SSEs of Israel and apartheid South Africa are unstable and threatening to their national security and that of post-apartheid South Africa stable and non-threatening, we shall examine whether or not their weapons acquisition behavior match the condition of their respective SSE. In other words, we shall attempt to determine if both societies in their defense policies engage in balancing security threat with military capability; in which event, they might have become entrenched in chronic addiction of offensive militarization. Similarly, we shall examine whether post-apartheid South Africa voluntary restraint in weapons acquisition behavior by snapping out of this chronic addiction has its root in its new non-threatening strategic security environment. The use of empirical data shall serve as the basis of this investigation. The term weapons acquisition has been used repeatedly in this study, but before we go any further some light would be shed on it, to understand the meaning of the concept and how it is utilized.

II. Weapons Acquisition and The Quest for States Security

Although substantial weapons acquisition may be symbolic of prestige in international arena, however, armament acquisition goes beyond the sociological

perspective that it serves the function similar to that of national flags, airlines, or Olympic teams.² The idea that weapon acquisition is a stamp of modern statehood and gaining legitimacy in world political stage is only peripheral, and not the principal reason why states engage in such an expensive behavior. To assume that armament buildups behavior, especially when unrestrained, is just an international norm does not explain the actual causes of why states engage in this act. In addition, since states behave differently in the extent of their tendencies to buildup weapons, it is imperative to correctly identify and link such behavior to the causal root (of insecurity) to provide the right opportunity for its amelioration.

In peacetime, no previous generation has ever borne the level of burden of armaments that almost every country bears in the present world.³ The proliferation of modern armament inventories started a century ago. Jack Snyder and Stephen Van Evera argue that the principle of a cult of the offensive that permeated European militaries prior to 1914 triggered the catastrophes of the Great War.⁴ And since then, military weapons play a dominating role in international relations.

Defense preparedness is not a spontaneous process. Leaders try to assess the threats to their states (and also national goals) and develop military capabilities and strategies to reduce or eliminate such threats. Defense preparedness requires conscious

² Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb", *International Security*, 21.3 (Winter 1996/97): 74.

³ Byeong Ho Jung, *The Korean Arms Race: A Theoretical Framework for Analysis* (Washington, D.C.: George Washington University, 1989), p. 1.

⁴ Quoted in Steven E. Miller and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Preface", in Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. XIV-XV.

efforts on the part of the state government.⁵ This optimum is itself decided by the objective and subjective assessment of the SSE in the context of national security. As already mentioned, the condition of the SSE has tendency to change in random manner as a result of interacting causal forces that might affect states strategic security interests. To appreciate the conscious efforts that governments and the societies make relative to their SSE in equipping themselves in matters of national security, we shall analyze the trend of armament acquisition in Israel, apartheid South Africa, and post-apartheid South Africa.

Prior to this comparison of weapons acquisition exercise, it is important to understand what the term 'weapons acquisition' really means. Richard G. Head defines weapons acquisition as "the process of designing, developing, producing, and buying military hardware for use in a state's force posture".⁶ He similarly expresses that:

Weapons acquisition is essentially a process of research and development or importation that converts national resources into usable military hardware. Weapons acquisitions can be further defined to mean the research, development, production, and purchase of technically advanced equipment to accomplish specific military missions.⁷

While Head offers a plausible definition of the term, his definition is only partial for our purpose. For this study, armament acquisition is not limited to research and development or importation of military hardware, but it also has a human dimension. To separate the machines from the military men that breathe life into them offers only a partial portrait of a whole picture. For an adequate analysis of the concept of armament acquisition (i.e.

⁵ D.D. Khanna, *Strategic Environment In South Asia During The 1980s* (Calcutta: Naya Prokash, 1979), p.117; Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations, 2nd Edition* (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996), p. 227.

⁶ Lt. Colonel Richard G. Head (USAF), "The Weapons Acquisition Process: Alternative National Strategies in Richard F. Rosser et al, Eds *Comparative Defense Policy* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 412.

⁷ Ibid, p. 410.

militarization), both the man and the machine, neither of which can do without the other in this context, must jointly be presented in the equation of military power. Military capability is a function of both military men and their military tools. Unless weapon acquisition is conceived in the essence of both dimensions, our definition and understanding of the term can only be partial.

The concept of weapons acquisition emphasizes the continuous stream of preceding activities within the SSE that are germane to national security, followed by a nexus of decision-making process in the dynamics and efforts to combat threats to national security and/or fulfil national aspirations by amassing military tools. The SSE dictates the state's defence or military doctrine. Military doctrine in turn shapes the states defence policymaking structure. The defence policymaking structure determines defence actions of the state, particularly the extent of military weapons acquisition. In addition to human resources, "the weapons acquisition process produces an output – military hardware – which becomes, in turn, an input to the state's force structure".⁸ In addition to supplying a nation's force posture, weapons acquisition also serves other influential purposes such as to "create and maintain a domestic industrial base", to promote or assist the growth of national economy, and to use as tool of diplomacy "to create or reinforce alliances,".⁹ Fulfilling security requirements is the ultimate goal of states armament acquisition. However, first, physical survival must be assured before hegemonic or any other greedy or economic ambitions set in. Therefore, the primary purpose of militarization concerns military security.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

The level or extent of weapons acquisition is different for every nation. The SSEs of states vary because domestic imperatives combine with peculiar external factors to create uniqueness in each case. As such, the rate or extent of conscription and arms build up vary from state to state. Also, military hardwares are expensive in absolute term as well as in relative term when compared to the size of the overall national defense and defense budgets.¹⁰ Despite states' uniqueness in their strategic security environment and the extent of weapons acquisition, states commonly acquire weapons in four principal ways. That is, according to Lt. Col. Head: through "national self-sufficiency, cooperative projects with other states, license production of an established model from a major power, and off-the-shelf acquisition through either grant aid or direct purchase."¹¹ John Sislin, Frederick Pearson, Jocelyn Boryczka and Jeffrey Weigand, for example, identify three methods of how ethnic groups acquire arms, namely: "domestic procurement, indigenous production, and importation."¹² Arms are acquired domestically when an ethnic group picks up arms that are readily at hand, such as rifles, shotguns, and pistols. Indigenous production include manufacturing and re-manufacturing of arms, conversion of explosives into bombs, modifying of hunting riffles and assembling crude missiles. Importation method includes channeling arms through the black market, "transfers from private dealers, or exports from states."¹³

Generally, three main sets of actors are involved in the act of weapon acquisition, Head argues. That is, 'the suppliers' (defence contractors at home or abroad); 'the

¹⁰ Ibid. , p. 411.

¹¹ Ibid. , p. 412.

¹² John Sislin Et al, "Patterns in Arms Acquisitions by Ethnic Groups in Conflict", *Security Dialogue*; 29.4 (1998): 395.

¹³ Ibid.

buyers' (national government, ethnic, insurgent, or terrorist groups); and interested parties' (allies, neutrals, and opponents).¹⁴ Generally speaking, literature in the field suggests two categories of weapons: Conventional, and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Conventional weapons are subdivided into major and light arms subcategories. Light arms include: "revolvers and self-loading pistols, submachine guns, rifles, machine guns, grenades, fuel air explosive, mines, and anti-tank weapons."¹⁵ SIPRI (1995) define major weapons to include: aircraft, armor and artillery, guidance and radar systems, missiles and warships".¹⁶ The UN identifies seven categories of major conventional arms: battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, large caliber artillery systems, combat aircraft, attack helicopters, warships, and missiles."¹⁷ WMD are mainly of three types, that is: NBC (Nuclear, Biological and Chemical) weapons.

There are new military weapons which are derivative of the contemporary technological revolution. Such weapons include: offensive and defensive information weapons, e.g. radio and T.V broadcasts, computer viruses, holograph projectors, radio waves which can disarm security control and command centers. There are weapons like sound waves that can shake human internal organs and disrupt their functions, laser beams which can reap open an airliner in the sky, and microwaves that can shut down computerized and automotive engines. Regardless of how and what type of weapons are acquired, states venture from the point that the expected net benefit of acquiring arms surpasses the value of doing nothing in the context of seeking national security and pursuing national ambitions.

¹⁴ Head 1974, p. 410.

¹⁵ Sislin et al 1998, p. 400.

¹⁶ Cited in Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid. ; see also UN General Assembly, *Transparency in Armaments, Resolution 46/36L*, 1991.

Although military conscription and military hardware procurement are also influenced by a genre of uneasy factors such as “technological, economic, geographic, strategic, tactical and political inputs,”¹⁸ there appears to be a continued trend among states that strategic interests, mainly, a combination of national survival, and national motivations drive the extent of weapons acquisition.

III. Comparative Analysis of Weapons Acquisition Behavior

In the remaining section of this Chapter, we shall attempt to integrate theoretical insight with empirical evidence. First, the empirical data sources are mainly: 1) *SIPRI Yearbooks; Armament Disarmament and International Security*; and 2) *The Military Balance*. Second, to decipher comparatively the weapons acquisition behavior of Israel, apartheid South Africa, and post-apartheid South Africa, three methods shall be applied. That is, the comparative investigation of their extent of weapons acquisition would be based on:

- 1) military expenditure as the percentage of Gross National Products;
- 2) the number of military forces and personnel; and
- 3) Possession of nuclear capability (i.e. Weapon of Mass Destruction).

Finally, the period to be examined shall cover, roughly, the post-establishment era of the Zionist state in *Evetz Israel* (the land of Israel'), and the apartheid system in South Africa; both of which occasioned in the same year, 1948.

Comparable data are available to cover most of the post 1948 period, specifically 1955 to 1998, for military expenditure as the percentage of GNP, and 1965 to 1999 for

¹⁸ Head 1974, p. 412; 425.

military manpower comparison. These respective periods are sufficient for the empirical investigation and the analysis of the three societies' weapons acquisition behavior. Also, except for the last two decades (1981-1998), comparison of military expenditure would be done on an annual basis. All other data for either military expenditure or military manpower are compared on five yearly basis (See Tables 3, and 4, respectively). Since the SSE of each state has been virtually constantly unstable prior to the demise of the apartheid system, an annual comparison of data would not yield a different result. It is important to remember that the term weapons or armament in this study is conceived as having both military material and human components. It is therefore appropriate to establish our empirical investigation on the comparison of both states military expenditures and military manpower, respectively. It is also critical to keep in mind that the focus of this Chapter, the empirical investigation itself, is firmly anchored on the theoretical framework sketched in Chapters 3 and 4.

Military Expenditure as Percentage of Gross National Product

To compare the military expenditures of the three societies, Israel, apartheid South Africa, and post-apartheid South Africa, the data series from *Stockholm International Peace Research Institution (SIPRI)* is utilized. The *SIPRI Yearbook*, unquestionably, contains one of the most comprehensive and best-documented works published in one volume on armaments and disarmament.¹⁹ Although established in 1966, military expenditures as percentage of GNP were not featured in the publication

¹⁹ See the commentary of *International Defense Review* (Switzerland), at the back page of *World Armament and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1968-1979* (London: Taylor & Francis Ltd.) 1979.

until 1976, retrospectively from 1954. As such, our comparison of Israel and South Africa starts from 1955 to the present (See Table 3).

SIPRI not only features the military expenditures as percentage of GNP in 1954, it features also the defense expenditure in real terms and in constant price figures of the U.S. dollars for both states. The prices and exchange rate of each series are based on the constant price figures of the year of publication. Therefore, caution must be exercised, because defense expenditure for the same year might be different in another year's publication because the prices and exchange rate of each year is used for the calculation and they vary from one year to another. However, the prices and exchange rate in any particular year of SIPRI publications is constant for all the states featured and in our case, Israel and South Africa. The methodology used for collecting the data from both countries by SIPRI is also the same. These attributes provide for us an even playing field for the actual comparative exercise that is necessary for a meaningful empirical analysis.

Throughout Table 3, the defense expenditures as percentage of the GNP of Israel except for 1955 to 1965; 1988 to 1989; and 1993 to 1996 are in double digits, ranging from 26.7 percent in 1970 to 10.2 percent in 1987. Whereas, the amount of the GNP percentage spent by South Africa in its apartheid years ranges from 1.0 percent in 1955 to 4.2 percent in 1989. The amount of defense expenditure in real term of South Africa ranges from US\$81 million in 1960 to US\$4.719 billion in 1990, compared to Israel's which in the same period ranges from US\$68 million in 1955 to US\$8.420 billion in 1984. Whether compared in terms of percentage of the GNP or in real term, Israel spent many times over in military expenditure than apartheid or post-apartheid South Africa throughout the last half of this century.

TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF MILITARY EXPENDITURE AS
PERCENTAGE OF GNP

		1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980
Israel	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	2.5	6.6	7.9	23.6	26.7	25.0
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	68	144	562	1,375	3,160	6,110
Apartheid South Africa	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	1.0	0.8	2.3	2.1	3.3	3.9
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	86	81	300	360	1,429	3,206

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook* 1976: 1950 – 1970; 1981: 1975; 1990: 1980.

Figures are in constant US dollars (millions) of the corresponding SIPRI year's price and exchange rate.

CONTINUED

Table 3 (Continued)

		1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Israel	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	23.5	19.0	20.2	21.4	14.4
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	6,887	7,314	8,000	8,420	5,249
Apartheid South Africa	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	3,003	2,970	2,956	3,137	3,036

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1991: 1981-1985*

Figures are in constant US dollars (millions) at the corresponding SIPRI year's price and exchange rate.

CONTINUED

Table 3 (Continued)

		1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Israel	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	11.3	10.2	9.1	9.2	12.3
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	4,318	4,134	3,811	3,830	7,851
Apartheid South Africa	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	3.7	4.0	3.9	4.2	3.6
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	3,139	3,355	3,468	3,808	4,719

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook* 1991: 1985-1989; 1998:1990

Figures are in constant US dollars (millions) at the corresponding SIPRI year's price and exchange rate.

CONTINUED

Table 3 (Continued)

		1991	1992	1993	1994
Israel	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	10.9	10.5	9.4	8.9
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	7,534	7,707	7,200	7,250
Apartheid South Africa	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	3.0	2.8	2.5	2.5
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	3,836	3,428	3,076	3,208

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1998*.

Figures are in constant US dollars (Millions) of the corresponding SIPRI year's price and exchange rate.

CONTINUED

Table 3 (Continued)

		1995	1996	1997	1998
Israel	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	8.5	8.7	8.6	NA
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	7,378	7,716	8,010	8,540
Apartheid South Africa	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP				
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)				
Post-Apartheid South Africa	Defence Expenditure As % of GNP	2.2	2.1	1.8	NA
	Defence Expenditure In Real Term (in US\$M)	2,949	2,854	2,478	2,196

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 1998; 1999.*

Figures are in constant US dollars (Millions) of the corresponding SIPRI Year's price and exchange rate.

NA = Not Available

First, compared to many third world countries and countries of their respective sizes featured in SIPRI publications, both Israel and South Africa spent heavily on defense. Second, and more remarkably, Israel spent far more than South Africa. While part I of this Chapter concludes that both states' SSEs are threatened, Israel's SSE is even more threatened than that of apartheid South Africa. Regional militarization in the Middle East is also far more tedious than in Southern Africa. Although apartheid South Africa was surrounded by hostile states, the degree of hostility and the amount of threat they pose to it was far less in comparison to that confronted by Israel from its heavily armed hostile Arab neighbors. Other than a few skirmishes with guerillas and assisting oppositional forces in destabilizing neighboring countries, apartheid South Africa fell short of fighting a civil war and never fought any major war. This is in contrast with the situation of Israel. There have been eight major wars and one *Intifada* in which Israel and Arabs (or Palestinians) forces faced each other. The idea, hence, that the SSE dictates a country's EWA can explain why Israel devoted more of its resources to armament acquisition than South Africa. Also, supportive of this claim is Israel's hegemonic ambition, which inevitably broadens the strategic interests it must prepare to protect itself against, or the pertinent adversarial threats. Israeli weaponry acquisition behavior therefore is driven both by its quest for "survival" or security and its own ambitions, both of which condition its SSE. Whereas, already a regional hegemon, apartheid South Africa was only worried about its survival (to a lesser degree than Israel), and maintaining the regional status quo especially among less militarized states.

Third, Table 3 depicts a dramatic fall in South Africa percentage of GNP devoted to military expenditure between 1992 to 1993, but more remarkably from 1995 after the

demise of the apartheid system. Following the end of the Cold War and President de Klerk's announcement in 1991 that the end of the apartheid system and transition to democracy are inevitable, South Africa military's expenditure both as percentage of GNP or in real term dwindles. It becomes even more so after the country became democratic in 1994. The decline of South Africa's EWA prior to the end of the apartheid days was brought about by the minority white government's realization that the demise of apartheid system is inevitable. This realization was coupled with the actual disappearance of the external threat attributed to the Cold War. The 1995, 1996 and 1997 spending are the lowest in the last sixteen years (i.e. since 1980) in South Africa's history. In other words, comparing the military expenditure of apartheid South Africa with post-apartheid South Africa, one can deduce accordingly that the differences in the conditions of the SSE of one state at two distinct periods reflects on its weapon acquisition behavior. There is no question that the SSE of apartheid South Africa was perceived as more threatening by the apartheid government. Contrarily, the SSE of the post-apartheid society is perceived as less threatening by the democratic regime relative to the disappearance of both the Cold War and the apartheid system that conditioned the apartheid era ESC and ISC, respectively. Again, here, the condition of the SSE appears to have driven South Africa's weapons acquisition behavior.

Finally, by comparing Israel's military expenditure to that of South Africa after 1991 and especially after 1994, Israel's spending both in terms of GNP percentage or in real term continues to be high while in fact South Africa's defence spending decreases. South Africa has adopted a cost-cutting strategy while Israel continues its chronic habit of militarization. To understand the change in South Africa's strategy and the persistent

of Israel's militarization endeavor, one must understand the differences between the two states strategic security environments and their conditions. Based on these findings, as long as the SSE of Israel remains insecure and unstable, Israel would rely on its own militarized posture and deterrence strategy for both its survival and national ambitions. Clearly, regional cooperative security is an important incentive for non-military solution to interstate disputes. However, competitive security, which is predicated on the states SSE, drives the chronic habit of misguided weapons acquisition.

The graphs of defence expenditure as percentage of GNP (Fig. 3) supports the above observations for both countries. Although there is slight decrease in Israel's defence spending as percentage of GNP between 1985 to 1989, however, the fall in the graph's slope from 1990 onward is relative to the increase in its overall GNP. The true picture of Israel's weapons acquisition becomes clearer by studying its defence expenditure graph in real terms (Fig 4). It continues to spend heavily on militarization after the end of the Cold War. Both graphs reflect that generally Israel spends far more heavily than South Africa. South Africa defence expenditure is heavier during the apartheid era. Such spending diminishes dramatically since the end of the Cold War and the apartheid era.

**Defense Spending
as a % of GNP**





Figure 3: Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of Gross National Product From 1955-1995: Israel and South Africa

**Defense Spending in
Real Terms in
US \$ Billion(s)**



**Figure 4: Defense Expenditure in Real Terms (US Dollars in Billion(s))
From 1955-1995: Israel and South Africa**

Comparison of Military Manpower

The comparison of military manpower of Israel, apartheid South Africa, and post-apartheid South Africa would be based on the annual compilations of information by *The Military Balance* published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in England. Established in 1959, *The Military Balance* initially provides the annual estimates of the nature and size of the military forces of the principal powers. By 1965-1966, it started producing a comprehensive quantitative assessment of the military forces, equipment holdings, and defense expenditures of (most of) the countries in the international system “based on the most accurate data available”. “It does not attempt to evaluate the quality of units or equipment, nor the impact of geography, doctrine, military technology, deployment, training, logistic support, morale, leadership, tactical or strategic initiative, terrain, weather, political will or support from alliance partners.”²⁰ It is essential to recognize that one particular year’s information may differ in different publications as a result of revised assessment of evidence supporting past entries.

This comparative analysis (See Table 4) is based on the total military armed forces in terms of both the number of total active forces, that is, ‘total strength’ (TS), and ‘total mobilizable strength’ (TMS). Other than the army, navy, and air force categorizations, this comparison has no intention of comparing the detail national forces, such as paramilitary forces, medical service, and internal opposition forces, whose manpower are normally not included in the Armed Forces totals.²¹ A broad comparison of the Total Armed Forces is sufficient for our purpose of comparing the strength of

²⁰ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* 1997/98 (London: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 4.

²¹Ibid. , p. 6.

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF MILITARY MANPOWER

1965/66	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	2,500,000	$\frac{\text{TS}=\text{TMS}=\text{NA}}{\text{250,000}}$	$\frac{\text{NA}}{\text{250,000}}$	$\frac{\text{E16,000}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{3,000}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{8,000}}{\text{NA}}$
Apartheid South Africa	16,500,000	$\frac{\text{TS}=\text{TMS}=\text{NA}}{\text{26,500}}$	$\frac{\text{26,500}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{19,000}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{3,500}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{4,000}}{\text{NA}}$

1969/70	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	2,800,000	$\frac{\text{TS}=\text{TMS}=\text{NA}}{\text{290,000}}$	$\frac{\text{22,500}}{\text{290,000}}$	$\frac{\text{11,500}}{\text{268,000}}$	$\frac{\text{3,000}}{\text{7,000}}$	$\frac{\text{8,000}}{\text{15,000}}$
Apartheid South Africa	19,500,000	$\frac{\text{TS}=\text{TMS}=\text{NA}}{\text{39,700}}$	$\frac{\text{39,700}}{\text{85,500}}$	$\frac{\text{28,000}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{3,700}}{\text{NA}}$	$\frac{\text{8,000}}{\text{NA}}$

Source: *The Military Balance*; 1965/66; 1969/70.

**TS = Total Strength; TMS = Total Mobilizable Strength;
NA = Not Available; E = Estimated**

CONTINUED

Table 4 (Continued)

1974/1975	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	3,260,000	$\frac{TS=}{TMS=}$	$\frac{145,500}{400,000}$	$\frac{125,000}{375,000}$	$\frac{4,500}{5,000}$	$\frac{16,000}{20,000}$
Apartheid South Africa	24,490,000	$\frac{TS=}{TMS=}$	$\frac{47,450}{NA}$	$\frac{34,500}{NA}$	$\frac{4,450}{NA}$	$\frac{8,500}{NA}$

1979/1980	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	3,820,000	$\frac{TS=}{TMS=}$	$\frac{165,600}{400,000}$	$\frac{138,000}{375,000}$	$\frac{6,600}{10,000}$	$\frac{21,000}{27,000}$
Apartheid South Africa	28,060,000	$\frac{TS=}{TMS=}$	$\frac{63,250}{404,500}$	$\frac{48,500}{NA}$	$\frac{4,750}{NA}$	$\frac{10,000}{NA}$

Source: *The Military Balance 1974/1975; 1979/1980.*

TS = Total Strength; TMS = Total Mobilizable Strength
NA = Not Available

CONTINUED

Table 4 (Continued)

1984/1985	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	4,200,000	TS= TMS=	<u>141,000</u> 500,000	<u>104,000</u> 600,000	<u>9,000</u> 10,000	<u>28,000</u> 37,000
Apartheid South Africa	26,800,000	TS= TMS=	<u>83,400</u> 404,500	<u>67,400</u> NA	<u>6,000</u> NA	<u>10,000</u> NA

1989/1990	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	4,542,000	TS= TMS=	<u>141,000</u> NA	<u>104,000</u> 598,000	<u>9,000</u> 10,000	<u>28,000</u> 37,000
Apartheid South Africa	35,364,000	TS= TMS=	<u>103,000</u> NA	<u>E77,500</u> NA	<u>6,500</u> NA	<u>11,000</u> NA

Source: *The Military Balance 1984/1985; 1989/1990.*

TS = Total Strength; TMS = Total Mobilizable Strength
NA = Not Available; E = Estimated

CONTINUED

Table 4 (Continued)

1994/1995	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	5,100,000	TS= TMS=	<u>E172,000</u> NA	<u>134,000</u> 598,000	<u>E6,000- 7,000</u> 10,000-12,000	<u>32,000</u> 37,000
Post-Apartheid South Africa	40,284,600	TS= TMS=	<u>78,500</u> NA	<u>E58,000</u> NA	<u>E4,500</u> NA	<u>10,000</u> NA

1998/1999	Total Population		Total Armed Forces	Army	Navy	Air Force
Israel	5,910,000	TS= TMS=	<u>E175,000</u> NA	<u>134,000</u> 598,000	<u>E9,000</u> 10,000-12,000	<u>32,000</u> 37,000
Post-Apartheid South Africa	39,100,000*	TS= TMS=	<u>82,400</u> NA	<u>58,600</u> NA	<u>5,500</u> NA	<u>10,900</u> NA

Source: *The Military Balance 1994/1995; 1998/1999.*

TS = Total Strength; TMS = Total Mobilizable Strength
NA = Not Available; E = Estimated

*: The population decrease from 1995 to 1999 in South Africa might be reflective of the recent massive but quiet departure of whites from the country.

human component of armament acquisition and in determining each country's extent of weapons acquisition relative to its strategic security environment.

Active total forces or total military strength comprises of all full time servicemen and women including conscripts and "long-term assignments from the Reserves".²² Total mobilizable strength includes both active total forces and those on reserve. Reserves are formulations and units that are not fully manned or operational in peacetime but can be mobilized quickly in time of crisis.²³ *Military Balance* population aggregates are based on most recent state's respective census data, and where not available, on the annual World Bank's *World Population Projections*' demographic statistics.²⁴ In Table 4, data are compared on five yearly bases starting from the 1965/66 publication. A more frequent comparison would not provide any new or additional information that could make a significant difference in the outcome of the comparative exercise.

On the average, (on Table 4) both in their lowest (1966) and highest populations (1999) South Africa is about seven times the size of Israel.²⁵ However, first, the ratio of military manpower to population is higher in Israel than in South Africa. Second, from 1974/1975 to 1998/99, and in this five yearly comparison, Israeli military, whether as total strength or total mobilizable strength, is greater and sometimes more than twice the size of South African military manpower. This data corresponds to their military expenditure in Table 3. From 1974/1975 to 1998/99, Israeli army, navy, and air force

²² Ibid. , p. 5.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 11

²⁵ Here it should be noted that during the apartheid era, almost all South African forces were drawn from the white population. In the post apartheid period.

were larger and sometimes more than twice those of South Africa, even during the apartheid era, either as total strength or total mobilizable strength.

Third, there is a dramatic reduction in the number of Total Armed Forces of South Africa towards the end of apartheid years (e.g. 1984/85, and 1989/90) compared to the post apartheid period (e.g. 1994/95; 1998/99). This reflects the effect of a less threatening and more stabilized post-apartheid SSE and the contraction in the necessity compelling South African appetite for militarization.²⁶ In fact, while the 1998/99 total strength is 82,000 according to *The Military Balance* data, in the 1998 *South African Defence Review*, the total strength of the South African army for the nearest future (after SANDF integration) is targeted at 70,000.²⁷ That is, South African Military Manpower would even be lower in the nearest future than what is shown by the data on Table 4. On the other hand, Israeli military constantly maintains its high level of military manpower or increases them, which is reflective of the lack of any significant changes in the condition of its SSE.

Finally, from the data on Table 4, and based on this study's assumption, one can argue that while Israel and apartheid South Africa are relatively situated in their respective unstable SSE, the intensity of Israel's hostile environment is far greater than that of apartheid South Africa. For its size and population, apparently, Israel is heavily militarized compared to apartheid South Africa and even more so in contrast to post-apartheid South Africa. The violence that characterized the foundation of the Zionist

²⁶ Again militarization is used in this study as synonymous with weapons or armament acquisition. Weapons are thus explained as having both equipment and human components, and together, they are seen in this study as weapons of war.

²⁷ South African Department of Defence, *South African Defence Review 1998* (Pretoria: Department of Defence, 1998), p. 9; 10.

state partially explains its addiction to militarization. Twelve days after the declaration of national independence, the Israeli army was established on May 26, 1948. Actually, this was a myth, the creation of the army predated and made possible the establishment of the new state, which was invaded few hours, the same day the country was formally created, by seven Arab states.²⁸ Insecurity feeling is an addiction to which Israel must guard against.

The Search For Security Through Acquisition of Nuclear Capability (i.e. Weapons of Mass Destruction) As A Measure For Deterrence

Though each refuses to formally acknowledge having nuclear weapons (until 1990 in case of South Africa), Israel and apartheid South Africa are *defacto* nuclear states. While the question of Israeli nuclear arsenal, size, and qualities remain controversial, there is no question that since 1948, when the state of Israel was born and sanctioned by the UN, it has turned to the research of A-bomb, early in its history, to compensate for the lack of security among rich and hostile Arab nations. In fact, the United States aided Israel's research on the bomb in 1955 during the administration of President Dwight Eisenhower's 'Atoms for peace program'.²⁹ He helped Israel build a 5-megawatt reactor, Soreq Reactor, for breeding plutonium. Between 1960-1966 the United States provided Israel with 50kg of Uranium 235 of 90 percent purity to power the Soreq. This *per se* is enough to manufacture several fission weapons.³⁰

Israel is suspected to have obtained its first nuclear weapons in the 1960s. Today,

²⁸ John Keegan, *World Armies* (New York: Facts On File, 1979), p. 358.

²⁹ Peter Pry, *Israel's Nuclear Arsenal* (Westview Press Inc., 1984), p. 6.

³⁰ Cited in bid.

“it is credited having advanced nuclear designs, a sizeable stockpile of weapons, and sophisticated missile and aircraft delivery systems.”³¹ The sophistication of and the long-standing nuclear status of Israel are widely acknowledged by security analysts.³² The essence of Israel’s nuclear capability is to ensure nuclear deterrence from enemy missile. Worried mostly about its survival in a hostile environment, since it was created, Israel seems to have offensive defence policy but has no foreign policy. Deliberately, it chooses to have the former at the expense of the latter. Its behavior in attacking and denying Iraq having a nuclear capability in 1981 highlights this point. As of 1994, Israel is said to have produced fission material to fabricate anywhere from 60 to 300 nuclear weapons.³³ Both, being pariah states, significant cooperation existed between Israeli and apartheid South Africa defence industries in both conventional and nuclear weapons research, development, and production.³⁴ The case of South Africa’s nuclear program was prompted by its abundant uranium reserves which was then converted by the US and Britain in furthering the Manhattan Project. By the late 1950s, South Africa established “an indigenous nuclear research and development program for peaceful purposes.”³⁵ The technological success of the apartheid regime in this project led to the 1969 construction of a pilot uranium-enrichment plant, “named the Y Plant, at Valindaba, outside Pretoria.”³⁶ It produced both industrial scale and nuclear weapons manufacturing materials. The year 1971 marked the preliminary nuclear explosive research. Prime

³¹ Kerry G. Herron, *Full Spectrum Antiproliferation: Integrating Nuclear Proliferation Theory and Policy For The Future* (Albuquerque, New Mexico: The University of New Mexico, 1994), p. 21.

³² Louis Rene Beres, “Limits of Nuclear Deterrence: The Strategic Risks and Dangers to Israel of False Hope,” *Armed Forces & Society*, 23.4 (Summer 1997): 541.

³³ Edwin S. Cochran, “Deliberation Ambiguity: An Analysis of Israel’s Nuclear Strategy,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19.3 (Sept. 1996): 321.

³⁴ Flint (in Yorke) 1998, p. 172

³⁵ F.W. de Villiers Et al, “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb,” *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 1993), p. 99.

Minister John Vorster approved the nuclear explosive capability that took place in May 1974. Although it was aimed for peaceful applications at the time, supposedly, Vorster approved the construction of a small number of explosive devices that were secretly tested in the Kalahari desert, later in 1974.³⁷

Diplomatic sources confirmed that the apartheid regime was concerned with its relations with front-line African states, its insecurity over the possibility of Cuba and Warsaw pact troops invasion of apartheid South Africa from Angola and Mozambique (i.e. northern defenses) and decided to acquire nuclear weapons.³⁸ President de Klerk's public explanations of why his country acquired nuclear warheads confirmed this nuclear deterrent goal.³⁹ South Africa unprecedently and voluntarily destroyed its nuclear weapons arsenal in 1991, which was said to consist of about six to seven nuclear weapons. Three reasons were cited for this disarmament behavior by President de Klerk, viz: first, a peaceful cease-fire negotiation had been concluded in Angola; second, Namibia had gained independence in 1990; and finally, the dramatic end to the Cold War in 1989/90.⁴⁰ However, he omitted the central issue of apartheid, which originated the self-inflicted predicament of the apartheid regime.

It is clear that both Israel and apartheid South Africa were trapped inside hostile and unstable SSEs. The fear of insecurity and threatening external climate and the search for security led to these state's development of the unconventional and the ultimate weapon of deterrence. It is not surprising that both states cooperated in their endeavors to

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid. ; see also Sagan 1996/97, p. 69.

³⁸ Bradley A. Thayer, "The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and The Utility of the Nuclear Proliferation Regime," *Security Studies*, 4.3 (Spring 1995): 495.

³⁹ Sagan 1996/97, p. 69.

⁴⁰ Ibid. , p. 70; Thayer 1995, p. 494.

acquire these weapons, with the aim of achieving the deterrent benefit that comes with them. Also, the change in the strategic security environment, exemplified by de Klerk's three reasons above, illustrates how a state's SSE condition can dictate its extent of weapons acquisition and armament acquisition behavior in general.

Currently, nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrent strategy is perceived as superfluous for the security need of a more stable and less threatening post apartheid SSE typified by collective security and regional peace-building endeavors. Pretoria understands that the solution to South Africa's problems relies on political rather than military fortification and nuclear deterrence. As such, nuclear capability along with strategic ambiguity was perceived as a burden⁴¹ as opposed to benefit. South Africa had completely given up the bombs by early July 1991 and joined the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in July 10, 1991.⁴²

Israel's nuclear capability with strategic ambiguity and its deterrent strategy and adherence to military solution, rather the political continue to be at the forefront of Israeli security doctrine. Israel's continuous reliance on its militarized posture to ward off threats and ensure security is a smoke that is continuously being generated by the insecurity fire burning within its SSE. Thus, the differences in the weapons acquisition behavior of these two countries emanate from the differences in the condition of their SSEs.

⁴¹ Reuse 1993, p. 103.

⁴² Ibid. , p. 104.

IV. Empirical Result of Hypothesis I: The Correlation between the SSE and EWA

Looking into the armament acquisition of Israel, apartheid South Africa and post-apartheid South Africa societies, we have carried out a three-way investigation. That is, we investigated their behavior analytically in terms of each society's defence expenditure as percentage of the GNP; defence capability by depicting the amount of military manpower; and seeking and acquiring the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons (i.e. Weapons of Mass Destruction) to achieve their strong deterrent capabilities, to neutralize and ward off external enemies' capability and threats, respectively. In each of these three types of investigation, three patterns of behavior emerge. First, both Israel and apartheid South Africa were/are locked in threatening and insecure SSEs. Both resort into offensive and unrestrained militarization, accordingly. However, the SSE of Israel is more threatening than South Africa's relative to its quite militarized and rich Arab neighbors, and coupled with its own hegemonic aspirations. We observe that these conditions influence Israel's extent of weapons acquisition which is far more aggressive than that of apartheid South Africa as illustrated by Figures 3 and 4, respectively. Despite their shared attribute of being situated in a hostile SSE, clearly, the degree of how threatening the condition of the SSE is, correlates with the level of weapons acquisition. Thus, the marked differences in the amount of material and human resources, and extent of nuclear capability sought, *vis a vis* by Israel and South Africa. In this sense, the degree of the threat in the SSE correlates with the EWA behavior in each society based on the three methods of investigation carried out.

Second, both the SSE and EWA of apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa differ. The former was typified by military build-up, in the words of Flint, “to deal with internal resistance, to deter the newly decolonized African states by expanding and displaying South African military might, to use military strength to retain control over Namibia and to present South Africa as an attractive ally to the West both in the subcontinent and the Southern hemisphere.”⁴³ Also, the installation of Soviet defence system in Angola, which neutralized Pretoria’s air superiority in the region, led to the mid-1970’s decision to acquire nuclear weapons.⁴⁴ Because the SSE of apartheid South Africa was more threatening, its level of weapons acquisition was much higher than that of post-apartheid South Africa with a more stable and less threatening SSE. The end of the Cold War, and the relatively peaceful internal democratic transition, removes violent threat from its SSE. This brings about a significant opinion of the view that the defence force is unnecessary because “there is no real threat” any longer.⁴⁵ (See and compare South Africa militarization efforts prior to, and after 1990 in Tables 3 and 4; also see Figures 2 and 3).

Data from other sources outside those used in Tables 3 and 4 point toward similar findings as our empirical investigations. David Silverberg commenting on post-apartheid South Africa situation says: “defense budgets have declined by 50 per cent in real terms over the past five years and are likely to decline further, ultimately coming to rest this year (i.e. 1997) at 10.2 billion rand (approximately \$2.26 billion), according to Pierre

⁴³Flint 1998, p. 170.

⁴⁴ Thayer 1995, p. 495.

⁴⁵Gutteridge 1997, p. 12.

Steyn, the Secretary of Defense.”⁴⁶ Similarly, Greg Mills opines that “In South Africa, the defense budget has dropped from 4.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1989-1990 (U.S. \$4.9 billion in 1997 values) to 1.6 per cent in 1997-1998 (U.S. \$2 billion).”⁴⁷ Also, Flint articulates “Between 1991 and 1995 the South Africa defence budget declined by 45 per cent. The resultant effect in the defence industry has been a reduction of 60 per cent of production within the industry over the same four years. In employment terms the number of people employed by the defence industry has fallen from 160,000 in 1991 to 50,000 in 1995.”⁴⁸

These data information is about the same as those of Table 3. Beyond reasonable doubt therefore, the extent of weapons acquisition of a country imitates the condition of its strategic security environment at different periods in time. By comparing the SSE of a state at different point in time, one can conclude that there exists a strong correlation between the SSE and weapons acquisition behavior. Of course while the primary reason behind such might be the search for security, motivational factors such as aggression cannot be ruled out.

Third, and finally, this empirical analysis finds that while post-apartheid South Africa is demilitarizing, as Figures 2 and 3 would imply after 1990, Israel continues to adhere to its usual weapons acquisition behaviors; as succinctly stated by Michael Barnett:

Israel has traditionally embraced a self-reliant doctrine for a variety of reasons: on existential view of the precariousness of Jewish existence; a Waltzian realism that holds that anarchy generates self-help behavior; a

⁴⁶ Silverberg 1997, p. 50.

⁴⁷ Greg Mills, “The South African National Defence Force: Between Downsizing and New Capabilities,” *Naval War College Review*, LII.1 (Winter 1999): 87.

⁴⁸ Flint 1998, p.173; see also J. Cilliers, “Towards a South Africa Conventional Arms Trade Policy,” *African Security Review*, 4.4 (1995): 8.

Military-industrial coalition that benefits from arms production; a geographical imperative that suggests a doctrine that is offensive minded and carries the war into the enemies' territory; and a strategic culture that is ultimately premised on deterrence and overwhelming use of force. Such factors contributed to Israel leaning heavily on competitive, rather than cooperative security strategies.⁴⁹

The basic differences in the South African change in its defence tune and Israeli addiction to aggressively offensive doctrine in security matters are grounded in the causal-chain analysis of the SSE. In these scenarios, two countries initially behave similarly, by engaging in militarizing activities in their quest for security and/or pursuit of national goals. The departure of one country or the abandonment of this strategy in favor of collective security and peace-building behavior, on the one hand, and the adherence of the other country to the conventional behavior, is relative to the condition of each state's SSE.

Apartheid South Africa's and Israel's decision to acquire armament extensively, and also nuclear weapons, support the argument of realism. They were acquired to maintain security. Offensive realist tenets captured in the expression of Labs postulates that "states try to maximize their relative power in order to maximize their security and that leads to decisions to expand war aims."⁵⁰ From our empirical analysis, this realist argument can be fine-tuned by first saying that states in unstable and threatening SSE maximize their relative power in order to maximize their security. This behavior cannot be generalized without qualification since states with stable and relatively secured SSE might see no need to engage in militarizing activities. Second, instead of the realist

⁴⁹Michael N. Barnett "Regional Security after the Gulf War". *Political Science Quarterly*, 111.4 (96/97): 609.

⁵⁰Eric Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and The Expansion of War Aims" *Security Studies*, 6.4 (Summer 1997): 1.

saying that states engage in balance-of-power activities in their quest for security, it would be more appropriate to contend that states engage in balancing threat with defence capability to attain or maintain security or a stable and secured SSE. The case of Saudi Arabia is instructive here. After the Persian Gulf War, it engages in massive armament acquisition.⁵¹ The causes of militarization which begets militarization resides in the SSE.

South Africa's abandonment of militarization as a way of sustaining its security and its involvement in regional security arrangement and peace building supports neoliberal thinking; but not without understanding the critical role of the SSE concept. According to Keohane, "Cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others."⁵² Acknowledging mutuality of interests is the root of cooperation. However, this cannot occur unless threats in the SSE are eliminated or at least ameliorated. Neither the realist nor the neoliberal perspective is absolute. Each perspective is obtainable in different security scenarios. A single analytical framework that can accommodate and throw light on the range of possibilities in the neorealist – neoliberal spectrum, to which other concepts can be utilized complimentarily, is critical to understanding states behavior in international security in a post-structural world. The theory of the SSE that is changeable can be sufficient to playing such a significant role.

⁵¹ Abbas Maleki, "A Southern Perspective on Kolodziej," *Arms Control*, 13.3 (December 1992): 502.

⁵² Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions" in David A. Baldwin, Ed. *Neorealism And Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) p. 86.

Utilizing the SSE Framework for Empirical Analysis

In applying the concept of SSE to analyzing other cases, some cases might be easier than others. The case of the United States militarization during the Cold War is straight forward and explainable using this model relative to both its concerns for national security (based on external threats) and national motivations relative to strategic interests. A combination of factors such as a history of colonial past, world wars, geopolitical factors (e.g. the 1962 Cuban incident), hegemonic ambitions and rivalry, and ideological disagreement with the Soviet Union which emanated the hostile Cold War norms and identity in a bipolar context all drove the United States militarization endeavor. Currently, national motivation, that is, retaining unchallenged strategic superiority more than security concern, influences its post-Cold War arms buildups behavior.

The concept might be expected not to fit in explaining some states' behavior. However, if great care is taken, the SSE model can be useful in explaining difficult cases. A good example of such cases is that of Switzerland. Until recently, this state was located in a very dangerous region. After suffering defeats in major wars, e.g. against France in 1516, it adopted the concept and strategy of 'neutrality' as its military doctrine; having realized that neutrality is the only way to survive at the strategic level if you are small. Switzerland was too small to pursue hegemonic ambition or play a major role in European policy. Its major goals are maintaining independence, freedom, and defense of national territory. Although it took a period of about 700 years of struggle between its four principal ethnic groups (i.e. German, French, Italian, and Romanch) to unite, nonetheless, Swiss national identity is very strong. Currently, other than Austria, all states

surrounding it are members of NATO. Beyond low intensity conflicts such as terrorism, international organized crimes, no major threat exists in its SSE.⁵³

However, Switzerland understands that just because there is no conventional threat does not mean that conflict will not occur, especially in a region with a history of past violence. Thus, Swiss acquires and maintains a defensive militarization posture while holding the belief that neutrality is only credible when you are able to defend yourself. This state is highly militarized with contemporary and sophisticated weapons; with a military doctrine that requires 98 percent of all males to join the military, in a 'militia system' that is based on a volunteer citizen duty.

Despite the lack of threat perception, the Swiss defense planners understands very well that the state is located in a potentially conflict prone and dangerous region and hence militarized according to its security needs and expectation. Although it tries to maintain a stable SSE, the regional SSE is too volatile to risk the adoption of a neutrality position that is not backed with armament buildups. In this light, its neutrality is backed by Hobbesian sword. Clearly, the potential for unstable SSE at the regional level, just as ongoing instability, can drive states to militarize. Here, the perceptual and psychological aspects of a potentially 'unstable' security environment are in play, based on the long run strategic consideration. While not all the causal elements might be applicable in the Swiss case, geopolitical factor is crucial in the formulation of its military strategy. Also, it is important to note that sometimes states assess the threat to them from other states' military capabilities and develop affordable military strategies to mitigate such threats.

⁵³ The general information provided here are partly excerpts from the interview conducted with Major General Markus Rusch, The Defense Attaché at the embassy of Switzerland, Washington, D.C. in the spring of 1999.

Another good example of a difficult case could be Costa Rica. It is located in a somehow dangerous neighborhood (consisting of Nicaragua and Panama), but without a standing army beyond lightly armed police and non-professional guards. While financial constraint might be a contributing factor to this state's non-military security option, it does not fully account for such option since states do militarize regardless of such constraint. Despite the turbulent regional SSE, Costa Rica has never been attacked since it was established as a state.

Costa Rica is the oldest democracy in Latin America. After the internal revolution of 1948 that toppled the last authoritarian regime, the late President Jose Figueres came to power and established democracy. He abolished the army in 1949. Resources formerly allocated to defense thereafter had been used to fund social development. By the mid-1980s, President Luis Monge declared a national principle of 'neutrality' on military security matters. Like Switzerland, it has provided regional 'good services' to disputant parties such as mediation, and so on in Latin America.⁵⁴

The internal security climate has for a long time been stable as a result of its democratic style of government. Externally, Costa Rica shares borders with only two countries: Nicaragua to the north, and Panama to the south. It is flanked by the Atlantic Ocean to the east, and Pacific Ocean to the west. Generally, Panama has remained friendly and even came to its aid militarily when it was threatened by Nicaragua's dictator, Anastasio Somoza's government, in the 1970s. Otherwise, Nicaragua has mostly respected Costa Rica's national security and neutrality stance. In addition to military

⁵⁴ Some of the information presented on Costa Rica is excerpts from the interview conducted with Mr. Sabiro Morera, Minister Counselor for Cultural Affairs at the Embassy of Costa Rica, Washington, D.C. in December 1999.

assistance from Panama, Costa Rica relies on, and in the past had sought military help from, the United States and Venezuela, both of whom responded accordingly.

The state is internally stable and externally it has no enemy. Despite the regional turbulence in Latin America, Costa Rica's SSE is quite secured and stable as far as its military security environment is concerned. Having only two immediate neighbors beside the two oceans, it can afford a position of neutrality. Like Switzerland that is protected with natural mountainous barriers, Costa Rica is even more insulated relative to its being shielded by the two oceans in a naturally barricaded geopolitical context. As such, its threat perception of its SSE is much less. It psychologically feels more secured than Switzerland, which to the north has Germany and to the south Italy as neighbors, among several others.

The case of Costa Rica is not only explainable by the SSE model, but it is supportive of the this study's central hypothesis, that states with acute insecurity tend to militarize heavily and more aggressively while those with stable and relatively secured SSE like Costa Rica invest much less in armament acquisition. The cases of Switzerland and Costa Rica also support the claim that stability and security have a perceptual component just as it has the substantive aspect. Rationality (however defined), and profound reasoning play major role in these two states military or non-military doctrine, as the case may be.

Applying this study's model in explaining the Soviet's security and militarization behavior, in contrasts to that of its former republics after its demise, could be very interesting. Gorbachev 'glasnots' (i.e. openness) and 'perestroika', (i.e. new thinking), domestic reforms from orthodoxy to flexibility, the consequential disintegration of the

Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, all presented the communist regime the opportunity to realistically combat head on the main causes of national insecurity, to which, mistakenly and abortively, its heavy militarization was meant to eradicate. But by addressing the major causations of insecurity, whether intentionally or coincidentally, in the awkward manners the opportunity presented itself, the insecurity (e.g. the Cold War related) that provoked the Soviet's unrelenting militarization disappeared. Since the adoption of a governing process by egalitarian principles, among other things, the former republics', especially Russia's SSEs have become less threatening and more secured than any other time in the twentieth century. In pragmatic terms, the increase stability in the SSE and the perception of being more secured have an immediate positive impact on the republics level of militarization (and de-militarization) endeavors. Not only has this stability led to a diminished extent of weapons acquisitions, it has a dramatic turn around effect on the Eastern Europeans' attitude towards the realization of international arms control objectives. Currently, while they are not completely stabilized, the SSEs of Russia and those of the members of the Community of Independent States (i.e. CIS), individually, correlate with their level of weapons acquisition. Also, the overall regional success has markedly improved in terms of more flexibility towards the realization of international arms control objectives.

The case of the Soviet Union supports the central assumption inferred from the empirical application of the SSE framework that: chronic and extended armament acquisition can only complicate but not resolve state's insecurity concerns. While it might be useful in buying time, it also unfortunately digresses national resources and states' attention from actually confronting and resolving their peculiar causes of

insecurity. Militarization, on the long run, cannot be substituted for the actual resolutions of the root cause of security problems. Overall, such digression can be very costly, particularly by eating up states' economic resources that could have been devoted to and utilized for the actual elimination or amelioration of the roots of instability. Eventually and in the past, such economic misfortune have led to the fall of great powers and even a superpower like the defunct Soviet Union.

The key point here is that the Soviet's SSE, marked by insecurity, correlated with its high level of weapons acquisition. On the other hand, the presently more stable SSE of the Commonwealth of Independent States post Cold War correlates with the members' less militarization endeavor. These scenarios parallel the cases of apartheid and post apartheid South Africa, respectively.

Chapter 8

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE STRATEGIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT AND THE EXTENT OF WEAPONS ACQUISITION ON INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES (IACO)

Is arms control a good idea? For quite sometimes, the arms control issue has been identified with world security and peace. Arms control on the contemporary world dated back to 1945, following the use of atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. World politics has registered bids to abolish national ownership of atomic weapons. There have been renewed bids for a mixture of genuine and insincere offers to negotiate general and complete disarmament. Historically, such litany of offers and negotiations have been on stage without meaningful outcomes; or when meaningful outcomes were obtainable, implementation and/or verification have been problematic. When agreements were implemented judiciously, there were a mixture of feelings of whether or not the final outcome tallied with the original purpose of the arms control agreement.

As stated in Chapter 1, this Chapter examines the impact of the association between the strategic security environment (the key independent variable) and the extent of weapons acquisition (the key dependent variable) on international arms control objectives (IACO). In the process of doing this, first, we shall delve into the protagonist argument on arms control wherein the objectives of arms control efforts are embedded. Second, the contention of the pessimists against the validity of these objectives and how accomplishable they are would be considered. Third, based on the concept of the strategic security environment, we shall examine what role, if any, does the SSE play on the realization of the IACO; and also, whether or not or to what extent does arms control

enhances security. Finally, inferring from the above premises, and the previous chapters that deal with theoretical and empirical investigations, we shall delineate how the relationship between the SSE and EWA affects international arms control objectives. Thereby, we can decipher if this study's second hypothesis has been substantiated or not.

Arms Control and the Optimists Argument

Arms Control: What is it?

Arms control is a way to enhance national and international security via careful design of military strategy, weaponry, military deployments and doctrines among nations in danger of military hostilities. It is an endeavor based on reciprocity and cooperation between potential enemies, to offset, to compensate or mitigate the destructive characteristics of modern weapons and military expectations. By so doing, the political, economic, and ideological differences that genuinely underlie international antagonisms and rivalry are either decimated or eliminated.

Arms control helps to limit the damage in general war in the event both sides wish to do so. It is also concerned with restricting and tranquilizing arms race. Arms control has some good and bad effects; a good arms control will have less bad effects than a 'bad' arms control.¹

According to Thomas Schelling and Morton Halperin, customarily, arms control entails "formal agreement, negotiated detail at diplomatic conferences embodied in a treaty, and with machinery or institutions for monitoring the agreement."² These

¹ Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control* (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 65.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77.

variegated and flexible concepts embody degrees of formality ranging from a formal treaty with detail specifications to executive agreement composed of formal or tacit understanding. They can also take the form of self-restraint on each side of the parties to hostility or among potential enemies.

Cooperation of all parties to any arms control is critical to its success. Arms control is a step towards recognizing the role of military force in the modern world. Insights of arms control theorists, like Schelling and Halperin, took off in the late 1950s and early 1960s. The narrow traditional interpretation of the term focuses on strategic stability between the Cold War superpowers. Hedley Bull is one of the founders of modern arms control analysis. In its “broadest” conception, according to him, arms control “comprises all those acts of military policy in which antagonistic states cooperate in the pursuit of common purposes even while they are struggling in the pursuit of conflicting ones.”³

Stuart Croft offers a more contemporary and broader perspective of the term. His typology of arms control constitute five distinct forms, namely: (1) “The traditional interpretation, focusing on strategic stability;” (2) arms control at the end of major conflicts to formulate new relations; (3) arms control to develop the laws of war in terms of norms of behavior; (4) to control proliferation of weapons; and (5) to seek collective and formal basis, e.g. by international organization to resolve against conflict.⁴ Croft elucidates that the conservative critique which came about over 28 years ago focuses on

³ Hedley Bull, *The Control of the Arms Race* (New York: Praeger, 1965) p. XIV.

⁴ Stuart Croft, “In Defense of Arms Control,” *Political Studies*, XLIV (1996): pp. 888-891; 903-904.

the narrow definition of the traditional interpretation. His own broader conception of the term is an attempt to overcome such weakness.⁵

Objectives and Potential Security Function of Arms control

The objectives of arms control from the viewpoint of the optimists, particularly as seen in the 1961 work of Schelling and Halperin, are as follows⁶: in the event of war, the character of today's strategic weapons is such that an immense advantage is provided to the side that takes the initiative to attack first. One way arms control can help is to alter the character of the weapons themselves in a manner that reduces their ability to achieve advantage by a quick attack and to suffer a great disadvantage by responding slowly. Weapons will be less vulnerable in the event of a surprise attack. Second, by prior cooperative arrangements, pre-emptive urge to strike can be minimized. Thirdly, by addressing the decision process or the expectations of each side and intentions in the event of a brink of war. Cooperative measures will improve intelligence, warning facilities and weapons design.

Arms control can eradicate the mistake of 'accidental war' that can result from errors in warning systems or misinterpretation in tactical evidence; and also mistakes in brinkmanship. 'Accidental war' is, mostly, pre-emptive war sparked by some unpredictable occurrence without the control of the main participants and unintended by

⁵ Ibid. , pp. 888-891.

⁶ Schelling and Halperin 1961. These objectives reflect the view of the authors who are reknown founders and proponents of the concept of arms control. While their view is not exclusive it represents the mainstream perspective of the protagonist school.

them. Reduction of false alarms and increasing the reliability of the warning system are thus desiderata (i.e. essential). There are other types of problem that arms control can eradicate, such as human or mechanical dysfunction, etc.

Arms control can reduce the capability for destruction in case of a thermonuclear exchange than it would have been, otherwise. Measures to prevent local wars in the form of a joint arms embargo to a region or international treaty could be achieved through arms control. Local war can be made limited by maintaining strategic balance among rivals, having the limits that form the boundary and conditions of war, having an open channel of communication and understanding not to initiate the use of certain types of weapons. Agreement to accept mediation, conciliation or arbitration services of neutrals, e.g. the UN or any other group, can eliminate the chances of a limited war becoming a total war. Mutual agreement to abstain from mischievous and provocative activity short of war can prevent and/or limit local wars.

Arms control decreases the danger of arms race. According to Schelling and Halperin, "Arms race" refers to the interaction between two or more adversaries' military programs to a tendency for each side's program to respond to what the other is doing. Each side is guided by its estimate of what the other side is doing. If each side greatly exaggerates what the other side is doing, the competition is exacerbated; if each underestimates the other's accomplishments, the race will be damped".⁷ In the case of arms control, each side possesses better information about what the other side is doing and the chances of arms race might be dampened; thereby limiting insatiable programs on

⁷ Ibid. , p. 34.

both or all sides. Allowing access to each other's facilities for inspection, and thereby improving each side's intelligence about each other's programs, can accomplish this. Arms control emphasizes that secrecy can be a dangerous and unreliable support for strategic security for each party involved in arms control, as such, reliance on it should be less. Cooperatively, measures to stabilize or slow down arms technological race can be considered at different points – research stage, development stage, testing stage, or the stage of updating and improving. Finally, arms control can undermine the spread of nuclear weapons or missiles which are conducive to the danger of accidental or catalytic war.

In general and succinctly put, arms control is traditionally most popular for three main objectives, namely: (1) to make war less likely; (2) to lessen the destructiveness of war should in case one occur; and (3) to reduce the cost of armaments.⁸ Kruzal rightly notes that in the face of nuclear weapons and with the possibility of nuclear warfare, the second objective of lessening the destructiveness of war, as a reconsideration of arms control, has disappeared. Primarily, the function of arms control in a contemporary world, Kruzal postulates, is to promote stability particularly in a crisis. "Crisis stability is achieved by reducing as much as possible the incentive for either side to launch a preemptive attack."⁹ When both preemption and retaliation can inflict the same level of damage, deterrence is achievable and stability results.

⁸ Joseph Kruzal, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Stability of the Post War Era," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., Ed. *The Long Post War Peace: Contending Explorations and Projections* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 257.

⁹ Ibid.

N. J. Rengger, explaining the optimists' view, states that if managed properly, arms control should lead to arms reductions and thus to the longed-for goal of disarmament.¹⁰ Arms control can thereby not only reduce military forces, it can also ease international tensions.

According to Phil Williams and Joseph Kruzel, three perspectives with differing propositions are obtainable on the subject of arms control. First, the conventional wisdom, according to Kruzel, postulates that while arms control has not lived up to its full potential, it had modestly been useful in moderating the US-Soviet strategic stability. Second, the optimists posit that arms control, could have been used to transform US-Soviet relations but was "generally misused and subverted to perpetuate the arms race." Finally the pessimists view contend that "arms control whatever its theoretical appeal, has been a practical failure. It has lulled the West into a false sense of security and therefore heightened the danger of war."¹¹

Rengger, an optimist, argues that if arms control is conceived in the light that goes beyond the Bullian notion of international society as just a "group of states," towards a more meaningful cosmopolitan version, arms control objectives would be realized. That is, it would enhance international security.¹²

Another optimist, Stuart Croft, identifies two groups of critics of arms control: the Essentialists and the Marginalists.¹³ The Essentialists argue that arms control is deeply flawed both in theory and practice. Colin Gray, for example, contends that

¹⁰ N.J. Rengger, "Arms Control, International Society, and the End of the Cold War," *Arms Control*, 13.1 (April 1992): 36-37.

¹¹ Cited in Renger 1992, pp. 36-37. See also Kruzel 1991, p. 258.

¹² Rengger 1992, p. 34; 52.

¹³ Croft 1996, pp. 888-889.

“policy, which is to say politics, drives armaments, their acquisition and use, far more than it is driven by them. Discovery of ever more elegant alleged used for an arms control process cannot succeed in negating or otherwise evading the point that arms control puts the cart before the horse.”¹⁴ Colin Gray’s argument tallies with the dynamic sequence in this study’s analytic model, in which case, the national defense planning process, acting like the intervening variable between the SSE and EWA, precedes the act of weapons acquisition itself (see Figure 1, page 32).

The Marginalists, unlike the Essentialists, do not attack the theory and history of arms control. Rather, they suggested that with the Cold War over, arms control would be pulled to the “margins of international relations,” because it had outlived its usefulness as both a diplomatic and strategic tool.¹⁵ The Marginalists see arms control as a Cold War institution.

Croft, on the other hand, refutes both sets of arguments, saying that, when arms control is broadly understood as he typologizes it in its five distinct forms, it will continue to play an important role in international security.¹⁶

Arms Control: The Pessimists Argument

In his critique of arms control in general and particularly, as explained by Schelling and Halperin, Gray describes it as a ‘house of cards’, in which case, what is postulated and promised in the theory is hopelessly impractical in reality. The prevailing attribute of states’ system and the nature of state behavior toward security, he says,

¹⁴ Cited in Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid. , p. 888; 900-904.

ensures the persistence of those conditions which precipitate that arms control must fail.

He distilled his 'strategic philosophy' from historical evidence as follows:

- (1) That arms control is about enhancing war prevention;
 - (2) In nominal terms, arms control is appropriate only between potential enemies;
 - (3) However, the more likely that states will fight each other, the less likely is the prospect of negotiating a strategically meaningful arms control agreement.
- On the other hand, there cannot be any strategically significant arms control regimes between states that have no political incentives to fight each other (exception include a situation whereby states collude to deprive a third party of, e.g. nuclear weapons acquisition).¹⁷

From these three propositions, Gray marshaled what he calls the arms control paradox; that is, that arms control is directly linked to causes of war. Gray dismissed the practice of arms control arguing that it rests on false premises. He depicts the founding fathers of arms control as ambitious in their vision at the point of departure of the theory. However, he interpretes their work as saying that unstable arms races leads to war outbreak.¹⁸

Gray postulates that weapons do not cause wars, although wars are fought with them. The self-appointed guardians of the vague idea, arms control, take refuge beneath the banner of "instability".¹⁹ The political determination of defense programs is so strong that arms control is incapable of controlling arms. The practical control of arms is orchestrated by the politics of the defense budgetary process.

¹⁷ Colin S. Gray, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 2-3.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

Historically, however, arms control had no impact upon the control of competitive armament. Since 1945, leaders in world politics have negotiated fruitlessly to abolish the ownership of atomic weapons in successive, “occasionally renewed and thoroughly insincere offers to negotiate general and complete disarmament.”²⁰ Such negotiations include the followings: (1) that of 1958: on nuclear testing and the dangers of surprise attack; (2) 1960s: on limited nuclear test ban treaty of 1963, and hot “line agreement”; (3) 1967: the outer space treaty; (4) 1968: on nuclear proliferation; (5) 1969: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) renamed START in the 1980s; (6) 1987 INF; and (7) 1991: START. However, there is a shortage of evidence that arms control agreements are effective. Its history can thus act as a reasonable basis upon which to predict the likelihood of its future achievement.²¹

Generally, in his book, *House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail*, Gray argues that countries in conflict cannot attain arms control to the effective degree that is needed; weapons do not cause war, hence the control of weapons is unlikely to cause peace. The core concept of arms control, ‘stability’, lacks concrete meaning. Revisionist or potential revisionist states cause wars as they seek to achieve their ambitions. History shows that arms control does not work. In the absence of well-crafted authoritative and effective national grand and military strategies, arms control is a mystery tour; implementation of sanctions against violation and non-compliance have been elusive. Additionally, arms control is a diversion from national strategic reasoning; defense planning is not beneficial at technological prediction.

²⁰ Ibid. , p. 14.

²¹ Ibid.

In stressing their concern on 'the problematic future of arms control', Kegley and Wittkopf express that:

The international agreements controlled only obsolete armaments or ones that the parties to the agreements had little incentive for developing in the first place. Do states purposely leave the most threatening problems outside negotiations and seek only to control the insignificant ones? Several indicators suggest that states rarely take arms control seriously when they perceive their survival to be at stake.²²

The history of the past negotiations, the authors are saying, testifies to many obstacles looming in the future of arms control. The concern of states for their own survival (and in addition, their concerns for national goals and ambitions) is likely to make it difficult to put any international arms control objective ahead of national interest.

The authors cite four indicators from the history of arms control objectives that point in the direction of failure in the future. First, between 1975 and 1981, there were twelve instances in which chemical and biological warfare occurred. Some countries including the United States thereby violated the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention.²³

Secondly, Kegley and Wittkopf observe that states have the tendency to improve their (nuclear) weapons rather than controlling them. Despite the 1963 partial test ban treaty, testing did not slow down among the nuclear states. According to the June 1996 *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, an average of one test was conducted almost every nine days between 1945 and 1995, with a total of 2,046 nuclear explosions.²⁴ Although this ban prohibited atmospheric and underwater testing, underground explosions continue.

²²Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation, Sixth Edition*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 473.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Cited in Ibid. , p. 473.

Third, the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty obligates non-nuclear states to refrain from acquiring such. However, India, Israel and Pakistan broke the barrier by becoming de facto nuclear states. The treaty has failed to erase the nuclear ambitions of Iraq, Iran, Libya, and North Korea that are not parties to this treaty.²⁵

Finally, Kegley and Wittkopf cite the “sobering lessons” suggested by SALT agreements. Under SALT I agreement, the number of strategic launchers in operation and those under construction were frozen. However, the agreement did not cover the strategic bombers, nor prohibit quantitative thresholds that can render the treaty meaningless. Thus, the two superpowers deployed “four times as many multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVS) on missiles in 1977 as when the SALT talks began.” The arms race escalated rather than toned down.²⁶

Rengger, although optimistic, tenders some plausible complaints that arms control has been mostly a great power concern and a means to further their own national security strategies. In its theory and practice, it usually subordinates the interests of international society to the interest of a particular member. Arms control does not address real issues in a changing world politics and it is not concerned with international order.²⁷ Although arms control might be useful in some instances (e.g. regional political process), however, it is secondary to the warranted political process necessary to negotiate the root causes of disputes.²⁸ The only way arms control can be useful in the post Cold War, for example,

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Rengger 1992, p. 41.

²⁸ Ibid. , pp. 44-47.

is to be used to enhance and strengthen the international society rather than simply being used as national security strategies by individual powers.²⁹

Arms Control and the SSE Standard Argument

Whether it is seen in the light of conventional wisdom, modestly, that it moderated the US-Soviet strategic stability, or in the optimists contemporary broader context as articulated by Croft, arms control is an individual state actor's diplomatic tool, and thus, can be seen as a military strategy. While it is important to acknowledge the confidence-building aspect of arms control, which might complement individual state's national interest, it does not address issues concerning international security and the root causes of distrust and disputes among states. As mentioned in chapter one, chronic armament acquisition complicates the original causes of threats and insecurity. But, this should not cause any confusion by mixing up a secondary source of tension, armaments, with the primary source of threats, instability and insecurity, i.e. the SSE.

Unfortunately, both the conventional proponents of the concept of arms control, the optimists, and sometimes the pessimists who respond to their (i.e., the protagonists and optimists) argument, have been distracted by the tip of the iceberg regarding the causation of international insecurity while overlooking its principal source (i.e. SSE). Weapons do not cause wars, as both optimists and pessimists have echoed. As such, even a successful control of weapons would not and could not per se eliminate the chronic and potential causes of conflicts from states' strategic security environment.

²⁹ Ibid. , p. 51.

In Chapter 5, we broadened the concept of security vertically to encapsulate the societal, regional and extra-regional levels. The concept is similarly broadened horizontally to conceive of the causes of insecurity to go beyond anarchy but to include other sources, namely: historical circumstances, demographic composition, geopolitics, national goals and ambitions, and norms and identity. Neither weapons acquisition or arms control can eliminate these sources of threats in the states SSE. The attention of both the proponents, the optimists and pessimists of arms control, have been distracted from the main source of international insecurity while they concentrate on the secondary source of insecurity that is provoked by chronic armament acquisition.

Chronic armament acquisition is the manifestation of insecurity from the SSE. To focus on controlling armaments is to focus on the symptom while neglecting the root cause of the problem. The political condition that permits arms control negotiation can only be relative to the condition of the SSE of each party involved in the agreement. Prior to any agreement, actors must study their security environment before making any commitment, unless they know at the back of their mind that the negotiation is about obsolete military machines or those they have no incentives for developing. When security problem concerns national survival or vital national goals (i.e. strategic interests), states do not and would not take arms control seriously.³⁰ No state would, prerogatively, put international arms control objectives before its own national interest. Contrarily, states would do whatever they can to “guarantee their survival, including breaking international norms to acquire the means to their security.”³¹

³⁰ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 472.

³¹ Bradley A. Thayer, “The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation and the Utility of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime,” *Security Studies*, 4.3 (Spring 1995): 502.

At best arms control is an aspect of military strategies of great powers, sometimes in the form of a diplomatic tools, and workable mostly on bilateral basis but not universally effective for the international society, at large. Arms control theory and practice, according to the Marginalists, are originally shaped by the context of the Cold War, and thus have a marginal role to play in the post-Cold War order.³² It was utilized during this era as national security of individual powers based on their own quest to expand and secure their SSE and strategic interests.³³ These powers only look at global strategic security environment in their own image and not truly in the context of a cosmopolitan international environment. Normalized by the great powers as the sure way to security, the popularity of arms control overshadowed the causes of instability and the threats existing in individual small states SSE. However, as soon as the cloud of the Cold War vanished, these instabilities started to resurface. Arms control parallels an attempt to quench the smoke without quenching the real fire.

The concept of SSE is a systematic analysis of the causal-effect phenomenon in international security. It delineates analytically, the multilevel, multidimensional, and multicausal sources of international insecurity. The SSE concept is not only concerned with the security at the societal level, it is concerned with regional and extra regional levels of security. This concept makes it possible to diagnose properly insecurity problems at all these three levels, which in turn can bring about the right therapeutic regimen. On the other hand, although arms control attempts to resolve the problem created by chronic armaments acquisition in exacerbating security problem (e.g. by leading to security dilemma), however, its focus is limited to eradicating the symptom of

³² Rengger 1992, p. 40.

³³ Ibid. , p. 51.

states' insecurity problems, but lacking the ability to address the causal root of the problems.

The limited focus of arms control provokes some critical questions to which students of arms control should attempt to answer. First, which one precedes the other, the causes of threats and threats, on the one hand, or weapons, on the other hand? Second, if it is the insecurity that is invoked by threats in states SSE that leads to weapons acquisition, how does arms control resolve the issues posed by the causes of danger and threats that provoke states' perception of insecurity? Third, is it possible for a state with unstable SSE to engage in arms control knowing fully well that the sources of instability can emanate from one or a combination of any of the six elements of the SSE causal-chain that cut across the ISC and ESC contexts? Fourth, would the limitation or even the absence of weapons make the causes of threat and instability to go away? Fifth, even when IACO are successfully achieved, how long could the interstate and stability that result last, especially when the condition of the SSE remains unstable? Finally, what is responsible for states noncompliance and their failure to adhere to the pursuit and realization of international arms control objectives?

A compact answer to these questions is, the noncompliance of states and the failure of arms control is relative to the threatening condition of their SSE. Just as it is absurd to ask people to undress in the winter, it is equally absurd for states to loyally commit themselves to international arms control obligations while there are ongoing insecurity flashpoints in their own environment. It is no wonder, remarked Rengger, that

“both, ‘optimists’ and ‘pessimists’ argue that the practice of arms control has heightened the danger of war.”³⁴

Arms control is a distraction for both security analysts and policymakers towards a false sense of security endeavor. It siphons quality time and limited resources into unproductive, or, at most, a less productive approach to world security. Meanwhile, unattended, actual causations of instability continue to ferment into a degree that poses more danger and instability to security. For example, how can arms control resolve the threats posed by ISC events such as: aids, civil war, insurgency, ethnonational and ethnic conflict, troubled states scenarios, scapegoat theory; or ESC events such as: international organized crimes, terrorism, mass refugee and migration flow. It is impossible to curb bad socially constructed norms such as apartheid, the Cold War mentality in a world lacking central authority by reliance on arms control. In other words, the efforts that had been devoted to achieve security by accomplishing IACO should have been concentrated on improving the condition of states’ SSE.

Whether it is defined more broadly as the optimists advocates, or understood from the conventional perspective, arms control therapy can only be palliative and ephemeral in ameliorating international insecurity because its theory neither cover nor does it address the real and primary source of threats, distrust, and instability. Neither arms nor arms control can truly resolve the source(s) and causes of threat. They cannot resolve the threat that emanate from them, in the states’ SSE. The SALT agreements point to the fact that arms control, as many security analysts conclude, (i.e. the pessimists), paradoxically, leads to arms race and chronic weapon preparation.

³⁴ Ibid. , p. 37.

The end of the Cold War can be mostly credited to President Mikhail Gorbachev's insight to solve Soviet Union's security problem from its root cause, by the revision of both its national security and ambitions priorities, rather than crediting it to the strategy of arms control. The possibility existed that Soviet officials came to the realization that the quest for security or national goals through either armament buildups or arms control was an illusion, and the Soviet Union therefore disengaged accordingly. Not only can chronic armament buildups lead to economic anemia and the fall of great powers (e.g. the USSR) as Kennedy argues, he also argues that armament acquisition might lead inevitably to war.³⁵ If arms control provokes more armament among states, as the pessimists argue, the paradox that arms control causes war, as argued by Gray, is also plausible.

In fact, by asking the developing states to be compliant with international arms control objectives, the former US Deputy Secretary of State, Eagleburger, expresses such demand: places "we in the industrialized world," in an "awkward position." By asking them "to forgo the production of weapons which we ourselves possess and which contribute to our security in a dangerous and unpredictable world," Eagleburger remarked, is illogical.³⁶ Similarly, one of India's most powerful reason for objecting to the original Nonproliferation Treaty was the fact that it 'froze in' the five nuclear haves and thereafter restricted the rights of the other sovereign states to possess such.³⁷ This is a cogent objection that supports the Marginalists argument stated earlier that arms

³⁵ Paul Kennedy, *Arms-races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 165.

³⁶ Rengger 1992, p. 46. Also, see Eagleburger cited in Richard Ullman, *Securing Europe* (London: Adamantine Press, for the Twentieth Century Fund, 1990), p. 123.

³⁷ Rengger 1992, pp. 46-47.

control, in the most part, fulfills the national security objectives of the great powers who themselves usually resist the subordination of their strategic interests to that of the international society.³⁸ Iraq's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons even as a member of the NPT demonstrates the weakness of the arms control regime³⁹ and the awareness by the developing nations of the great powers' lip service and politics about the importance of IACO while in actuality they are looking out for their own interest.

Arms control regime, at best, is only one of the tools to combat the security challenges at states' SSE, particularly at the regional and extra regional levels of security. So far, however, our analysis depicts that arms control is a poor if not the wrong tool for achieving security in an unstable SSE, especially at the domestic end of security. Unfortunately, students of arms control and their sympathizers among security analysts have been caught up in the illusion that arms control regime is the gate to international security, and, that by achieving IACO, international stability and security could be sustained. Arms control has digressed and taken away too much of our attention from both the primary source of insecurity and the principal insecurity issues in the contemporary world. In essence, it exacerbates the shortage of resources necessary to achieve security, and thereby exacerbates international insecurity. Arms control in this sense contributes tremendously to the neglect of states SSE by luring both security analysts and policymakers to be looking for security in the wrong place(s).

³⁸ Ibid. , p. 41. Rengger uses the term 'pessimists; in this article sometimes when he actually means the 'Marginalists.' According to Stuart Croft 1996, there are two groups of pessimist on the subject of arms control. First, The Essentialist totally dismiss the regime as planned both in theory and practice. The second group, the Marginalist is less fundamental in their critique. They argue that arms control regime is a Cold War institution. Thus, with the end of the cold War, arms control would be pushed to the margins of IR. Here, Rengger expresses the same concerns as the Marginalists that arms control is a tool for the great powers national security strategy.

³⁹ Thayer 1995, p. 504.

The Implication of the Relationship between the Strategic Security Environment and Extent of Weapons Acquisition for International Arms Control Objectives

In Chapter four we have established hypothesis I as substantive that: the condition of the Strategic Security Environment dictates the extent of weapons acquisition. When the condition is stable or stabilizing, as in the post-apartheid South Africa, weapons acquisition and preparation for war diminishes. When the condition of the SSE is not stable, as seen in apartheid South Africa or Israel, chronic and unrestricted weapons acquisition characterize states' behavior. Also we should remember here that the strategic interest within the strategic security environment is two fold. That is, strategic interests that are related to survival and those that are related to national motivations. The question to be tackled in this segment is: How does the association between the SSE and EWA impacts on IACO?

From the empirical investigation conducted, it is clear that, concern over unstable SSE escalates weapons acquisition. When the causes of such concerns are removed, e.g. the Cold War, and/or apartheid South Africa, states gravitates toward demilitarization, as is the case in South Africa. However, in Israel, where the sources of concern (over survival or motivational issues) are still present in its SSE, militarization doctrine, typified by extensive and unrestrained weapons acquisition persists. Clearly, unless international arms control objectives can remove the sources of states concern over their strategic security environment, it would not do much to improve international security in the long run. Any success in IACO can only enhance stability on a temporary basis. If this is the case, at best, when successfully attained, IACO can only produce a temporary and palliative therapy for international insecurity.

We shall not debate the issue of whether or not arms control is capable of dampening or discouraging security dilemmas by encouraging trust among individual states that speak the language of cooperative security, but instead, act according to the logic of competitive security.⁴⁰ Based on our empirical investigation outcome, however, we are arguing that even when IACO is achieved as intended, it would still play a minimal role, if any, towards sustaining international security on the long on.

The extent to which arms are controlled is relative to the extent to which states and regional SSEs are stabilized and rid of the causes of instability. "Controlling arms," Kegley and Wittkopf argue "is contingent on removing the fears that underlie states conflicts."⁴¹ These authors further asserts that: "Arms control does not solve the basic problem of rivalry between states, because as long as states have and can use weapons, such agreements are little more than cooperative arrangement between adversaries. They define the competition and confine the potential destruction that war brings but do not remove the source of the conflict."⁴² Kegley and Wittkopf also argue that arms are less causes of war than they are symptoms of political tension.⁴³ Even if international arms control objectives are fully achievable, they can only scratch the surface of the causes of insecurity, but they cannot remove them. As such, without addressing the causes of states insecurity at the SSE, engaging in arms control objectives is parallel to putting the cart before the horse. It cannot and would not work.

⁴⁰ Michael N. Barnett, "Regional Security After the Gulf War," *Political Science Quarterly*, 111.4 (1996-97): 607.

⁴¹ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 476.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

Arms cannot reduce international tension by itself,⁴⁴ although it might serve as a complement to actual measures for re-conditioning the SSE, and in this sense, be seen as part of regional political process. Otherwise, arms control is only one of the policy tools among many others that might be useful in the pursuit of narrow national security objectives.⁴⁵

In contemporary Western Europe, it is the attempt to resolve the main causes of insecurity at states and regional strategic security environments, collectively, typified by “a matrix of interlocking security networks,” that is responsible for the current stability in this region.⁴⁶ Western Europe’s stability does not come about simply as a result of whatever arms control endeavor that might have transpired (e.g. CFE, i.e. Conventional Forces in Europe). It is the network of regional organizations (such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) European Community (EC)) and confidence and security building measures aimed at removing the causes of threat to states’ survival and reconciling their goals that stabilize both the regional and states SSEs. This stability is also possible because the intent and purposes of states in these regions, such as borders, economic and social issues, are satisfied to a large extent. Contrarily, this is not the case in regions like the Middle East, Asia or Africa.⁴⁷ In Western Europe, arms control procedures are secondary to political steps utilized in eradicating and reforming the root causes of insecurity and conflict.

⁴⁴ Rengger 1992, p. 44.

⁴⁵ Ibid. , p. 52.

⁴⁶ Ibid. , p. 47.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

Similarly, to credit the end of the superpowers rivalry and the end of the Cold War to arms control would be both analytically and empirically erroneous. Rather, it was the Soviet disengagement in competitive security strategy, having realized that armament acquisition had not improved the condition of its strategic security environment, that brought the Cold War to an end. In fact, the condition of its SSE was deteriorating partly because it was channeling its resources and endeavor into the wrong resolution mechanism (i.e. militarization). The concept of SSE can explain the Soviet Union's disengagement and shift from competitive security towards the re-conditioning of its SSE and cooperative security.

According to Emmanuel Adler:

Arms control practice emerged from the theories of a group of mostly American intellectuals – scientists and strategists – who shared a common view as to the causes of war, the effects of technology on the arms race, and the need for cooperation among nuclear adversaries. Reaching into the places where decisions were made and into the minds of the people who made them, these intellectuals helped turn arms control ideas into a politically relevant and widely promoted national security issue, and ultimately into arms control policy. In time, the Soviets, acting in their own national interest, began negotiating with the American on the basis of this theory.⁴⁸

Arms control created a viable alternative to either nuclear superiority or total disarmament, thereby serving as a refuge for US-Soviet sour relationship. It brought about the foundation of cooperation and the superpower's progress toward avoiding nuclear confrontation. Thus, both sides, whose relationship was dictating the global political culture and the Cold War era norms, cajoled their satellite and proxy states into lining up behind them in a blind loyalty and without the consideration of whether the idea

⁴⁸ Emmanuel Adler, Ed. *The International Practice of Arms Control* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 3.

of arms control would be conducive to their long term security and national goals. This position also reflects the Marginalists argument that arms control is a Cold War institution and, inevitably, would be pushed to the margins of International Politics in this post Cold War era.

Ignoring the SSE and trying to fix the problem of insecurity by controlling arms would not only fail, it could also be counterproductive. There is no way to stop the spread of industrial-military capability, Buzan argues. "Any attempt to do so would put the goal of arms restraint into direct opposition with that of economic development."⁴⁹ The Western concerns over developing countries such as Iraq, Libya, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Brazil have much to do with their industrialization as their arms importation behavior.⁵⁰ Buzan further expresses that:

The controlled effect of the arms trade and industrialization means that military capability will spread by one mechanism or the other. Attempts to block the arms trade will intensify efforts at military industrialization, as they did in South Africa, so adding to the number of arms suppliers. The industrial genie, with its military progeny, is permanently out of the bottle. As a consequence, military security will remain an elusive objective posing difficult policy choices.⁵¹

Unless the root causes of states' insecurity are constructively dealt with at the level of the SSE, arms control (e.g. by the way of embargo and sanctions) cannot stop any state that is determined to acquire weapons from doing so. Contrarily, arms embargoes against both Israel and apartheid South Africa only pushed them further in the direction of self-sufficiency by creating their own defense industrial bases domestically.

⁴⁹ Barry Buzan, "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," *International Affairs*, 59.3 (1991): 445.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Truly, arms control might lead to some interstate agreements. But in a world where portable nuclear bomb may be available to a terrorist group, in an era where what is mixed in the bath tub at the basement can do a good job of mass killing, arms control can only serve, in large part, as a digression from dealing with the root causes of why states engage in chronic weapons acquisition behavior. Arms control is not beneficial, in the long run, to enhancing international security. To achieve true security, the endeavors that have been muscled down towards achieving international arms control objectives by both security analysts and practitioners should be refocused to stabilizing the strategic security environment of states at all the three levels of security. Arms control regime focuses only on the supply side of armaments, but neglects the demand side and the reason(s) for such demand. Thus, IACO have a hard time materializing in stopping states with acute security problem from unrestrained weapons acquisition behavior. As long as states' SSE is not particularly conducive to their survival, and sometimes for reason of incompatible national motivations (such as aggression or hegemonic ambitions), each state would continuously militarize in the attempt to 'securely feather its own nest'. In conclusion, based on the empirical investigation and conceptual juxtaposing/analysis of the concepts of SSE and arms control, hypothesis II has been substantiated. That is, whether or not international arms control objectives are accomplishable, is contingent upon the relationship between the military security environment and the extent of weapons acquisition. Consequently, it is contingent upon the condition of the strategic security environment.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Three objectives have been carried out in the course of this dissertation project. First, a post-structural theory of international environment, specifically, a strategic security environment framework has been formulated. Although multidimensional, the framework is nonetheless unified. Second, this strategic security environment (SSE) which harbors both the states' strategic interests and the causations of insecurity that threaten them has been identified as the driving factor behind states' behavior, particularly their weapons acquisition behavior, in their quest for security. Empirical analyses of weapons acquisition behavior of the state of Israel and apartheid and post-apartheid South Africa, support the existence of a correlation between the SSE and the extent of weapons acquisition (EWA).

Finally, this study has established that the relationship between the strategic security environment (SSE i.e. the key independent variable) and EWA (the key dependent variable) has a tremendous impact on the realization of the international arms control objectives (IACO). In fact, it has been demonstrated based on empirical analysis that the relationship between the SSE and EWA dictates the level of success or failure in the realization of the objectives of arms control and international security. As such, just like militarization, arms control is a military strategy and not necessarily a security mechanism.

Based on the second and third premises, this study concludes that chronic or misguided weapons acquisition endeavor, which individual states might see as the solution for insecurity, lacks positive utility from the global perspective. Not only does it results in a competitive security dilemma, but like arms control regime, it distracts security analysts and states from addressing the actual causations of insecurity. Hence, on national or

regional basis, it is critical to investigate the original or actual source of interstate distrust, identify and address the causations of insecurity.

Modeling serves as the launching pad for the methodology of the study. In the model, there are three relationships that are crucial to the understanding of the dynamics of states' behavior. That is, the relationship between the SSE (Context) and the national defence planning body (Process), how these context and perception are interpreted to determine the extent of weapons acquisition (policy Action I), and how EWA (which is relative to both the SSE and NDPP) impacts on international arms control objectives (Policy Action II). Primarily, the research focuses on the relationship between the SSE and EWA. The condition of the SSE explains individual state's attitude and approach to the issue of national security. Policy Action I is the embodiment of the level of weapons acquisition by which states tend to match military capability with threats and/or potential threats and national motivations within the SSE.

The SSE framework is conceptualized as a causal-effect analytic framework, in which case, the SSE houses both the states' strategic interests and the causes of threat that hamper them. Thus, it is the instability or lack of such (and national motives) that emanate from this environment that explains states' militarization behavior.

Although the framework focuses on the military dimension of security, yet it conceives security and insecurity as functions of various interconnected multi-causal factors that range from having endogenous to endogenous character. In this analysis, military security is categorized into three levels namely: internal or societal, regional and extraregional. This categorization enables one to pin down the causes of conflict and the policy measures that are peculiar to a specific level of analysis without exaggerating such phenomenon and to allow analytical and policy-oriented precision. All the three levels are

vital to explaining the causes of insecurity and the pertinent measures to resolving them. This allows more powerful explanatory capability, in contrast to the neorealist framework that is confined to one level of analysis. In essence, the concept of security has been broadened, vertically, by acknowledging three level of analysis, and horizontally, by organizing our experience of international outcomes as resulting from multi-causal factors as opposed to monolithic structural constraints.

Generally, a combination of qualitative analysis and elements of logical positivism approach is utilized. This approach is utilized in carrying out both the theoretical reformulation at abstract level and its application at empirical analysis.

The significance of the theoretical framework includes the following: it serves as a solution for overcoming the lack of a contemporary and multidimensional but unified theory in the field of international politics/security. Accordingly, assumptions from various analytic perspectives have been combined to attain a cumulative theory.

The significance of the research also lies in its adequacy and explanatory power in accounting for the new issues and recent changes in security affairs (e.g. the role non-state actors), to which the Cold War paradigms have been incapable of doing. As a post-structural framework, the theory recognizes non-structural causations of instability in addition to those that are structural relative to the interactive tendency of the external and domestic elements composing the SSE.

The framework offers an action focused conceptualization that shifts attention from short term and palliative measures – militarization and arms control – to a more effective means of addressing the root causes of threats and insecurity in order to achieve a more therapeutic and long term stability.

The reason being that physical safety, whether at individual, national or regional levels, cannot be taken for granted. The single most important concern in international politics and security is the security of its members in terms of physical survival. As a testimony to this claim, there is a constant and continued effort by countries to protect or engage in the pursuit of their national security. However, reducing insecurity and ensuring security are, and would always, be challenging goals. Invariably, the two most salient states' initiatives aimed at resolving true security problems are either ineffective or lead them to thorny dilemmas by yielding support in the opposite direction of that which is intended. Primarily, states seek security by the mode of militarization through chronic weapons acquisition. But counterproductively, those weapons to a large extent are putting at risk the same institutions they are designed to protect. While many scholars in security studies argue plausibly that weapons do not cause war, armament does not bring about security either. Militarization is a quick fix for attaining certain level of security that might prevent war temporarily but at maximum, its utility is limited to treating the symptom rather than the cause of insecurity and conflict. Unfortunately, today not all causations of military insecurity can be combated by the use of military force. The question then becomes: if chronic weapons acquisitions and military force does not guarantee security, what does?

Global defense spending was \$1.2 trillion in 1987, 850 billion in 1994, and about 700 billion in 1998, according to the *International Institute for Strategic Studies, and SIPRI Yearbook*.¹ Despite the considerable global spending on annual armament acquisition, reducing international insecurity remains a challenge. Clearly, a good portion

¹ The international Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 1995/96* (London: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 19; *SIPRI Yearbook 1999*, Chapter 7.

of the world resources has been devoted to militarization but unfortunately without actually addressing the source and causations of insecurity.

The realization by states that militarization, in the long run, is an additional source of insecurity to the principal one, the SSE, it was meant to cure leads to the adoption of another method of assuring security, that is, arms control. As it turns out, arms control mechanism also does not address the source and causations of insecurity, but only serves as a digression from actually combating them. The persistence of the conditions of insecurity in states' SSE guarantees that arms control itself as a measure for achieving security must fail.

Arms control only deals with the supply side of weapons without addressing the cause of arms acquisition or the proliferation that is dictated by the demand side of the equation. As such, arms control regimes would have great difficulty in stopping states with acute security problems from engaging in unrestrained armament acquisition behavior. Since one state's security and security measures make others insecure, controlling arms is and should be contingent on the removal of the causations that underlie fears and insecurity.

Johansen correctly argues that: "The militarization of world society is the most pervasive consequence of unrelenting preparation for war." Chronic weapons acquisition exacerbates adversarial relations and stimulates counter-military preparations that legitimize a militarized code of international conduct, which arms control measures have not been able to reverse². Arms control has been mistaken for what it is not. In its true

² Robert C. Johansen, "Do Preparations for War Increase or Decrease International Security?" In Charles W. Kegley Jr., Ed. *The Long Post War Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1991), p. 235; 237.

sense, arms control is an act of diplomacy rather than a branch of defense planning, or a measure for achieving and sustaining security.

International arms control objectives are at best very difficult to realize as long as states' strategic security environments, which influence the extent of weapons acquisition, are unstable and insecure. Both militarization and arms control methods which are supposedly to be solutions for insecurity have become problems by distracting our attention from the actual problems that reside in the SSE. These two methods are palliative measures and not therapies, they are superficial and not central to the core of attaining and maintaining security. The focus of state actors and especially security analysts from the leading perspective in security studies (neorealism) on militarization and arms control demonstrates the failure in focusing and addressing the causations of insecurity at the appropriate level, in the context of the strategic security environment.

The wildly held model explanation for security and security issues is that of neorealism. The main reason being that it rightly identifies the international environment in which states exist as the cause of states behavior. However, neorealists conceive the causal character of this environment principally and monolithically based on the narrow concept of anarchy. Whereas, there are other causal elements that the international environment constitute that the neorealist paradigm analytically overlooks. Also, in neorealism, security is thought of, to reflect balance-of-power among rival states thus, the assumption here is that the surest method to attain security is to maximize military capabilities unilaterally. While this might be good strategy for national security, it is not for international security in a world where increasingly, threats to security have transnational character. Neorealism is a Cold War paradigm which has proved inadequate for addressing the post Cold War new and unfamiliar set of security concerns beyond the

systemic level of analysis. Currently, the causations of insecurity do not conform to the stipulations of neorealism, particularly, since threats emanate not just from state actors but from non-state entities as well.

Neorealist main argument that the lack of a central authority is primarily responsible for state behavior is too general and evasive with regard to the actual causations of insecurity and instability. Anarchy blames the system for states behavior and vindicate states for irresponsible behavior. Neorealist explanation is therefore not adequate in understanding or resolving international security concerns in the contemporary world. Unfortunately, since the end of WWII, security studies have been limited in the most part within the theoretical framework of realism. This study has been an attempt to free the subject and concept of international security from the theoretical shackles of neorealist paradigm. While neorealist concept of anarchy is included in the idea of what constitute the strategic security environment, five other concepts from other paradigms and subparadigms provide other vitally germane explanations outside its scope. Realist predictions today might accurately depict the situation in the Middle East (e.g. Arab-Israeli relationship) or the South West Asia region (e.g. Indo-Pakistani situation), however, it is a mismatch to the current situation in Western Europe. As a result of the inadequacy of the existing neorealist concept of what constitutes the international environment, this study has reformulated it in the form of the strategic and non-strategic security environments. In addressing the military security issue the SSE has been the focus.

The evidence used for this study suggests that multicausality rather than monolithic causal factor explains the root of international insecurity. Thus, the strategic security environment is a function of (1) anarchy but also (2) historical circumstances, (3) demographic composition, (4) geopolitics, (5) national goals and ambitions, and (6) norms

and identity. Each of these six elements constitute a part of the strategic security environment. Together in a holistic sense as a causal chain, they determine states' behavior and action in international relations and security. At diametric extremes, the present world system is partially accounted for by anarchy on the one side and international institutions on the other. As this study has shown, there are other elements between these two extremes that are critical for explaining security/insecurity. Thus, as Keohane opines, there is the necessity to utilize "a multidimensional approach to world politics that incorporates several analytical frameworks or research programs." Therefore, for Keohane, as it is for this author, structural approach should be seen as a foundation for further analysis.³

In reformulating the causal framework in the field and by accommodating six cross-paradigm causal concepts in the SSE framework, the concept of security has been broadened horizontally. Equally, by going beyond the mainstream level of analysis, systemic level, and broadening the level of analysis to include both the domestic (i.e. societal level) and external (i.e. regional and extra regional levels) components, we have broadened the concept of security, vertically.

Operating from the premise that we cannot continue to use weak or inadequate theories to predict the future, and that doing so is analogous to using an old map to tracing a new road, a post-neorealist or post Cold War theory of what constitute (military) security environment is formulated prior to testing the hypothesis in the study. In operationalizing the concept of SSE and refocusing attention to addressing the source(s) and causations of insecurity, two hypotheses were tested. The first postulates that: there is a correlation

³ Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond" in Robert O. Keohane, Ed. *Neorealism and It's Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 190-197.

between the condition of the strategic security environment of a state and its extent of weapons acquisition. Specifically, we proved that: unstable or threatening strategic security environment would not enhance a state's quest for national security but instead, gravitates it towards aggressive/chronic weapons acquisition. Based on the empirical analysis conducted of the three societies: Israel, apartheid South Africa, and post apartheid South Africa, it has been established that a correlation does exist between these two variables (i.e. SSE and EWA).

A marked difference exists between the behavior of states with stable and secure SSEs and those with unstable and insecure ones. The states of Israel and apartheid South Africa aggressive weapons acquisition behavior correlates with the unstable condition of their security environments. In one of the two states, and specifically apartheid South Africa, its unstable SSE transformed into a stable or stabilizing environment from the onset of post-apartheid era. Evidence shows that South Africa's weapons acquisition and militarization activities not only diminish but this state actually engages in demilitarization. Unprecedentedly in world history, post-apartheid South Africa became the first country to voluntarily gave up its nuclear weapons in 1991. This behavior correlates with the newly transformed condition of its SSE.

On the other hand, Israel continues to embark on increasing its weapons acquisition capability, at heavy costs. The differences in their behavior are well depicted by each country's defense expenditure as the percentage of GNP. Since the SSE of Israel remains hostile and unstable, it is not surprising that it continues to engage in persistent militarization.

It is important to take note of one key argument in this study that sets it apart from the neorealist approach to achieving security. Rather than engaging in balance-of-power

which is limited to interstate activities, states balance their 'security needs and expectations' with 'military capabilities' based on the condition and assessment of the SSE. Most of the time, both Israel and apartheid South Africa were threatened not just by states, but by non-state entities as well. Had they focused only on balance-of-power strategy to ensure their security, either society would have done so at their own peril. To properly understand how states behave in their attempt to overcome insecurity, the time has come to look beyond balance-of-power behavior and focus overall on how states balance their security needs and expectations with militarization.

The second hypothesis of this study suggests that: the relationship between the strategic security environment and extent of weapons acquisition determines the outcomes of international arms control endeavor. Thereafter, it has been established that: without ameliorating or eliminating the causes of insecurity in states strategic security environment, the realization of international arms control objectives would be difficult, if not impossible. From our empirical analysis, we also found this hypothesis to be substantive. Post-apartheid South Africa denuclearized and is still demilitarizing. However, Israel continues to embark on militarization. These differing behaviors are relative to the differences in these states SSE conditions.

A study of history would reveal that 'reason' does not control human motivations and sometimes actions. Otherwise, the problem of insecurity should not have been tackled upside down for so long by seeking solutions at the wrong ends (i.e. militarization, and arms control). "Madariaga theorem" according to Barbara Tuchman stipulates that: "The source of hostility must be eliminated or mitigated before nations will give up their

weapons.”⁴ Not only has the western world not given up their own weapons, it blames the developing states for their addiction towards militarization and chastises them to give them up without even considering the condition of their strategic security environment. Whereas many of these states were founded on chaotic and unstable circumstances that warranted their militarization behavior and persist to the present. Insisting that others should do what one cannot do, that is, abiding by the stipulations of international arms control objectives, is not only selfish but irrational. Truly, if chronic and misguided weapons acquisition is dampened, tensions emanating from competitive arms buildups would diminish. However, without controlling the source or eliminating the causes of insecurity, states would not give up their weapons nor militarization endeavor.

Based on the theoretical and empirical findings, this study concludes that: a strong relationship exists between the condition of the strategic security environment and the extent of weapons acquisition. Viable long term international stability or security can be galvanized only by ameliorating or eliminating threats and insecurity at their causal roots. **To be preparing for war when peace is desired is as dangerous as to remain at peace when you should be going to war.**

World security can only be truly achieved and sustained by primarily combating and removing, as much as possible, the causations of insecurity. And then secondarily, by propagating the norm that military force should be used not to wage but to fight war; and that it is very difficult to find sustainable positive consequences flowing from chronic military preparations. As seen in the case of post-apartheid South Africa, states would

⁴ Barbara W. Tuchman, “The Alternative to Arms Control.” In Roman Kolkowicz and Neil Joeck, *Arms Control and International Security* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 140.

voluntarily cut down their defense expenditure and militarization efforts when and if their environment becomes stable or is stabilizing.

More armaments do not lead to more security because the world societies are intertwined. Contrarily, armament build up impedes economic growth and security by consuming resources and digressing the attention necessary to guarantee new and common security requirements. By engaging in chronic armament acquisition, there is no question that there is a trade off between guns and butter, that is, between military spending and economic prosperity. In many instances (e.g. North Korea), addiction to chronic weapons acquisition occurs to those states least able to afford them. Thus, the problem of military expenditure, President Eisenhower observed in 1956, "is to figure how far you should go without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without."⁵ It might be true that military spending stimulates economic growth, however, this can only be in the short run.

History and studies of the rise and fall of great powers teach us that chronic investment in military preparations usually lead to war or economic exhaustion. For example chronic and high level military spending, in conjunction with communism, was primarily responsible for the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In the recent past and for long time in world history, no other industrialized country except the United States, has spent so much for so long, a good chunk of its national wealth on militarization like the defunct Soviet Union. The lesson that we learned from the fall of this empire is that: maintaining a balance between military preparedness and economic revitalization would remain, and always pose a challenge to the great powers.

⁵ Cited in Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politic:Trend and Transformation, Sixth Edition*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1997), p. 400.

Only intense preparations for peace by addressing and alleviating the causations of insecurity would prevent war and guarantee security. Chronic military buildups not only waste resources that are needed to alleviate conditions of insecurity, but it decreases international security especially by legitimizing what Johansen labeled, a militarized code of international conduct. This, per se, perpetuates states continual preoccupation with large-scale military preparations that in turn erodes the normative constraints on the use of force as a popular method of dispute settlement. Large-scale military buildups cannot bring about peace, it is peace that has made such military buildups tolerable.

This author recommends that in the quest for national security, each state should take into consideration the security of others to avoid the stalemate inherent in security dilemma and the waste of resources that accompanies such. In this light, security analysts and practitioners should acknowledge the importance of and adoption of cooperative security as opposed to competitive security that exacerbates chronic militarization. Heavy emphasis on international security engineering, diplomatic, and political approach to addressing and removing the causes of distrust, insecurity and disputes could gradually reduce the role of military power in guaranteeing international security. Unfortunately, there is no doubt in what Kegley and Wittkopf express that: "The forces that propel the pursuit of peace and security through military might have sown the seeds of the world's destruction."⁶ While it may be daunting to attain, however, international security is virtually an important challenge for the future of human specie.

Ultimately, Kruzal elucidates, the task of realizing "true international security depends not as much on arms or arms control as on reducing as much as possible the

⁶ Kegley and Wittkopf 1997, p. 416.

sources of conflict in international relations and finding effective nonviolent means of resolving the conflicts that remain.”⁷ Similarly, if students and practitioners of international security find the central argument in this study plausible, i.e., that a correlation exists between the strategic security environment and extent of weapons acquisition, clearly it has important implications for future scholarship on security studies.

In contributing to the field of international relations and security, this research endeavors to bridge the gap between endogenous and exogenous causal dimensions in security studies. For long, bridging this gap has posed a major impediment in the quest for a single analytic framework in international relations. However, internal and external variables are critical to fully accounting for international outcomes. Also by unifying various causal-effect analytical concepts from different schools, the SSE framework serves as the basis for cross-paradigm debates that could create a culture of cumulative theory building and joint intellectual endeavor. This unification effort can succeed in bringing different perspectives close together, thereby yielding progressive knowledge in science.

The framework makes it possible to address national and international security concerns at their fundamental instead of symptomatic level. This research study marks the extension or application of theory to a new set of unconventional problems that the leading world views are unable to account for. As such, it provokes questions which scholars in security studies and policymakers are otherwise not prompted to ask in the past and help seek answers in nontraditional areas. The results from this study are supportive and suggestive that other cases warrant study utilizing strategic security environment model,

⁷ Joseph Kruzel, “Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Stability of the Post War Era.” In Kegley 1991, p.268.

for their security assessment and militarization behavior, and the implications for international security.

Finally, the empirical studies in Chapter seven have shown that not only is the SSE model generalizable, but that its applicability is useful for analyzing big or small states' behavior in their quest for security, whether or not they are threatened or engaged in misguided militarization. Every state in the system has both internal and external components that constitute their SSE, a national defence planning apparatus, and makes policy to enhance national security. Therefore, the key independent variable (SSE), the intervening variable (NDPP), and the key dependent variable (EWA) are broadly useful in explaining states' behavior on the subject matter of security, whether in domestic, regional or extra-regional contexts. The model highlights how each state's militarization or non-militarization approach to security impacts on either the failure or success of international arms control objectives (dependent variable II), which has implication on global stability. Global stability in turn is imperative for the security of the individual states. This post-structural theory has established the necessity for the general adoption of a cooperative instead of competitive approach to security. The strategic security environment framework is useful in accounting generally for traditional and non-traditional causes of instability and how states endeavor to overcome them.

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